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"The best way to understand a system (organisation) is to try to change it" ... 
 
"There is nothing so practical as a good (sound) theory" 
 
Attributed to Kurt Lewin 
(Schein, 1999; Argyris, 1997; Gold, 1992) 
 
 
 
"Psychological forces, unconscious as well as conscious, at the level of the group 
and of the individual, interact with structural forces to bring in existence a concrete 
'field' with a dynamic pattern which is specific for a given social situation ...  
The aim of action research is to understand such dynamics patterns ... [which] is 
impossible with either psychological or sociological concepts alone" 
 
"... culture [can] make comprehensive reference to the structure of social systems or 
... reach down to emotional phenomena at the deeper levels of personality" 
 
Eric Trist, 1950 
 
 
"an institution affects the personality structure of its members" leading them to 
"introject and identify with the institution" and become "like the institution in significant 
ways" such as "sharing common attitudes ... to change members one may first need 
to change the institution"  
 
Isabel Menzies Lyth, 1989 
 
 
... "a social group unintentionally generates thoughts that sustain its own existence ... 
members ... do not intend to construct a thought style that sustains the form of 
organisation: it is a collective product" 
  
... "all thinking is to some degree institutionally shaped" 
 
Mary Douglas, 1986 
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Abstract  
 
Despite repeated demonstrations of the dysfunctional effects of social defences in 
organisations, social defence theory's (SDT) problem of organisational change 
(Long, 2006) remains. Why? Can this be avoided? 
 
The research centres on a four-year coaching and consulting project within a 
multinational manufacturing company. Social defences appeared but a careful 
Tavistock action-research intervention failed. Despite Menzies’ (1960) 'sociological 
innovation' that social defences are more than psychic phenomena and get built into 
organisations, she did not explain how this happens or what to do. A review of the 
literatures and case study revealed problems with the theory and intervention. Clues 
from Trist, Emery and Jaques suggested that both sociological and psychological 
theories are needed, implying that social defences be re-examined as both causes 
and symptoms. The change literature proposes that organisational change is 
qualitatively different from individual and team change (the focus of SDT).  
 
We develop realist explanations of the causes of social defences along with 
forecasting of their consequences, while retaining Tavistock interpretive methods. 
The cultural theory (CT) of anthropologist, Mary Douglas, emerged as the preferred 
sociological resource. We reconceptualise social defences as 'informal institutions' 
carrying implicit rules, norms and 'ways of thinking' that generate consequences 
(feedback). CT posits that contending 'thought-styles' derive from Strong/Weak 
Social Regulation and Strong/Weak Social Integration (solidarity). Anxiety and social 
defences may be understood as directed against a prevailing thought-style and the 
practices it inspires: leading to either task-undermining or anxiety-circumventing 
behaviour in service of task.   
 
Together, SDT and CT improve our capacity for diagnosing and facilitating change. 
SDT recognises that social defences are forewarnings of unspecified troubles ahead, 
but does not explain or forecast what these might be. CT improves our forecasting of 
the effects of social defences. SDT assists CT in seeing anxiety and defences as 
significant evidence of cultural shifts and realigning of the organising logic of 
institutions.   
 
This thesis should appeal to leaders who prioritise 'financial' rationality; and to 
change agents concerned with reading 'emotional' warning-signs and enhancing an 
organisation's capacity to do things differently.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Social Defences: What they Do and the Key Problem with the Theory 
The dysfunctional effects of social defences against unconscious anxieties are well-
known and documented (Menzies Lyth, 1888; 1989; Obholzer and Roberts, 1994; 
Armstrong and Rustin, 2014; Gould et al., 2001; Huffington et al., 2004; Miller, 1976). 
They get incorporated into the way work is done, and at their worst: circumvent role 
and task performance, undermine organisational effectiveness, and the motivation 
and best-efforts of people (Menzies, 1960). Yet, despite its long history and repeated 
use in organisational consulting, the problem of bringing about organisational-level 
change remains a key shortcoming (Long, 2006 and Krantz, 2010). This thesis 
examines why and what can done to improve social defence theory's (SDT) 
prospects of change.  
 
 
The Research 
The research centres on a four-year coaching and consulting project with the three 
most senior levels of a medium-size, multinational, specialist manufacturing 
company. It was fortuitous rather than planned. It was initiated when social defences 
appeared during the second year, but a traditional Tavistock style action-research 
intervention (Menzies, 1960; 1990; Bain, 1998; Miller, 1995) with the senior executive 
team, which included the CEO and direct reports, did not lead to change.  
 
The major research question became why?  
 
And, given this case study: what can be done to improve SDT's prospects of 
organisational-level change?  
 
The research was a post-fact analysis of a consulting failure.  
 
 
Reviewing the Literature and the Case Study for Clues 
A review of the social defence and Tavistock consulting paradigm literatures, and 
examination of the case study, revealed problems with both the theory and 
intervention. These shaped the parameters of the research.  
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What is proposed builds upon, what will be referred to as, Isabel Menzies’ 
'sociological innovation' (1960) of Jaques’ original social defence hypothesis (1953; 
1955). For Menzies (1960; Menzies Lyth, 1989), social defences are more than 
psychological phenomena. They get incorporated into organisational systems, 
structures and work practices. However, she did not elaborate on what consultants 
could do with this knowledge, except to point it out, focus on psychological reasons 
and effects, and help individuals and teams come to grips with their effects and 
situation (1990). As a result, her sociological innovation remains under-developed. 
 
A review of the organisational change literature highlighted that organisational-level 
change is qualitatively different, and additional, to individual and team change. To 
assume that by changing individuals and teams, organisations will then change, 
ignores the influence of the context + situation on behaviour (following Lewin). In 
organisations, this includes an organisation’s strategy, culture, and leadership 
practices on members’ thought and behaviour (Burke and Litwin, 1992; Burke, 2011); 
the interaction of the formal and informal organisation and institutions (Goldsmith and 
Katzenbach, 2007; Soda and Zaheer, 2012; Scott, 2008). It also includes how 
changes in the external environment (Emery and Trist, 1965) frequently necessitate 
internal organisational changes.  
 
Menzies (1960; Menzies Lyth, 1988; 1989; 1990; 1997) was most likely aware of this 
distinction. But, as a consultant, she was frequently not in a position to address the 
organisational contributors of social defences. It was not part of her consulting brief.  
But her writing reveals her preference to help the individuals involved come to grips 
with their effects and situation (Pecotic, 2002). Her seminal paper (1960) is devoted 
to the psychological reasons and effects on individuals, rather than (also) the social 
causes and consequences of social defences in organisations. 
 
 
Problems with the Theory 
The work of Trist, Emery and Jaques, who were all either founding or early members 
of the Tavistock Institute, and key contributors to its theory and methods, provided 
the clues that led us to develop Menzies' sociological innovation to SDT.  
 
From the mid-fifties, their work, in different ways, took an increasingly sociological 
turn. In a very early paper, Trist (1950, in Trist and Murray, 1990) wrote that both 
sociological and psychological theories were needed to understand the real-life 
  
18 
complexity of action-research consulting projects, and hence SDT. With Emery 
(Emery and Trist, 1965), they found that in many of their projects, the external 
organisational environment was having a stronger effect than the organisation's own 
efforts. They focused on understanding what organisations could do about it. With 
this, their consulting increasingly placed psychological insight in the background, 
rather than foreground of interventions. They found that psychoanalytic methods and 
group dynamic interventions, alone, could not help organisations make the "paradigm 
shift" that is frequently required for change (Trist et al., 1963: in Trist and Murray, 
1990; Emery, 1997).  
 
If we examine Jaques' reasoning for abandoning his social defence hypothesis 
(Jaques, 1995; 1998b; Papadopoulos, 2010), what he did was to see social defences 
as symptoms of organisational causes, and not the other way around as Menzies, 
and much the literature does. From the mid-fifties, his work focused on improving the 
internal design of organisations (1998a) that built upon one of his foundational texts 
for the Tavistock (1951).1  
 
 
Cultural Theory to Develop the Sociological Dimensions of Social Defences 
With these clues in hand, the cultural theory (CT) of anthropologist, Mary Douglas, 
emerged as the major resource through which to build upon Menzies’ sociological 
innovation. CT was developed after Trist, Emery and Jaques, and was probably 
unknown to them, even though, it is argued, it shares many of their later premises. 
To our knowledge, using SDT and CT together has not been done previously.  
 
CT, also referred to as grid-group theory (GGCT) is an institutional theory of culture 
(Douglas, 1986; 6 and Mars, 2008). It infers that cultural 'ways of thinking' are 
derived from underlying social principles. These are the degree to which individuals 
are regulated (grid) and integrated (group). Douglas (1970) cross-tabulated what she 
                                                          
1
 Papadopoulos (2010) has argued that Jaques' latter work is built on psychoanalytic foundations. This is despite 
Jaques' belligerence in abandoning SDT and psychoanalytic theory, saying its use in organisations was 
dysfunctional (1995). If we look at what he did, not what he said, and follow the evolution of his "middle 
working-through phase", he emphasised that individuals at work need to use their initiative-discretion and feel 
they belong. He increasingly placed the creation of trust as the measure to assess organisations, and how a 
leader’s values and beliefs about why people work, and whether they could be trusted, get built into 
organisational systems, structures and practices: a play on Menzies’ sociological innovation. Like Trist and Emery, 
he used psychoanalytic insight in the background and data-gathering or diagnostic phases, but not during 
intervention. Trust, values and leaders' assumptions, along with initiative and belonging, is applied 
psychoanalysis. He never abandoned his psychoanalytic training, and kept up a practice alongside his consulting 
and research until he moved to the US in the 1980s. Psychoanalysis was ingrained in the man and how he 
approached and understood the world.      
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called the grid-group dimensions, derived from Durkheim, to reveal four distinct ways 
of organising social relations based on underlying values, principles and beliefs. 
These are CT's elementary forms of social organisation. Social environments, of any 
shape or size, and individuals' preferences (Douglas, 1982) are organised according 
to one or a mix of the elementary forms which generate distinctive ways of thinking 
and behaving, referred to as "thought-style" (Douglas, 1986).  
 
Like SDT, CT developed through field work, not consulting, but anthropological work. 
Like SDT, it too has been applied to the study of organisations. It will be argued that 
their cross-fertilisation can improve the range and capacity of both theories, 
especially diagnosing organisations for change.  
 
 
Problems with the Method 
Findings from the research revealed a difficulty with SDT and the Tavistock 
paradigm's methods of investigation and intervention, especially in business 
environments.2 Part of the reason the social defence intervention failed was because 
the very idea of social defences was not taken seriously by the senior team. It did not 
appeal to their business rationality or 'way of thinking’. In addition, it could not 
indicate what the social defences would go on to cause if not attended to.  
 
Tavistock methodology draws on an interpretive meaning-making approach (Long, 
2013). During the intervention phase, despite its action-research-as-intervention 
approach, its interpretations are intentionally non-directly-interventionist, more in 
keeping with consulting room psychoanalysis (Lawrence, 2006; 2000; Bain, 1999).  
 
In order to appeal to the senior team's rationality, and to provide an explanation, a 
realist causal approach3 was integrated with interpretive methods. This emerged 
                                                          
2
 Unlike the early work of the Tavistock Institute, SDT was developed during consultations with public sector 
human services organisations and professionals, and this is where it has mostly been applied (Obholzer and 
Roberts, 1994). It will be argued that human services professions are mostly open to, and benefit from, 
psychological insight and interventions focusing on people and culture. It matches their own work with clients 
and rationality. With most senior business executives, their rationality and roles lean them towards economics 
and finances (Beer, 2008). It takes something more tangible to engage their interest when offering psychological 
insight as diagnosis or intervention.   
3
 Rustin (1991: 126-128) was an early advocate for realist methods that he suggested account for psychoanalysis, 
and by implication, SDT and consulting, better than either positivist or hermeneutic approaches. He argued that 
realist causal or "generative structures, known by inference from their effects, but more than the sum of 
observations" characterise psychoanalytic theoretical conceptions such as "internal worlds and states of internal 
relations as formations constraining and shaping everyday experience”. What psychoanalysts and consultants do 
is add value to the meaning of behaviour, and how such meaning can function as a cause.  
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from, and ultimately required, the post-fact research of the coaching-consulting 
project, which allowed it to go backwards and forwards over the data, to determine 
the key features of the case that needed to be explained, and why the social 
defences appeared and the intervention failed.4 Providing a clear explanation of the 
causes and consequences of the social defences might better appeal to the senior 
team's rationality.5   
 
The post-fact analysis of the consulting revealed three key features of the case that 
needed explanation, individually and together. The social defences, the second key 
feature, were preceded (six-to-nine months) by the introduction of several policies 
that were introduced to curb the fall-out from the GFC (Global Financial Crisis).6 
These post-GFC policies were the first key feature. The organisational impact of the 
post-GFC policies emerged as the most likely causes of the social defences. It took 
another six-to-nine months after the social defences for real organisational problems 
to emerge. These problems were the third key feature.    
 
The appearance of the social defences clearly forewarned of real organisational 
troubles that eventuated. But this was only evident after the event. Nevertheless, for 
purposes of organisational diagnosis, this was significant. CT could explain their 
effects but only, well and truly, after the event. It demonstrates the value of Tavistock 
consulting investigation that examines the collective emotional experience in 
organisations (Armstrong, 2005). But this was not enough. While the intervention 
could go back over the consulting data and adequately hypothesise what triggered 
the social defences (which did spark the interest of senior team members), it could 
not determine what the social defences will go on and cause once they were 
established and operating.   
                                                          
4
 The fact that the consulting methodology drew on the Tavistock methods (Long, 2013; Newton et al., 2006; 
Bain, 1999; Wells, 1995; Menzies Lyth, 1990) allowed its findings to be compared or applied to existing cases in 
the social defence literature. 
5
 The interpretive action-research intervention provided an interpretation of the meaning of social defences, in 
the form of a working hypothesis (Miller, 1995) that was presented to facilitate further analysis by the senior 
team. Tavistock interpretations intentionally put the ball in the client's court, leaving it to them to decide. 
Instead, an explanation can guide potential intervention, and still be integrated with the facilitation of further 
analysis for the client to decide what to do. An explanation signals to take it seriously and that something needs 
to be done. 
6
 With the GFC, sales stopped and would take two years to get near to pre-GFC levels. Fortuitously for the 
consulting and ultimately for the research, the coaching was expanded. It started six months before the GFC with 
the coaching of the 15 most senior members of manufacturing. After the GFC, it was expanded to include the ten 
most senior members of Sales, and later all of the top three levels of Sales. By the time the social defences 
appeared, the coaching was expanded to all other departments. In all, over the four-year period of consulting-
and-research, over 50 of the senior most people had coaching. Tavistock methods mostly informed how the 
coaching was conducted.  
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The failure of the intervention necessitated asking: when should social defences be 
seen as causes of organisational outcomes, and when should they be approached as 
symptoms? It will be argued that when social defences first appear, they are better 
approached as symptoms of social causes that need to be explained. Only when 
they are consolidated, and start to take on their own social shape and character, can 
they be seen as generating their own causal effects back onto individuals and the 
organisation. The implication is that intervention should focus on identifying both the 
causes, and forecasting the likely consequences, of social defences. SDT which 
draws heavily on Bion's (1961) psychoanalytic group theory, as its implicit causal 
theory, could not provide this. Reconceptualising social defences as being 
(sociologically) driven by one or a mix of CT's elementary forms could.  
 
While it was the impact of the post-GFC policies that emerged as the most likely 
social causes of the social defences, with regard to forecasting the consequences - 
the later organisational problems - the social defences clearly contributed to this, but 
on their own were not enough to account for what caused the problems. More 
satisfying was the interaction of the post-GFC policies together with the social 
defences that generated the conditions leading to problems.  
 
This necessitated a more sociological analysis of both the social defences and the 
case as it unfolded, to be carried out alongside a psychological one. 
 
 
The Major Research Finding 
Providing an explanation of how the post-GFC policies, in tandem with the social 
defences, caused the organisational problems, led, with the help of CT, to the key 
finding of the research.  
 
This involved reconceptualising social defences as informal institutions, and not just 
psychic constellations. They operate not only according to psychological group 
dynamics, but with regulative, normative, and culturally-cognitive institutional 
qualities. As institutions, social defences, in turn, generate feedback processes back 
onto individuals and the organisation. Both the post-GFC policies and the social 
defences were conceptualised as institutions generating a thought-style, or ways-of-
thinking-and-doing, which could explain their conflicting effects when operating in 
tandem.  
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From a CT perspective, anxiety and defence can also be seen as appeals to different 
values, and ways of thinking and organising, reflecting a change or realignment of 
the underlying elementary forms driving the group or department in which they 
appear.  
Seen this way, we can more readily assess what the social defences are reacting to 
in the organisation, in terms of the relevant elementary forms-rationalities operating 
in different organisational parts or policies. And what, in turn, they would likely target, 
and therefore effect, in either a task-undermining or anxiety-circumventing-in-service-
of-task fashion. This depends on whether the elementary forms or mix in the social 
defences and their target(s) are complementary and reinforcing each other’s 
operation, or competing and undermining.  
 
With this we can:  
 Forecast what social defences will likely do 
 Explain why some social defences are more dysfunctional versus benign and 
accommodating to organisational performance and task  
 Explain how change occurs, and not just why it is resisted. 
 
 
The Research Questions 
The value of SDT and Tavistock methodology to the case study was to identify social 
defences as the first sign, or early warning, of impending problems. But what they 
could not do was adequately explain or forecast the consequences of social 
defences. The value of CT was to offer a better explanation of: the social nature, 
operation and consequence-generating effects of the social defences; what in the 
organisation they were a likely reaction to; and how social defences interacted with 
the post-GFC policies to bring about the largely unintentional and unanticipated 
outcomes that were observed. This could have improved forecasting capacity of the 
social defence intervention.  
 
Together, SDT and CT contribute more to organisational diagnosis and change, than 
either can alone.  
 
CT offers a viable sociological account of how social defences operate, and an 
alternative social lens through which to view behaviour and group dynamics. Cultural 
theory provides the second and supplementary research questions. How can CT 
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contribute to the sociological dimensions of SDT? And, in what ways can CT work 
alongside SDT to contribute to organisational diagnosis and change? 
 
To do this, required bringing CT and SDT into conversation, and to cross-fertilise 
them which can improve the range and capacity of SDT and CT, individually and 
together. This gave shape to the third and supplementary research questions. What 
is the value, relative contribution, and relationship between social and psychological 
forces in the diagnosis and change of organisations? See Table 1.1 below.  
 
To help answer this question, three analytical-models7 from sociology and across the 
social sciences that were relevant to, underlay or were used by CT and SDT, were 
employed to improve their communication and to examine the strengths, weaknesses 
and claims of SDT and CT in the light of the research case study. These were: 
 The agency-structure interplay, with structure seen as institutions  
 Institutional theory and models, including distinguishing between the formal 
and informal organisation and institutions  
 Systems theory, including feedback loops and the concept of 'self-
organisation’.  
 
These models are explained in chapter two (literature review), and how they were 
used in the research is taken up in chapter three (methodology). The results of 
attempting to improve the communication and cross-fertilisation of SDT and CT is 
taken up in chapter six (from theories to practice). Table 1.1 below sets out the 
research questions. 
                                                          
7
 It helps to differentiate between paradigms, theoretical frameworks and analytic models. A paradigm brings 
together a number of theoretical frameworks and analytic models which reflects a shared commitment and 
standards for what counts as relevant data in answering research questions that are deemed important (6 and 
Bellamy, 2012: 32 [quoting Kuhn, 1970]). Paradigms can provide more than one explanation for particular events, 
trends or patterns. They tell us “how descriptions, explanations and interpretations should be developed” (2012: 
33). Psychoanalysis, which is made up of a number of theories and models, and the Tavistock paradigm, are 
paradigms, whereas Social Defence theory is one theoretical framework within both paradigms. Theories provide 
“candidate explanations of particular events, temporary state of affairs, trends, regularities or conditions” from 
which hypotheses can be deduced (2012: 33). Both, social defence theory and cultural theory, can be seen as 
theoretical or conceptual frameworks leaning towards being paradigmatic because they tell us how to look at 
and investigate a problem and “substantive” theories that provide descriptions, explanations or interpretations 
as “end-products” (Mouzelis, 2008: 221). Analytic models are best seen as “tools” or resources that are assessed, 
not so much on their “truth-value”, but their “heuristic utility” (2008: 221-2). The three analytic models were 
used in the research as tools to investigate the strengths, weaknesses and claims of both cultural theory and 
social defence theory and to help utilise them for the purpose of real-time organisational analysis or diagnosis.   
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Table 1.1 Major and Supplementary Research Questions 
Major and Supplementary Research Questions 
 
1.A Why did the social defence intervention fail?   
 
1.B What can be learnt from this case study and done to improve SDT's 
prospects of organisational-level change?  
 
 
2.A How can CT contribute to the sociological dimensions of SDT? 
 
2.B In what ways can CT work alongside SDT to contribute to organisational 
diagnosis and change? 
 
 
3. What is the value, relative contribution, and relationship between social and 
psychological forces in the diagnosis and change of organisations? 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
Overview 
The research was initiated when social defences appeared during a coaching-
consulting project the author was working on. When a Tavistock-style, action-
research intervention with the organisation's senior executive team failed to initiate 
change, nor a desire to understand or repair their potential organisational effects, we 
began to ask why?   
 
As an experienced practitioner trained in the Tavistock method, our primary literature 
has always drawn upon the Tavistock systems-psychodynamic or socio-analytic 
theory, so practical failures call attention to this literature in particular.8 A review of 
the social defence literature was firstly undertaken to explore why. This revealed two 
clues:  
 Social defence theory (SDT), utilising Tavistock-style intervention, has a 
recognised problem of bringing about organisational-level change (Long, 
2006; Krantz, 2010; Menzies Lyth, 1990).  
 Despite, what can be called, Menzies’ (1960) sociological innovation to SDT - 
that social defences are more than psychological phenomena, but get built 
into organisational systems, structures and work practices (p. 101) - little 
further work by her, or her followers, has been done to explore how, why, or 
to examine this sociological dimension to SDT or its potential to improve  
prospects of organisational change.  
 
A review of the literature on organisation change revealed how organisational-level 
change is qualitatively different to change directed at teams and individuals. The 
latter, however, is what much of the intervention-focus in the social defence literature 
is on. Recent theorising within the SDT and wider Tavistock systems-psychodynamic 
literature has suggested some possible reasons why this may be so. These point to: 
why change may be resisted by individuals and organisations; and difficulties 
associated with only using the concept of primary task as the social referent for 
identifying social defences. Neither, however, are satisfactorily addressed.  
 
A wider review of the Tavistock paradigm pointed to the work of Trist, Emery and 
Jaques, all founding or early members of the Tavistock Institute and key contributors 
                                                          
8
 Arguably, the Tavistock paradigm draws heavily on variations of social defence theory (SDT), with both resting 
on Bion's (1961) psychoanalytic group theory.  
  
26 
to its theory and intervention-methods. Their work from the mid-1950s took an 
increasingly sociological turn. They did not so much abandon psychological insight, 
but used it more in the background of intervention. They provided important clues 
about SDT's problem of change and how organisation-wide SDT-based interventions 
may be adapted to improve the prospects of change. They recognised that both 
social and psychological concepts are relevant to organisational consulting and 
change.  
 
We began with exploring the sociological focus within Freud's concepts of anxiety 
and identification, and the psychological focus within Durkheim's definitions of social 
facts and anomie. Both clearly used concepts that apply to inter- and intra-personal 
phenomena. The sociological and anthropological literatures were consulted to find 
theories and models that may assist SDT and its problem of change. This revealed 
the promising contribution of anthropologist, Mary Douglas' cultural theory (CT), also 
known as grid-group cultural theory (GGCT). Like SDT, CT has evolved through field-
work, with both being applied to organisations.  
 
The purpose of this literature review is to examine SDT, its 'problem of change’, and 
the contribution that CT could make to SDT and to more effective consultancies.  
 
 
2.1 SDT and the Problem of Organisational-Level Change 
 
Menzies’ Sociological Innovation and its Under-Development 
The social defence hypothesis was initially proposed by Jaques (1953), writing “all 
institutions are used by their members as mechanisms of defence against primitive 
anxiety” (1955: 496) which cohesively binds “individuals into institutionalised 
association” (1953: 420-21). He drew on Freud's (1921) psychological identification 
that occurs in groups, and Klein's notion of primitive anxiety (Jaques,1955). He 
emphasised organisational members' social needs for belonging, how they use 
organisations to give shape and meaning to their lives and to defend against 
infantile-psychological anxiety.  
 
Menzies (1960: 101) instead, recognised that social defences have a social quality; a 
life independent of the people involved. Defences inhabit organisational systems, 
structures and work-practices. For her, social defences are more than a duplicate of 
individuals’ psychological dynamics: they are “an aspect of external reality that old 
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and new members must come to terms” (Menzies, 1960: 101; Menzies Lyth, 1989: 
26-44).  
 
However, she went no further in developing her sociological innovation. She omits to 
explain:   
 How social defences operate socially  
 Why they form in some organisations but not others 
 What effects social defences, when unchecked, will have.  
 
She frequently experienced resistance from the organisation when naming social 
defences (Menzies Lyth, 1988),9 but did not satisfactorily elaborate why or what do 
about it. What she did, in response, was develop interventions to assist individuals 
and teams come to grips with their situation, by emphasising the psychological 
dimensions of the theory (1960; 1989) rather than to help organisations change. 
 
One of our concerns was to extend her sociological suggestion to improve SDT's 
prospects of facilitating organisational-level change.  
 
 
The Psychological-Sociological Tension  
The tension in Menzies' theorising lies between social and psychological 
explanations. This has important implications for SDT's translation into practice.  
 
She recognises that social defences have social origins and become institutionalised 
- they get built into organisational systems, structures and work practices (Menzies, 
1960: 101). But for her, individuals' social and psychological needs trump an 
organisation's task and technologies in determining organisational outcomes. She 
saw task and the available technologies as "limiting factors ... "The structure, culture 
and mode of functioning are determined by the psychological needs of members" 
(1960: 101, emphasis added). Her view did not change.  
 
In addition to Bion's influence, where she emphasises how primitive anxieties are 
never far away and threaten to disrupt work (Pecotic, 2002), she was also fond of 
quoting psychoanalyst Fenichel (Krantz, 2010). For Fenichel, "social institutions arise 
through the efforts of human beings to satisfy their needs, but then become external 
                                                          
9
 This was something her mentor, Trist, had warned her about when she first proposed her theory: that an overly 
psychological interpretation may evoke resistance (Armstrong, 2012). 
  
28 
realities comparatively independent of individuals that ... affect the structure of the 
individual" (Fenichel quoted in Menzies Lyth, 1989: 26; 1960: 115).  
 
Fenichel's statement can be read as justifying either psychology or sociology in SDT 
and within the Tavistock paradigm. Menzies suggests that "an institution affects the 
personality structure of its members" leading them to "introject and identify with the 
institution" and become "like the institution in significant ways" such as in "sharing 
common attitudes”. In a sociologically sanguine moment, she even suggests that "to 
change members one may first need to change the institution" (Menzies Lyth, 1989: 
26; 41-42), but went no further.  
 
Both psychology and sociology feature in her thinking, but she relies on psychology 
much more heavily in explaining organisational outcomes.   
 
 
SDT and the Problem of Organisation-Level Change 
Menzies’ long descriptions of nurses' defences are very psychological (1960: 97-98; 
101-108). She applies psychoanalytic theory in organisational settings, aiming 
interventions at individuals and teams. These involve helping them to understand, 
and come to grips with their situation; discovering the organisational defences 
against anxiety, and how they contribute to, and are caught up in, them (1990).  
 
She recognised the 'problem of change’, but her explanation remained psychological, 
suggesting that "institutions have a natural tendency to become bad models for 
identification”. The "reasons" include the "basic difficulties human beings have in co-
operating effectively together, the anxieties these arouse, and the defences against 
these anxieties”. These are "likely to be powerful and primitive" with "illness ... linked 
with excessive use of defences" (1989: 42).  
 
This naturalistic, and somewhat fatalistic, rationalisation of SDT's practical change 
failings is often given (Long, 2006; Krantz, 2010; Bain, 1998; Menzies Lyth, 1990). 
The claim is that:  
 SDT explains why change is resisted (Long, 2006; Krantz, 2010) 
 All organisations have social defences ranging from the benign to the 
destructive (Menzies Lyth, 1989)   
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 Organisations may be caught up in a wider arena of "systems domain 
defences" whereby organisations with a similar primary task such as 
hospitals, schools, human services organisations, or manufacturing, 
technological or financial services organisations, are subject to similar roles, 
structures, procedures, professional training, culture. Similar primary tasks 
make similar organisations vulnerable to similar social defences. Insofar as 
the primary task cannot be changed then social defences may be out of the 
control of single organisations (Bain, 1998).  
 
What this naturalistic explanation fails to do is explain how or why change comes 
about at all. Nor why some organisations do not develop social defences, even if they 
share similar primary tasks, while others do.  
 
Treating the 'problem of change' as a naturalistic given for all human subjects 
everywhere does not qualify as an explanation for change or stasis, either in this 
case study or elsewhere. The fact that the 'problem of change' is sometimes present 
and sometimes absent is suggestive of specific cultural contributors which show 
strong place- and time-variations. Indeed, the all-humans-everywhere quasi 
explanation is defeatist. It does not address nor attempt to facilitate whole-scale 
"paradigm shifts" that are vital to organisational survival (Trist et al., 1963; 1990). 
Emery and Trist (1965; 1973) re-confirmed that the occurrence or otherwise of 
paradigm-shifts cannot be explained nor facilitated through psychoanalytic theory 
alone (Palmer, 2002).  
 
Nevertheless, Menzies’ statement about how institutional membership affects 
personality structure, leading members to become like the institution, offers an 
opening to the sociology-anthropology of cultural theory. Douglas' CT focuses on 
"how institutions think" (1986). Institutions, defined as conventions, mean that 
individuals operating within them will share common ways of thinking and therefore 
behave similarly. Institutions constrain members to follow their implicit rules and 
norms, even if this means acting against their individual wills, preferences and 
conscience (Douglas, 1986; 1982). 
 
Douglas and her colleagues describe how any of four possible ways of thinking will 
themselves trigger antagonistic reasoning. These antagonisms can happen 
organisation-wide, within and between departments, teams or working practices, but 
also within individuals' consciences. We judge that Douglas (1982) is more 
  
30 
successful than Menzies in allowing for institutional constraints, social animation-
causation and individual agency, insofar as, up to four 'thought-styles' contend with 
each other within individuals as much as they do in institutions. With this, CT in spite 
of its sociological focus of explanation easily accommodates individuals and their 
agency.   
 
The 'problem of change' sits on a disciplinary divide between Isabel Menzies and 
Mary Douglas. We are persuaded that both approaches could contribute towards 
understanding our case study, together improve the practice of organisational 
analysis-diagnosis for change, and in doing so, CT and SDT might contribute to each 
other’s development.  
 
Indeed, Trist wrote a paper as early as 1950 (Trist, 1990), "Culture as a Psycho-
Social Process", where he specifies how psychological and sociological theories are 
required for an understanding of the many complex situations that arise in action-
research consulting projects.10 Though unaware of CT which came much later, Trist 
provides some validation for our intuition that SDT and CT together improve the 
quality of organisational analysis-diagnosis and hence the prospects of 
organisational-level change. 
 
 
Primary Task as Social Referent: the Influence of Bion's Group Theory 
Like Bion (1961) and Rice's elaboration (1958), Menzies treats the group's or 
organisation's primary task11 as the social referent, against which anxiety is an 
inferred response. A primary task is regarded as organisation-wide, but it can be 
departmental, team or role-specific. It can be daunting at whatever scale. For 
Menzies, defences develop in response to anxieties generated in primary task 
performance. Because a primary task essentially involves more than one individual, 
these defences are shared and social.  
 
                                                          
10
 The role of sociology in relation to psychoanalysis partly underlay the later split that occurred at the Tavistock 
Institute in the early 1960s between the leadership of Trist and Rice. Rice wanted a stronger psychoanalytic focus 
and links with the Tavistock Clinic, which Menzies supported, even though her mentor, Trist, wanted the role of 
sociology and the influence of social and environment forces on psychology to be part of the Institute's focus 
(Fraher, 2004; Armstrong, 2012). 
11
 What an organisation must do in order to survive (Rice, 1958).  
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SDT theory, can be seen as a variation on Bion's (1961) "basic assumption" (BA) 
group defence patterns,12 and Menzies acknowledges Bion's influence on her work 
(1989, 1990; Pecotic, 2002). Her preference for Bion's group theory over Freud's 
(1921) is what differentiates her from Jaques.  
 
Bion's innovation was to shift the focus of psychoanalytic attention from the patient-
analyst pair - Freud's focus - to that of the group-as-a-whole (Miller, 1998). This 
made social phenomena and, by extension, "society ... an intelligible field of study"  
from a psychoanalytic perspective (Khaleelee and Miller, 1985). The group, social 
institutions and wider system are now the focus.  
 
Bion's work admits the sociology inherent in social defences as psychic defence 
constellations, or Basic Assumption behaviour (1961), that get built into the way work 
is done in organisations (Menzies, 1960). However, this is a bottom-up way of 
building sociology out of psychology. A more directly sociological alternative would 
be to treat social defences as informal institutions driven by one of CT's elementary 
forms, (thought-styles). In CT, the fate of these institutions can then be explained by 
the 'positive' and 'negative' feedback loops they generate. A thought-style can 
become entrenched  by 'positive' feedback confirmation of its worst fears. But it can 
be dislodged by 'negative' feedback surprises which confound its expectations (see 
below).   
 
Given Bion's stature, we must preface a CT reconceptualisation of SDT next to 
Bion's own work, and those who developed it.   
 
For Bion, a group will be operating in one of two modes: either working on the task, 
for which it was created; or it is defending itself against the psychological demands 
and pressures that performing the task elicits. Bion's "Work Group" (WG), draws on 
Freud's sophisticated and rational secondary (thinking) processes during task 
performance, whereas his "Basic Assumption Group" (BA) is caught up in Freud's 
'primary process' (thinking) which is oriented to pleasure-seeking, and pain-avoiding 
behaviour.  
 
These theories developed originally during Bion's involvement during the WWII 
'Northfield Experiments' and the War Office Selection Board's 'Leaderless Groups' 
                                                          
12
 Like many theories to emerge from the Tavistock paradigm, Bion's influence is seminal. Arguably, the paradigm 
rests on this one theory. It is the means through which psychology and sociology are linked.  
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project (Bion, 1946; Pines, 1985; Trist, 1985; Armstrong, 2012; Henderson, 2015), 
and were further elaborated in the experimental groups at the Tavistock that Bion 
conducted in the late forties and fifties.13 Bion identified three types of BA defensive 
patterns:  
 dependency (members identify a messiah within their ranks to nurture and 
give them direction)  
 fight-flight (members select a resistance-leader to inspire battle, or lead them 
away from danger)  
 pairing (members attempt to break up a fight-flight culture through pairing up 
but these relations are ineffective in furthering or sustaining these relations or 
the group's work: pairs do not pay-attention to others and are easily broken).14  
 
In Menzies’ study of nurses (1960), the main defensive manoeuvres she observed 
could be labelled as BA Dependency and BA Flight.15 Nurses blindly followed orders, 
                                                          
13
 This work culminated in a collection of papers he produced during the late forties and fifties and published 
collectively in Bion (1961). 
14
 In his development of BAs, Bion drew on Melanie Klein's interplay of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive 
positions. He conceptualised BAs as part-object relations communicated through projective identification and 
based on mechanisms in earliest infancy (1961; Trist, 1985).  
15
 Although in 1960, Menzies did not describe social defences in basic assumptions terms, she did use Bion’s 
group ideas in her later papers (1988) and acknowledged his profound influence on her work (1989; Pecotic, 
2002). Her only reference to Bion in 1960 was alongside Jaques who both echo that “difficulties in achieving 
social change” relate to the “difficulty in tolerating the anxieties” which Menzies suggests are released when 
social defences are re-structured (1960:118). At the time, she drew on Freud’s and Klein’s ideas that placed “a 
central emphasis on anxiety and defences in personality development and ego-functioning” (p.118). This, we 
believe, reflects her intervention bias to help individuals tolerate anxiety even though she also stresses that it is 
the techniques that social institutions use to contain anxiety which contribute to their success and viability 
(p.118). The latter indicates that a parallel institutional change intervention may also be necessary but which she 
does not develop this.  
Arguably and consist with this thesis, the implicit sociology in both Bion and Menzies – for example, Bion’s 
(1961:29-137) earlier group work that basic assumptions come to operate independently of the individuals who 
contributed to them, in turn influencing their behaviour; and Menzies’ parallel recognition that social defences 
operate in a similar vein (1960: 101) – neither she nor Bion go on to adequately develop.  
This may be because Bion’s basic assumption ideas – especially when he moved away from his study of groups 
under Klein’s influence (Sutherland, 1985) to focus on individual psychoanalysis – were later developed in the 
context of group relations practice rather than organisational studies. This likely led the field away from 
conceptualising social defences sociologically as institutions. According to Trist (1985), Miller (1998) and 
Hinshelwood (2003), Bion’s (1961) papers 1 to 7 (written between 1948 and 1952 and progressively published in 
the Human Relations Journal) were distinct from his later “recasting” of his theory along Kleinian lines which they 
all suggest is “reductionist”. For example, in his final chapter ‘Review: Group Dynamics’ of which three versions 
were written in 1953, 1955 and 1961 (Sanfuentes, 2003), Bion (1961) states that “in groups the adult resorts [to] 
massive regression … typical of the earliest phases of mental life … that are characteristic of the paranoid-
schizoid position (p.147 and 162). For Trist (1985), Bion’s approach and interventions during his WWII projects 
and his multiple projects at the Tavistock in the late 1940s – in particular those associated with facilitating the 
splitting of the Tavistock Institute from the Clinic – showed a profound understanding of organisational change 
dynamics that were “at least ten years ahead” of “Organisational Development and Planned Changed literature” 
(1985: 36-37). They clearly reflected the earlier Bion, more under the influence of his first analyst, Rickman, 
rather than Klein, where he drew on psychoanalytic ideas to make social contributions to psychiatry (Sutherland, 
1985).  
Similarly, and not without irony, when the Tavistock Institute split in the early 1960s, it was Menzies who cast the 
crucial vote which committed the Institute at that time to a more ‘psychoanalytic’ (represented by Rice and 
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mindless medical procedures and schedules, that were not in the best interests of 
patients (and compromising the hospital's implicit primary task - to care for patients). 
They did so in order to protect themselves against the primitive psychological 
defences evoked in looking after sick, elderly, or dying patients.  
 
Turquet (1974) proposed a fourth basic assumption, BA Oneness (members 
surrender themselves to passive participation with a powerful omnipotent union of 
group wholeness that echoes neonatal-unity). Lawrence, Bain and Gould (1996) 
suggested a fifth, BA Me (where members turn to their narcissistic inner-reality, 
relying on themselves as individuals, by denying the existence of a group. These 
side-step disturbing external realities which group membership brings).  
 
One of the problems, not so much with Bion's theory, but the way it is interpreted and 
applied, is an overemphasis on BA defences and psychological disruptions to the 
exclusion of how a sophisticated work group could be helped to form (Armstrong, 
2012; Henderson, 2015).16 
 
What is missing altogether is the values, beliefs and (socio-political) ideologies that 
individuals draw on when taking up roles, relationships and work, justifying their 
claims, and defending their conflicts, coalitions and splits. Instead, such sociological 
phenomena are reduced to psychological competitiveness (sibling rivalry), and 
individuals' needs for autonomy, control and recognition.  
 
As we will see in Chapters Four and Five, we tried applying both BA 'defensive 
patterns' and CT's 'elementary forms' (thought-styles) to our evidence. Although this 
was an exercise in 'backward prediction', in all cases, CT was more persuasive in 
identifying the causes and forecasting the consequences of social defences.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
group relations) rather than an interdisciplinary ‘social’ approach (represented by Trist – Menzies’ earlier mentor) 
to organisational analysis and change projects (Armstrong, 2012; Fraher, 2004). These two measures shaped SDT 
– and those who applied it – to focus more on individual and team change, helping the individuals involved deal 
with anxiety, rather than focus on organisational interventions that look for the cause and consequences of social 
defences to the organisation. 
16
 This is particularly prominent in Group Relations Conferences: the Tavistock Institute's premier training events 
that have been conducted by similar institutes world-wide since the late fifties. Originally designed for 
leadership-development (Rice, 1965), they are used for group-dynamics training, and the training of 
psychoanalytically-informed organisational consultants.   
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Emotional Experience as Intelligence  
With Menzies, social defences are an aspect of what an organisation is and does. 
They "elicit" a "psychic constellation [social defences] ... in response ... [to an] 
objective situation" (Armstrong, 2005: 104). With this, Menzies paved the way for the 
Tavistock paradigm: to use the study of collective "emotional experience" in 
organisations "as a source of intelligence" and not just "a disturbing ... side-effect" as 
had Jaques (Armstrong, 2005: 104-106).  
 
What does emotional experience reveal and how valuable is primary task as the 
social referent for social defences?   
 
Both the organisation development (OD) and Tavistock literatures suggest that 
collective emotional experience tells us something about:  
 The organisation's functioning  
 The quality of individuals' engagement or frustration with the organisation 
 Whether task-undermining social defences are operating.  
 
Emotions provide a barometer that something is either working, not working, or about 
to falter (Burke, 2011; Burke and Litwin, 1992; Armstrong, 2005). 
 
The use of emotion for diagnostic purposes, intriguing as it is, asks much from 
emotions to also provide symptoms, explain causes, make prognoses, and offer 
treatment-as-intervention. The challenge is making meaning from what they are 
revealing.  
 
 
Controversy of Primary Task as Social or Organisational-Referent 
There has been much recent debate within the Tavistock paradigm about the efficacy 
of the concept of primary task, or what an organisation must do in order to survive 
(Miller and Rice, 1967: 25).  
 
For SDT, and the Tavistock paradigm, primary task serves as: 
 “The defining characteristic of the organisation” (Armstrong, 2005: 128) 
 A “baseline against which work-activity is measured” and organisational, team 
and role “performance is to be judged” (Obholzer, 2001: 199) 
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 “As an abstract ‘third party’ that allows members to bridge their polarised 
connections and grasp a shared reality” (Shapiro, 2001: 178) 
 As “the main institutional ‘ballast’ that keeps the organisation, both 
membership and leadership, steady” (Obholzer, 2001: 198-199).  
 
The controversy relates to: how it is defined; whether it should be exclusive, or 
whether there can be more than one primary task; and the degree to which it 
prioritises questions of survival over development (Armstrong, 2005: 128); or for that 
matter, change. What should be the balance: survival, development and change? 
Strategy and culture are barely acknowledged and it is here too that sociological 
theories can contribute. 
 
Within the paradigm, Armstrong suggests primary task is "an instrumental notion tied 
to ... external goals or objectives” that focuses “on the end result”. It does not capture 
the organisation’s “journeying” or “endeavour” which he suggests is the “carrier of 
organisational identity” (2000: 129). For Hirshhorn (1999), it does not show the 
processes through which people and organisations make choices about which 
primary task to focus on, or how strategy is shaped. Nor does it help us understand 
the strategic junctures, risks and threats involved in making choices and the "primary 
risk" of making catastrophic choice (1999: 9). It is doubt, choice and 'primary risk' that 
keeps leaders awake at night during times of increased complexity and ambiguity.  
 
 
Sociological Modelling, Consulting Practice and the Realist Method 
Examining these three aspects of SDT theory (Bion's BAs, emotional experience as 
intelligence, and the controversy of primary task) provide further clues as to why our 
social defence intervention failed.  
 
Re-examination of the evidence and the literature suggested several reasons for why 
our social defence intervention might have failed. At the time, we were: 
 Over-reliant on the Tavistock approach 
 Under-appreciative of Trist, Emery and Jaques' sociological suggestions 
 Unaware of non-psychoanalytic variations of what culture is and how it is 
socially animated 
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 Un-reliant on sociological-analytic (detective) devices (institutional theory, 
variations of systems theory17 and the agency-structure metaphor) 
 Under-appreciative of realist research-cum-consulting method. 
 
 
2.2 The Organisational Change Literature 
 
Competing Rationalities and Values Animating Change 
A review revealed three types of theories used to understand and facilitate change 
(Carnell, 2007; Burke, Lake and Waymire Pire, 2009; Burke, 2011; Jick and Peiperl, 
2011; Burnes, 2009; Boonstra, 2004; Darwin, Johnston and McAuley, 2002). 
Included are:  
 Strategic management models which feature 'industry forces', the 'resource-
based view of organisations', and 'emergent strategy' 
 Organisational development (OD) that features clinical approaches, planned 
and emergent change-strategies, and systems theory  
 Critical  postmodern and post-structural theories which are sceptical towards 
managing change altogether.  
These theories overlap and differ. Strategic management and OD specialists agree 
on the importance of external environments in triggering the need for change but 
offer different solutions. The two are separated along normative lines over what to 
prioritise: 'finances' or 'people' (Beer, 2008; Greiner, 2008). Within their specialities, 
there are also wide differences on what type of change to pursue: revolutionary or 
evolutionary; transformational or transactional; bottom-up or top-down; emergent  
versus planned change.  
 
Notwithstanding which theory is used, it is not just the Tavistock approach that is 
prone to failure. Most change efforts fail whichever the approach. Why? Critical and 
postmodern explanations include:  
 Ethical concerns related to means-ends instrumentality of change (Smircich, 
1983) 
 The gap between the rhetoric and the reality of planning and strategising 
(Whittington, 2001) 
 Competing ‘bounded rationalities’ (Simon, 1997) 
                                                          
17
 Not just open systems theory favoured by the Tavistock paradigm - but focusing more on the role of feedback 
processes and self-organising.  
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 The role of power on whose voices (perspectives) are audible or excluded 
(Clegg et al., 2006).  
 
How does the Tavistock approach compare?  
 
Tavistock practitioners: 
 Draw on OD, especially clinical, 'emergent' and 'transactional' (individual and 
team) change approaches. 
 Are not adverse to highlighting ethical concerns, the gap between rhetoric 
and reality, or to critique the effect of power relations (Lawrence, 2000; 
Hoggett, 2009; Brunning, 2014; Long, 2008; Swartz, 2010; De Gooijer, 2009; 
Stein, 2013; 2009; Sievers, 2013; 2009). 
 Acknowledge the role of the external environment, but through open systems 
theory. Emery and Trist's (1965; 1973) socio-ecological approach (Trist and 
Emery, 1997) that focuses on aligning people and systems with external 
environmental demands are there, but rarely used.18  
 Pay most attention to the 'socio-psychological' perspective (Trist et al., 1990; 
Miller, 1976; Obholzer and Roberts, 1994; Hirschhorn and Barnett, 1993; 
Klein E. et al., 1998; 2000; Gould et al., 2001; Huffington et al., 2004), and the 
internal environment, and culture. Intervention is aimed at individuals and 
groups.    
 Tend to approach change as "transactional", focusing on improvements on 
individual and team change, rather than "transformational" or whole-scale 
organisation-level change (Burke and Litwin, 1992; Burke, 2011). 
 Can explain why change is resisted, but not how change occurs or may be 
directed.  
 
What is missing?:  
 Mention of competing values, principles and beliefs (Quinn, 1988; 2001) and 
attention to normative choice (Beer, 2008; Greiner, 2008). These are 
subsumed in psychological terms as competition or rivalry, or the need for 
control, autonomy and the like. Emotional data is prioritised over financial 
data.                       
                                                          
18
 In fact, their work (1965) was a precursor to the development of strategic management models. Emery (1997) 
also found that open systems theory can inadvertently treat organisations as closed. Once the environmental 
inputs and outputs are considered, the environment is left unaccounted for.   
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 The tradition is willing to critique different theories and practices (Sievers, 
2013; 2009; Stein, 2013; 2011), but mostly by striking a normative or values 
stance, rather than through developing missing sociology that can 
supplement psychoanalytic insight and methods in consulting.  
 
CT can provide these missing pieces by explaining how equally rational (reasonable) 
but conflicting values, explanations and practices animate behaviour, unconscious 
processes and conflict within, and between, individuals and organisations.  
 
 
Whole-Scale and Individual-Team Change 
Whole-scale organisational-level change is qualitatively different to individual and 
team change. Burke and Litwin (1992) distinguish between "transformational change" 
involving change in an organisation's strategy and direction and/or its leadership and 
culture which re-shape organisations; and "transactional change" which focuses 
more on improvements to organisational systems, structures, management practices, 
people, and teams. Similar distinctions are made by Burnes including 'revolutionary 
evolutionary' change (2009).  
 
Transformational change "is catalysed by a change in belief and awareness about 
what is possible and necessary for the organisation" (Ackerman, 1986: 2). It is akin to 
the "paradigm shift" of Trist et al. (1963; 1990) regarding what an organisation is and 
does, and to Drucker's (1994) change in the organisation's "theory of business" 
which involves changing assumptions and beliefs about what it takes to succeed in a 
particular environment.  
 
Menzies’ focus on individuals and teams contributes to their development but may 
not affect the organisation (Emery and Trist, 1965; Jaques, 1995). It may not address 
what is causing individuals and teams to have difficulty which we also struggled with 
during our failed social defence intervention.  
 
 
Emotional Rationality and Financial Rationality 
Our failed social defence intervention took the socio-psychological focus. This did not 
captivate the interest of the senior team. They failed to appreciate the relevance and 
urgency of the intervention. It did not appeal to their rationality which concerned the 
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economics and finances of the organisation rather than our reasoning concerning 
people and culture.  
 
Beer (2008) categorises these competing rationalities as ‘Theory E’ and ‘Theory O’. 
‘Theory E’, he suggests, has its goals in “economic value creation and focuses on the 
hard facets of organisations, financial performance, strategy, structure and systems”. 
Its "results-focused, top-down initiatives" seek to improve the financial health of the 
organisation. ‘Theory O’ aims at “enhancing organisation effectiveness” by focusing 
on “the organisation’s culture and its people”. Its advocates improve motivation 
through stakeholder participation, coordination and engagement in constructive 
conflict (2008: 406-7). Daniel Duck (2001: 9-11) also differentiates between "financial 
data" and "emotional data”, suggesting that leaders’ attention is aroused by financial 
data. However, ignoring emotional data may undermine change efforts. This is why 
recent attention, from 2000 onwards, has sought to integrate the strategic and OD 
literatures (Greiner, 2008). Change efforts require both.  
 
Quinn's (1988; 2001) competing values framework also captured this normative or 
values divide that occurs in both the literature and organisations. It was initially 
considered, before CT, to contribute to the Tavistock's missing theory of social-
political values, beliefs and assumptions. See Chapter Seven: Rival Explanations 
and Anticipated Objections, for an account. Though developed independently, 
Quinn's competing values uses near-identical axes to those of CT, but directed more 
narrowly at leadership.  
 
 
Resistance to Change and Explaining Change 
SDT provides a psychological account of why change is resisted in individuals and 
organisations. The organisational change literature also highlights how resistance to 
change can be political and ideological in nature (Hambrick and Cannella, 1989). 
This includes: the loss of something valued (power, status, job, income) or the 
violation of previously espoused organisational values and individuals’ deeply held 
values, beliefs and philosophies. These can represent deep psychological 
attachments and foster defences and conflict.  
 
The value of searching for the sociological (political and ideological) inherent in social 
defences, and not just the psychological, is to suggest social causes and 
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consequences. This more complete explanation should appeal to both 'financial' and 
OD rationalities.  
 
Burke (2011: 119-121) identifies four forms of group resistance which are eminently 
social as they are psychological: 
 “Turf protection and completion”. A “work group fighting for survival will 
muster every rationale, fact and guilt-inducing behaviour to justify its 
continuation”. We saw turf protection in the social defences of both 
Manufacturing and Sales, competing to meet what had been demanded of 
them, but through diverging values and practices.      
 “Closing ranks” invokes the egalitarian principle of “one for all and all for one”. 
This was observed in the social defences that manifested particularly around 
the third level of the organisation and in Sales. ‘Closing ranks’ was exactly 
how their social defences operated. 
 “Changing allegiances or ownership” was observed particularly in second 
level managers squeezed from above and below. Some sided with the senior 
team, employing 'Individualist' face-saving defences, at least initially, while 
others displayed either Egalitarian cosiness or Fatalist mistrust alongside their 
direct reports.  
 “The demand for new leadership”. Towards the end of our consultancy, two of 
the four senior leaders behind the new initiatives left and a third chose early 
retirement (though most of the rumours suggested they were “pushed”).  
 
Our claim, then, is that these forms of group defences (and ideological/political 
resistance) were best captured by inferring the equivalent CT elementary forms 
driving each social defence; rather than by Bion's BA defensive patterns. 
 
But understanding forms of resistance is only half the story. How does change 
actually occur?  
 
This question was to occupy the author during the research, prompting a rethinking 
of Tavistock 'interpretive' methodology in which responsibility is shared between the 
consultant and client, in favour of a 'realist' one in which the researcher/consultant 
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assumes primary responsibility for detecting 'underlying' causes and mechanisms.19 
This is taken up in Chapter Three: Methodology.  
 
 
2.3 The Contribution of Trist, Emery and Jaques      
Trist, Emery and Jaques, provided clues to develop the sociological dimension of 
SDT.  
 
Sociological and Psychological Theories 
We have touched on how Trist was among the first who saw that both sociological 
and psychological theories were needed to make sense of the cut and thrust of 
action-research projects (1950 [1990]: 539-540). He suggested that "psychological 
forces" in individuals and groups "interacted with structural forces to bring into 
existence a concrete 'field' with a dynamic pattern which is specific for a given social 
situation”. These are impossible to understand "with either psychological or 
sociological concepts alone”. He also saw culture as a dynamic pattern and 
"medium" that could "make comprehensive reference to the structure of social 
systems [and to] reach down to emotional phenomena”.  
 
He first applied these ideas in "socio-technical" interventions that sought to align an 
organisation's social ('sentient') and technical ('task') systems in order to "reduce 
stress and prevent [psychological] regression" which can "easily appear in the face of 
higher levels of uncertainty" (Trist and Murray, 1990: 30-32).  
 
However, he with Emery, quickly realised that aligning an organisation socio-
technically, was helpful only in the short-term. Internal or external environmental 
changes affecting organisations quickly disrupt any alignment. This led to further 
discovery. 
 
 
Limitations of Open Systems Theory and Environment Influences 
Emery, who introduced open systems theory into the Tavistock (Trist and Murray, 
1990: 30-32), also saw its limitations. Once a system's "inputs" and "outputs" were 
identified, there was a temptation to treat the system as "closed", not allowing for 
                                                          
19
 This does not have to undermine the favoured action-research approach. The consultant here goes a step 
further than offering "working hypotheses" (Miller, 1995) that prompt the client's exploration, but offers a clear 
"because clause" (Turquet, 1975) as to why such an interpretation or explanation is being offered. This assists 
clients to join-the-dots between their behaviours/defences and their causes and potential consequences.   
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"any theoretical links between system and environment variables" (Emery, 1997). 
With Trist, he realised that the external environment was more determining than the 
client organisation's own efforts. Their new challenge became helping organisation's 
adapt to their environments (Emery and Trist, 1965; 1973; Emery, 1997).20  
 
At this time, Emery was adapting systems theory for use in interventions (1969; 
1981). Feedback loops (Emery, 1981; Meadows, 2008; Jackson, 2003) - the process 
through which system/organisation change occurs - are consistent with systems 
theory.  
 
SDT does not feature feedback, though we see no reason why it could not. Nor does 
it exploit other systems theory features such as "self-organisation" (Capra, 1996; 
Burke, 2011).  
 
Feedback loops and self-organisation seem to account well for the interplay between 
organisations and their environments, and how organisations are simultaneously 
open (indeed vulnerable) to influence but closed (restricted) in what they choose to 
do about them.  
It is a small step to treat any system, including social defence constellations, as "self-
organised" and to search for the limiting logic which drives it. CT's elementary forms 
provide for four 'organising logics' very exactly.  
 
 
Paradigm Shifts Push Psychological Insight into the Background 
Trist and Emery soon realised the limits of an exclusive psychological focus during 
change projects, but they retained psychoanalytic insights as the background, rather 
than foreground of interventions.21 "Group dynamics interventions" in the 
"psychoanalytic tradition”, while successful, "had not been concerned with an order of 
change that constituted a paradigm shift" (Trist et al., 1963: 492) or transformational, 
whole-scale organisational change.22  
                                                          
20
 This ushered in the Tavistock's third paradigmatic perspective - the "social-ecological" approach (Trist and 
Murray, 1990).  
21
 Kurt Lewin, a key influence in the Tavistock's early work, had earlier suggested the periodic shifting between 
social (contextual) and psychological perspectives in what is seen as foreground and background by 
consultants/researchers (Burnes, 2004). 
22
 At this time, however, many within the Tavistock Institute, such as Rice, were advocating for a stronger 
psychoanalytic focus. Menzies, despite her close association with mentor Trist, had voted for Rice which led to 
the split in the Institute in the early 1960s (Fraher, 2004; Armstrong, 2012). Rice argued that the Institute had to 
pay its own way rather than rely on grants for research which had fuelled much of Trist and Emery's efforts, as it 
did for the Institute throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, not long after both Trist and Emery had left. Today, 
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Social Defences as Symptoms and Causes 
Jaques’ earliest work, on the Glacier project (1951), established the Tavistock's focus 
on organisational structure, culture, role accountability and authority relations that is 
still used today. At the time, he also came up with the social defence hypothesis 
which he quickly abandoned, reasoning that "it is badly organised social systems that 
arouse psychotic anxieties and lead to their disturbing acting out and expression in 
working relations" (1995: 343).  
 
He turned to improving the design of organisations (1998a), reporting the difficulty of 
working with psychological and group dynamics taken "out of the context of the 
realities of accountability and authority ... in managerial hierarchies” (1998b: 254). He 
reasoned how the "essence of accountability [in organisations] rests in individual 
roles and is indivisible" (1995: 345).  
 
This thinking underlies the Tavistock paradigm's approach to coaching known as 
Organisational Role Analysis (ORA) (Newton, Long and Sievers, 2006) which we 
used during the coaching and to sort the coaching data for consulting and later 
research purposes. 
 
Jaques displaced his explanation for defences from individuals' psychology to social 
forces (from agency to structure), treating anxiety and defences against it as 
something to explain rather than providing explanation. This demarcates sociological 
from psychological theories thus inviting capture of the social causes and later 
consequences of social defences.  
 
 
Summary 
Menzies recognised that social defences become institutionalised in organisational 
systems, structures and work practices and that to change members, one may need 
to change the institution first.  
 
The work of Trist, Emery and Jaques can be approached as extending the 
sociological side of SDT by comprehending: the relationship between a system and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
their legacy is acknowledged, but less drawn upon. From this time, both publications and membership of Group 
Relations Conferences became more populated with human services organisations and professions rather than 
business and industry which drove much of the Institute's earlier work.  
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its environment; feedback loops and self-organisation; psychology for diagnosis 
rather than intervention; and treating social defences as effect first, and cause later.  
 
The relationship between sociology and psychology has been vexatious since 
Durkheim who was very suspicious of explanations couched at the level of 
individuals ("methodological individualism"). Nevertheless, Freud and his followers 
continued to seek explanations for inter- as well as intra-personal phenomena.  
 
 
2.4 Durkheim Meets Freud 
Durkheim and Freud, who provide the theoretical bedrock for CT and SDT 
respectively, used concepts that apply to both social and psychological phenomena. 
Between them, four concepts are promising, theoretically and methodologically, in 
progressing the research.  
 
If we reconceptualise social defences as Durkheimian 'social facts' (1895) and more 
particularly as 'anomie' (1897), this may better capture their social origins and 
operation. Similarly, Freud's concept of 'moral anxiety' and its relation to the ‘super-
ego’ – as the means through which morality is internalised and transmitted – admits 
that anxiety can be reactive (to something real) and social in origin (1923; 1926 and 
1933).23 Whereas ‘identification’ is central to his understanding of groups and social 
behaviour (1921).  
                                                          
23 In 1926, Freud revised his theory of anxiety to include the ego’s fear and hostility of the ‘super-ego’ to 
represent a critical function or “agency … which “observes”, “threatens to punish, … enjoys a degree of 
autonomy to follow its intentions … independent” of the ego, and constituted through the internalisation of 
parental demands and prohibitions that come to dominate the ego (Freud, 1933: 90-92). For Freud, the super-
ego “represents the claims of morality … our moral sense of guilt” (p.92) and embraces the functions and 
prohibitions of “the ego ideal by which the ego measures itself” and aspires to conform to, but frequently fails, 
(p.96) leaving the individual with feelings of guilt, imperfection, indecision and preoccupation with what is right 
and wrong (Bateman and Holmes, 1995: 35).  
In addition to the introduction of the super-ego and his new dissection of the personality to include the ‘id’ 
alongside the ego (1923), Freud found that his earlier conceptualisations of anxiety did not hold against clinical 
observations – especially of phobias and obsessional neuroses. These drew attention to the “significant relation 
between the generation of anxiety and the formation of symptoms” which “are created … to avoid the outbreak 
of the anxiety state” (1933: 115-116).  
For Freud, only the individual could appear to account for this. Instead of anxiety resulting from 
“unconsummated excitation”, he now saw the ego as “the sole seat” and cause – alone producing and feeling 
anxiety”. And, instead of realistic anxiety being the result of neurotic anxiety, he now saw it the other way 
around. He introduced two new concepts: anxiety as “automatic” implying an “involuntary” reaction to a 
traumatic (perceived as real) situation which the ego could not control; and anxiety as an intentionally 
(re)produced “signal” for “the avoidance of a danger situation” (1926: 102 and 108-109). These now overlay his 
“three main species of anxiety – realistic, neurotic and moral … connected with the ego’s three dependent 
relations – to the external world, to the id and to the super-ego” respectively (1933: 117-118). The super-ego 
represents an internalised and unconscious threat, signalling a “danger situation from which the ego must get 
away”, that “transforms into undefined social or moral anxiety” (1926: 90-91).  
While this is Freud’s only reference to moral anxiety in 1926, he clearly links it to the super-ego (a critical 
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For Durkheim, "social facts" are external to individuals: "feature(s) of social life”, that 
carry "expectations ... obligations, beliefs, and practices outside of individual 
consciousness”. They occur "in society irrespective of individual manifestations" and 
exert a "coercive power which they impose upon each individual independent of the 
person's will”. Nevertheless, their "most salient" feature is the "internal psychological 
states" they produce (Keat and Urry, 1975: 82-86). Social defences do all these 
things.  
 
They can also be seen as both 'anomic’, and a reflection of anomie in the 
organisation. Durkheim defines anomie as a social condition that affects individuals 
in profound psychological ways, with suicide the most severe manifestation. Anomie 
occurs when a social system is in a state of flux, and where shared meanings and 
values no longer hold: when individuals are not occupying the roles that suit them 
best (a forced 'division of labour') and when individuals lose sight of their contribution 
within the whole ('division of labour'). In our consultation, we especially observed this 
latter manifestation of anomie.  
 
A Durkheimian approach would identify social defences as 'social facts' independent 
of individuals, and 'anomic' as suggesting insufficient integration exists between them 
and the organisation.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
function or agency within the ego) as being an extension of the original threat of “castration” but belonging to 
later stages of development (p. 90-91). By 1933, he unpacks moral anxiety through its relation to the super-ego 
giving it now the weight, like identification, to carry important implications for “understanding social behaviour” 
(p. 97). In the course of an individual’s development that continues throughout life, “the super-ego also takes on 
the influences of those who have stepped into the place of parents – educators, teachers, people chosen as ideal 
models … it departs more and more from the original parental figures” and “becomes … more impersonal” 
incorporating social and cultural contributions and requirements such as education, religion or morality (p. 96). 
He also suggests that “as a rule parents and authority figures follow the precepts of their own super-egos in 
educating children”. “Thus a child’s super-ego is in fact constructed on the model not of its parents but of the 
parents’ super-ego; the contents which fill … become the vehicle of tradition and … judgements of value that 
have propagated themselves in this manner from generation to generation”. “The past, the tradition … of the 
people, lives on in the ideologies of the super-ego, and yields only slowly to the influences of the present and to 
new changes … playing a powerful part in human (social) life (p. 98-99).  
These last three statements – that the influences grow more impersonal; the super-ego is constructed on the 
parents’ / educators’ / ideal-figures’ super-ego: and that its contents carry the vehicle of tradition – clearly imply 
that it is values, beliefs, attitudes and opinions of the social-cultural-political tradition of the community, class, 
society etc. that the child is born, and socially inducted, into. His other statement that the influences of the super-
ego continue throughout life suggests that, as the individual makes her way into the world, she opens to wider 
and wider socio-cultural-political influences of that society / civilisation.  
Accordingly, we suggest that Freud’s super-ego has implicitly two-faces or sides. One is the personal prohibitive 
guilt-inducing one (as inheritor of the Oedipus Complex) that is familiar in psychoanalysis, and the other is the 
carrier of the traditions the individual is born into. The latter is arguably a good validation of what group analysts, 
starting with Foulkes, imply as the social unconscious (Hopper and Weinberg, 2011; Hopper, 2003; Dalal, 1998). 
We argue that the contents of the ‘social unconscious’ are the social-cultural-political traditions of the immediate 
community / class the individual is born into and, with the individual’s development, the wider society and 
civilisation (Western, Asian, Arabic etc.). 
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For Freud, in his revised theory, anxiety always has a realistic (external) source – 
even if what is real is subjectively perceived, and can be moral. Both acknowledge its 
social origin and nature. Sociologists have long utilised several of Freud’s concepts 
such as identification as the process through which individuals become socially-
constituted (Golding, 1982; Hausner, 2013: 170). This should equally apply to 
realistic and moral anxiety and the latter’s relation to the super-ego as the means 
through which morality is transmitted. 
 
For Durkheim, morality is a social fact and hence both external to individuals and 
exerting an influence over their behaviour. It exists in society before they are born 
and continues after they die. This would suggest that identification is not only with 
people and their behaviour (occurring as Freud would suggest through immediate 
interpersonal and experiential sources) but also with social-cultural and political 
symbols, ideas, principles and ideologies as markers of our sociality. Freud implies 
as much when he uses his concepts to account for social behaviour – even if his 
starting point is psychology as the springboard to explain the social – especially 
when he suggests that it is not just identification but the super-ego, which in the 
course of our development and throughout life, takes on influences that depart more 
and more from parental figures and become more impersonal in nature (1933: 96). In 
doing this, do they not incorporate social, cultural and political influences that are 
present and available in society for individuals to draw up?24 It is a short step from 
here to recognise how individuals identify (embrace, make their own) social values 
                                                          
24 While Freud focused on the more immediate experiential and interpersonal ways we internalise morality – and 
through identification, sociality – he did stop there, suggesting that this process continues throughout life. It 
increasingly becomes more “impersonal”, taking in wider social and cultural influences (1933: 96-99). French 
sociologist, Aron (1965: 15), suggests that any concept used to elaborate or explain “social” phenomena – be it 
social behaviour, social organisation, society – marks it as sociological. Using this formula, he suggested that 
political theorists such as Montesquieu and Tocqueville, in trying to explain social organisation in terms of 
political regimes and institutions, were sociological (1965). The concepts of Freud we have drawn on would 
equally fit this bill.  
What Freud proposes from the psychological, to explain the social, Durkheim unpacks sociologically starting from 
the other direction. He suggests that our values, attitudes, opinions and beliefs are not only personal in nature 
but social and political. They not only develop interpersonally but are present in the menu of social, cultural and 
political beliefs that provide the tools which we think with, and use, to orientate toward, and differentiate from, 
others. These are examples of what Durkheim refers to as ‘collective representations’ that get reinforced through 
‘ritual’ and encompass what is considered ‘sacred’ to a group or society (Durkheim, 1912). They are available to 
us to draw upon in different ways – in justifying our behaviour or blaming others, and during conflict and change 
to express our agency (Douglas, 1986) – and are available to us through our membership to a particular society or 
civilisation (Huntington, 1996; Gauss, 2000; Smith, 2008). Sociologically, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
Freud’s concepts could encompass socio-cultural symbols, ideas and principles as markers for political values and 
beliefs. 
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and beliefs, such as one or more of CT’s four competing rationalities and ways of 
organising.25 
 
 
2.5 Three Sociological Models of Analysis 
But how to bring SDT and CT into more direct conversation? The literature contains 
three sociological models which contain relevant mediating concepts that have been 
incorporated within CT and can equally apply to SDT. They are presented in their 
order of importance with our disconcerting 'problem of change'.  
 
 
Institutional Theory 
Institutions are examples of Durkheim's social facts. They are external to individuals, 
a feature of social life, carry obligations and expectations, and exert coercive force on 
individuals, independently of their will.  
 
Institutional theory and models challenge the dominance of methodological 
individualism, and highlight the social influences on thought and behaviour (Douglas 
and Ney, 1998). Douglas (1986: 46) defines institutions as "conventions" designed to 
achieve a purpose through ensuring "coordination". Leaving her definition vague, 
allows institutions to be seen as both formal or intentionally-designed, or informal 
practices which may be held loosely and exchanged for other practices from within a 
wide social repertoire of reasoning.  
 
Our reading of Douglas and CT leads us to think it possible to treat social defences 
as institutions, or for that matter, groups and group-dynamics. Institutions have 
precisely the dynamic qualities which CT specifies (Douglas, 1986; 6 and Mars, 
2008). From our knowledge and training in psychoanalysis, we see no reason why 
institutions and social defences-as-institutions cannot be recognised as having 
unconscious features.  
 
                                                          
25
 It occurs to this author that Freud’s concepts of moral anxiety, the extra-personal sources of the super-ego and 
identification are a missing dimension in the psychoanalytic study of groups and organisations. Bion’s group 
theory focused on the interplay and analysis of the pleasure and reality principles occurring between the basic 
assumption group and the work group. He essentially focused on the relationship between Freud’s id and ego – 
but did not include the super-ego – not from the personal but the extra-personal and social sources that would 
encompass social values, principles and beliefs that individuals draw upon in their work in groups and 
organisations. This is a topic for future research. 
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Scott (2008: 48) points out that across the social sciences, institutions tend to be 
analysed in three ways: as "carriers" of rules, norms, and ways of thinking (Table 
2.1). Soda and Zaheer (2012) and Gulati and Puranam (2009) recognise formal and 
informal institutions, while North (1991) and Cason et al. (2009) find that 
organisations contain several of both. This fits. As we will see with our own research, 
social defences, and a number of post-GFC policies, can be analysed as institutions 
bringing clearer understanding of their operation and effects.  
 
Put simply, the formal organisation is the officially sanctioned system of coordination,  
lines of authority, and divisions of labour designed towards pre-defined objectives. 
They entail processes governing work, information flows, and incentives that connect 
'means' and 'ends'.  
 
The informal organisation exists within the formal, implicitly. It encompasses the 
relationships not found on organisational charts and procedural documents. It 
involves improvised networks and improved work methods, and "grapevines" that fill 
knowledge gaps and lacunae in the formal organisation (Goldsmith and Katzenback, 
2007).  
 
Consultants intuitively know when things go wrong, to look first at what is working or 
otherwise within the formal organisation. We then rely on the informal organisation to 
gather data and understand why. Social defences operate in the informal 
organisation. They get built into organisations systems and practices, but are not 
recognised officially. 
 
 
Table 2.1 The Three Pillars of Institutions (Adapted from Scott, 2008 and others) 
 
 Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Definition  - Constrain, regulate  
 empower  
- Legitimate behaviour 
through explicit 
processes of: rule-
setting, monitoring, 
and sanctioning 
- Beliefs and values that 
constitute a basis for 
social order ...   
- Impose prescriptive, 
evaluative and 
obligatory elements to  
social life 
- Shared conceptions that 
constitute social reality  
- Symbolic systems through 
which meaning is made  
- Internal interpretative 
processes shaped by external 
cultural frameworks 
Basis of 
Compliance 
Expedience  Social Obligation Taken-for-granted Shared 
Understanding 
Basis of Order Regulative Rules Binding Expectations Constitutive Schema 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules, Laws, Sanctions Certification / - Common Beliefs 
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Accreditation - Shared Logics of Action 
- Isomorphism 
Affect Fear, Guilt / Innocence Shame / Honour Certainty / Confusion 
Basis of 
Legitimacy 
Legally Sanctioned Morally Governed - Comprehensible  
- Recognisable 
- Culturally Supported 
Opportunities 
for Agency and 
Change 
- Rules can be 
sufficiently ambiguous 
or controversial and 
need interpretation  
- Rules rely on, and are 
tempered by, 
normative and 
cultural-cognitive 
influences 
- Rules can be more 
easily changed than 
norms / shared 
meanings 
- Evoke strong feeling 
but may contradict or 
compete with each other 
- In larger systems, there 
can be several norms 
operating  
- This may evoke 
anomie, anxiety and 
defence leading to 
challenge and 
breakdown - but also 
unconscious / de-
centred agency 
- The most stable but can 
change over time  
- May not work in new or 
challenging circumstances 
- May contradict, or be 
contradicted by, rules and 
norms causing anomie, 
anxiety and defences that 
trigger change 
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Table 2.1 outlines the three ways institutions have been analysed with the social 
sciences (Scott, 2008) - as carriers of rules, norms and ways of thinking. It specifies 
how institutions operate and achieve their effects - intentionally or otherwise - while 
obliging and constraining individuals to operate accordingly. If we conceptualise 
social defences and group (and organisational) dynamics as institutions, this adds a 
missing sociological-analytic dimension that can be used alongside unconscious 
processes and Tavistock consulting methods in their analysis.  
 
Systems Theory: Feedback and Self-Organisation 
One problem consultants face is trying to understand why organisations get 'stuck' 
and, more occasionally, change quite wildly ... and then trying to explain this to 
clients in a way that is plausible to them. The literature suggests that both 'getting 
stuck' and wild changes may be the outcome of different kinds of feedback-loops 
(Meadow, 2008; Jackson, 2003; Jervis, 1997).  
 
In our research, social defences and the post-GFC policies (treated as institutions) 
might be intelligible as feedback processes which capture the effects they can have 
on: the individuals operating within them, each other (as distinct institutions), and the 
wider organisation. Institutionally-generated feedback is the means through which 
stasis and change occur within organisations.   
 
The literature distinguishes two phases of feedback: 
 First phase - institutions train members to think and act in concert. This 
generates a thought-style, a rationality, or way of making sense of things. 
Rules and norms gradually develop and this affects strategic preferences, 
decision-making, agenda-setting, resourcing, the pecking-order between 
individuals, and what thoughts and feelings are acceptable or out of reach (6, 
2011).  
 Second phase - institutions have effects on neighbouring institutions which 
will likely react back.  
 
It also distinguishes two types of feedback processes. 
 Positive feedback amplifies or reinforces the operation of the first phase - 
tending to reinforce the effects of the institution, ultimately leading to chaotic, 
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tipping-point effects that can undermine the institution if there are no 
moderating influences acting upon it.  
 
Reinforcement of institutional convictions can have paradoxical effects, taking 
compliant members to absurd extremes in the belief of their rightness. At these 
extremes, not order but chaos may be created. Convictions unbounded by 
moderating voices can undermine neighbouring institutions and create whole-system 
disturbances. A good example is a run-away train, or cattle running which reinforces 
other cattle to run, leading to potential out-of-control effects.  
 
In our research, positive institutional feedback generated by the social defences in 
Sales and Manufacturing, and the competing post-GFC policies that not only 
triggered the social defences but were a consequence of the social defences blindly 
followed, together produced a whole system disturbance pushing the organisation 
into a dysfunctional, survival-threatening form of isolate ordering. We explore this at 
length in Chapter Five.  
  
 Negative feedback reduces fluctuations within, and among, institutions. These 
are moderating influences. An example is a thermostat programmed to heat 
or cool a room when out-of-range temperatures are detected.  
 
In our client organisation, most of the feedback effects of the social defences 
involved positive feedback in the first and second phases. But with the post-GFC 
policies, positive and negative feedback was detectable.  
 
In short, though fairly straightforward concepts, we found that positive and negative 
second-phase feedback was very helpful in distinguishing and clarifying what 
seemed very confusing at the time.  
 
We also found it helpful to differentiate between dysfunctional or task-undermining 
social defences from the more benign anxiety-circumventing ones operating in the 
informal organisation. The former will undermine organisations, whereas the latter 
will circumvent anxiety and find alternative pathways in the service of the task. 
Dysfunctional or task-undermining social defences most likely generate positive 
feedback in the second phase of their feedback loop, whereas benign anxiety-
circumventing in-the-service-of-task defences, generate negative feedback or 
moderating influences on the individuals involved and neighbouring institutions.  
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Feedback originates from:  
 The purpose of systems, structures or work practices as institutions. This 
provides the rationale 
 Decisions by leaders to adjust, fix or improve the purpose or design of 
institutions   
 The agency of other members taking steps because of the effect that 
neighbouring institutions have on their work, promoting anxiety.  
   
'Self organisation' describes a quality that all living-systems (institutions) share, that 
is the result of feedback. According to Capra (1996), echoed by Burke (2011), "self 
organisation" posits that institutions are simultaneously open to the effects of their 
environment but are closed operationally in what they choose to do. Self-organisation 
describes the process through which institutions either adapt to their environment or 
'lock-in' and reinforce a way of doing things. This is a form of positive reinforcement 
which precedes the chaos mentioned above. Reinforcement would describe 
entrenched social defences that can lead to whole-system disturbance. Through self-
organisation, institutions will display their organising logic which gives a structure or 
pattern to relations and guiding principles.  
 
A key suggested by 6 (2011) is to identify the specific elementary form(s) driving an 
institution and animating the positive or negative feedback being generated in both 
phases.  
 
We simply applied this insight to SDT and the analysis of collective unconscious 
phenomena such as social defences, and group and organisational dynamics. We 
suggest that this is what is needed to understand how social defences become 
"institutionalised" ... and are "more than psychic phenomena" by getting built into 
organisational systems, structures and work practices (Menzies, 1960; 1989) that are 
... now ... self-organised ... and generating their own effects through feedback.   
 
 
The Agency-Structure Interplay  
Archer's (1996) suggestion, echoed by Mouzelis (2008), is to treat agency and 
structure (institutions) as two forms of causality and to study their interplay over time. 
This offers a way to examine the cause and effect claims of psychological forces 
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(SDT) or social forces (CT). How this was done in the research is described in 
Chapter Three (Methodology) and the results in Chapter Five.  
 
Agency,26 for example, may defy or undermine existing structures, or create new 
ones. In the case study, the social defences had undermining effects on the 
organisation’s many institutions. The post-GFC policies created new institutions, 
notably social defences. The issue for organisation diagnosis is what to treat as 
agency or structure, and when? When are they better approached as agency or 
structure, and what are the consequences for organisational diagnosis and change? 
 
Tavistock practitioners would, most likely, approach social defences as forms of 
psychological, albeit unconscious, agency that will affect structures (organisations 
and their systems and practices) as we did at the time. This view, we now believe, 
contributed to the recognised 'problem of change' that we encountered. It over-
inflated our sense that the mere presence of social defences needed to be taken 
seriously, period, rather than something that first needed to be explained, and then 
their likely consequences forecasted and traced for the senior team to act on them.    
 
Archer's (1996) suggestion was taken up because it builds on Jaques' view that 
social defences need to be explained because they are the likely effect of what he 
saw as badly-designed organisations, or what we believe to be organisational-
specific and/or external environmental influences. By analytically counter-posing 
social defences as either agency or structure over different points in time, we can 
hypothesise if social defences are better approached as a form of agency or 
structure, and when. This carries consequences for the types of hypotheses and 
diagnoses that consultants generate. 
 
We found that social defences need to be triggered (socially-caused) by some 
structural or environmental force(s) to come into being, and initially can be seen as 
psychic constellations. It was not helpful, however, to approach them as forms of 
agency, albeit unconscious and collective. As psychic constellations, they quickly 
consolidate into institutions (fully-fledged structures in their own right) that generate 
consequences back into the organisation.  
 
                                                          
26
 As it applies to SDT, agency does not have to be conscious, intentional or "centred" but best approached as a 
form of "de-centred" or unconscious agency (Caldwell, 2006) that can equally generate the types of 
consequences associated with individual or collective agents acting intentionally or otherwise. 
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The agency-structure interplay is included because it was an important analytic tool 
in our journey towards reconceptualising social defences as (feedback-generating 
self-organised) institutions driven by one or more of CT's elementary form(s). It was 
not enough to see them as agency, and we needed a way to reconceptualise them 
as structures (or institutions).      
 
 
2.6 Cultural Theory 
Originating in Durkheimian anthropology and sociology (Douglas, 1966; 1970; 1982), 
then taken up by political science (Wildavsky, 1987; 1994; Coyle and Ellis, 1994; Ellis 
and Thompson, 1997; Chai and Swedlow, 1998; Verweij and Thompson, 2006; 6, 
2011) and applied to institutional theory (Douglas, 1986; 6 and Mars, 2008; 6, 2011), 
advocates claim that CT provides an elegant, simple account for conflict and viability, 
and for both continuity and change.  
 
We think this claim is justified. We also think that it could offer SDT a social 
perspective from which to analyse social defences as dynamic institutions animated 
by one or more of the four thought-styles identified by CT's elementary forms, and 
the conflicts among them.  
 
Unlike many social theories, CT allows for an individual's agency to create, challenge 
and transform (Douglas, 1982),27 while also acknowledging the cultural origins of the 
thought which individuals use when acting. Individual thought (and feeling) is enabled 
collectively. It is not simply that individuals act and institutions constrain. The 
thoughts and actions of individuals and institutions are likewise social (Douglas, 
1986). Individuals and institutions are animated by the exact same four thought-
styles. Douglas (1986) argues that, over time, institutions create an accumulation of 
practices that will cultivate a distinctive thought-style which influences members to 
think and behave along similar lines, whether they agree or not. 28 The causal 
                                                          
27
 For a broader discussion advocating the importance of finding the role for both people’s or ‘actor’ agency and 
the role of social structure in explaining both stability and change, see Mouzelis (1995 and 2008).  
28
 Douglas (1982) suggests an institution or culture is created through a series of on-going contributions and 
negotiations between members of a group in which everyone contributes, actively, passively or even 
anonymously, but does not necessarily agree with the specific results or the outcome. This outcome generates a 
“collective consciousness [that] manifests ... by making penalty-carrying rules and justifying them” (p. 190). In 
this way, institutions provide for the coordination of behaviour, but also “establish order and regulate” it, 
providing the patterning of social relationships. Institutions not only make “the rules of the game, they structure 
the incentives of players” (Douglas, 1986: 19, 9, 15). Perri 6, building on these ideas, further differentiates 
between the “style” of thought from its “content”. While institutions will cultivate distinctive thought-styles or a 
manner in which ideas, beliefs and feelings are framed and used; its actual content consists of its specific ideas 
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emphasis is placed on institutions (6, 2011), and priority given to thought-style 
(Douglas, 1986) and informal institutions in generating organisational outcomes (6, 
2011).  
 
Douglas suggests that all thinking and behaviour is, to some degree, institutionally 
influenced through the various institutional memberships individuals belong to. In 
Scott's (2008) terms, this is how institutions exert their own “regulative, normative 
and cognitive” influences on thought and behaviour. Informal institutions that are 
loosely-held, or unconscious, can exert a causally critical influence on behaviour and 
outcomes. On the one hand, they frequently make it possible for formal institutions to 
achieve the leverage they do (6, 2011: 59) by working around cumbersome formal 
procedures, channels and structures to get things done. On the other hand, because 
they are sufficiently ambiguous, they can “provide opportunities” for actors to use 
their “creativity and agency” to “exploit” or manipulate conditions for change 
(Mahoney and Thelan, 2010: 2, 12).   
 
Note that institutions may be small, and constituted within very small groups (even 
dyads). We are inclined to treat social defences as institutions. We think that 
institutions, especially informal ones, can operate unconsciously and alongside 
unconscious processes such as anxiety, defence, competition, identification, hatred 
and the like.   
 
 
CT's Grid-Group Typology and Elementary Forms of Social Organisation 
Douglas (1986) starts from the assumption that all large or small institutions, like the 
people in them, are never static but are continuously being made, re-made and 
challenged through an on-going process of bargaining and negotiation. Thompson 
(2008) calls this "organising and disorganising”.  
 
From Durkheim, Douglas starts from two of his key ideas. The first is his social origin 
of thought.29 For Durkheim, it is not beliefs that explain society, which contribute to 
diverse forms of solidarity and conflict, but society that provides the individual with a 
menu of social, political, and moral beliefs and assumptions about human nature and 
the world. These become our tools for thinking. Though Durkheim and Douglas were 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and beliefs which may be accepted or not. In this way, “people with diametrically opposed ideologies [or world 
views] may exhibit similar thought-styles [and] ideological allies may think in contrasting styles” (2011: 1).  
29
 This refers to the idea that “classifications, logical operations and guiding metaphors are given to the individual 
by society” (Douglas, 1986: 10).   
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typically hostile to psychology (dismissing it as 'methodological individualism'), we 
see no reason to doubt that the same 'menu of assumptions' inhabits each 
individual's unconscious psychological reactions and defences. And unconscious 
processes, at times, animate CT's menu of (four) sets of elementary assumptions.  
 
The second idea is where Durkheim treats sociality as having two organising 
principles - social regulation and social integration or what Douglas calls Grid and 
Group. These give two dimensions to individual thought, behaviour and relationships. 
Any human subject is socially regulated by degrees (accepting of rules) and socially 
integrated by degrees (into groups).  
 
Douglas' innovation was to cross-tabulate them, noting the four distinctive 
elementary forms which the two dimensions of sociality give rise to. Each contains a 
different way of organising social relations and a set of values and cultural biases. 
Diagrams 2.1 and 2.2 capture the two social dimensions and the four elementary 
forms. Diagram 2.3 explores the underlying values and behavioural dynamics 
embedded in each of elementary forms and Diagram 2.4, the types of organisational 
designs that may be found in the organisations, institutions and cultures reflecting 
one or a mix of elementary forms. (All are adapted from: Douglas, 1982; 1986; 
Thompson et al., 1990; 6 and Mars, 2008; Thompson, 2008; 6, 2011). 
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Diagram 2.1 Durkheim’s Two Dimensions of Sociality and Social Organisation 
(or Grid-Group, Cross-tabulated by Douglas) 
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Diagram 2.2 Douglas’ Four Elementary Forms of Social Organisation 
(Adapted from Mars, 2008) 
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Diagram 2.3 Underlying Values and Behavioural Dynamics of Elementary 
Forms 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 2.4 Organising Strengths, Weakness and Tendencies to 
Disorganisation Within Elementary Forms (Thought-Styles) 
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The elementary forms are prototypes: theoretical extremes (Coyle, 1994). They 
rarely exist in pure form but in some weighted mix or hybrid (6, 2011). Due to the 
overlap of individuals' institutional memberships, such as families, work, friendships, 
associations and so on, individuals are exposed to a variety of conflicting thought-
styles which shape and reflect their preferences (though many seem able to block 
the thought-styles prevailing in one sphere, e.g. family, from another, e.g. work). 
Thompson (2008) suggests that the elementary forms are also "fractals", ranging 
from the individual, group, to the nation and epoch.   
 
 
Concluding Comment 
Because organisations are made up of multiple institutions, there rarely, if ever, 
exists one culture in organisations but several, up to four (and several sets thereof). 
This offers a social way of conceptualising conflict or competition with groups and 
institutions: conflicts that the Tavistock treats as psychological (from which it builds 
up its social concepts and models). 30  We see no reason why unconscious 
psychological phenomena might not also be animated by the same four contending 
thought-styles. And we are left with the startling possibility that social defences have 
distinctly social ('cultural') origins and that they provide defence, not just against 
anxiety-inducing primary tasks, but also defence against intolerable encroachment by 
conflicting thought-styles (rationalities).  
 
The literature supports our contention that social defences are cultural and that the 
four thought-styles animate, and can be animated by, unconscious processes.   
 
 
  
                                                          
30
 Wood (1987) found that the basis for sub-groupings, splits and coalitions in small groups was better explained on the basis of 
preference for socio-political values and beliefs, such as political beliefs or affiliations, than upon other factors such as race or 
gender and arguably psychological dynamics alone.  
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
 
3.1. Why a Realist Case Study? 
This research was fortuitous. The author was engaged in a four-year coaching and 
consulting project with the three most senior levels of a medium-size, multinational, 
specialist manufacturing company.31 Social Defences appeared during the second 
year so a Tavistock-style action-research intervention32 was offered to the senior 
executive team. But my attempts failed to create change, and the ‘Manufacturing/ 
Sales Divide’ of which they spoke, got worse. Here was my research question: 
‘Why?’ 
 
Social defence theorists know of this ‘problem of change’ and advocate the type of 
Tavistock systems-psychodynamic methods that were used. Most of the data was 
derived from coaching sessions. This allows for close comparisons with other cases 
in the social defences literature. Because Tavistock methods admit the role of the 
unconscious – which cannot be observed directly – it is argued that this is better 
embraced with a Realist epistemology (Rustin, 1991). Realism proposes that there 
exist ‘underlying causes’ to ‘surface appearances’. Our starting point, therefore, was 
realist which suggested the need for more investigation to examine why our social 
defence intervention failed.  
 
Consequently, the research became a post-fact analysis of a consulting failure. 
 
Tavistock researchers have long since suspected that a sociological/anthropological 
(cultural) side is needed for action-research consulting projects (Trist, 1950) and 
therefore social defence theory (SDT). The literature review indicated that Grid Group 
Cultural Theory (GGCT or CT) was a promising addition to SDT. It, too, is realist in 
the sense just described, insofar as it infers that ‘ways-of-thinking’ derive from 
underlying, essential social principles which we said more about earlier. CT 
postulates that thoughts, feelings, values, and actions have a ‘solidarity’ dimension 
(Group), and a ‘regulation’ dimension (Grid).   
 
                                                          
31
 The company has operations with production facilities and/or sales offices in 19 countries, across five 
continents with a staff of around 4,200 employees with operating and turnover revenue of €340 million in 2009.  
The consulting project commenced in the first half of 2008 and continued until early 2012.  
32
 The intervention included the presentation of evidence of the social defences and a working hypothesis 
outlining what may have triggered the social defences. It was designed and facilitated as an action-research 
intervention. The purpose was to facilitate the senior team’s discussion of the possible causes and what could be 
done about them.  
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SDT and CT developed through field-work, consulting practice and anthropological 
work. Both have been applied to the study of organisations, both are used to inform 
organisational interventions, and both are practice-based theories.  
 
Tavistock practitioners prefer participatory versus direct interventions in keeping with 
consulting room one-on-one psychoanalysis (Lawrence, 2006 and 2000). The aim is 
unearthing the underlying roots of problems, and allowing clients to decide what, if 
anything, to do about them. But realism encompasses both highly directive 
interventions (notably Marxism-Leninism) as well as collective ‘participatory action 
research’. Realism per se, then, does not dictate the form interventions might take, 
for it is an epistemology (theory of knowledge) and not a theory of practice. 
 
  
Aims 
It was suspected that social defences and the damage they can do might be better 
explained by CT. But the question became how to attach CT to SDT? Despite their 
use of sociology to Tavistock theory and methods; neither Trist, Emery nor Jaques 
knew of CT which only emerged later. And while SDT has a posited but undeveloped 
sociological side (Menzies, 1960), the author can see that CT demonstrates a limited 
understanding of system-psychodynamics33 and has much to gain from SDT. 
 
As a practitioner, our primary task is to assist clients. Can SDT and CT help clients 
understand and address conflicting ways-of-thinking and the defences which we 
suspect they generate? 34  
 
This after-the-fact SDT-cum-CT research aims to explain: 
 the specific timing and character of social defences; and 
 why our psychodynamic interventions did not lead to change. 
 
The aim is to enhance consulting practice and to ameliorate SDT's recognised 
‘problem of change’.  
 
                                                          
33
 Douglas (1982) was generally wary of psychological explanations, but saw a role for individuals to use their 
agency in changing their circumstances. 
34
 Synthesis of SDT and CT would allow many SDT-based studies to be revisited so that more could be extracted 
from them concerning ‘the problem of change’ that has been encountered so often before.  
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This case-based research examines a "complex social phenomena, ... [while] 
retain[ing] the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events", to 
investigate the "how", "why" and "what" questions that can develop a viable 
explanation and offer generalisations (Yin, 2009: 4-8). Both the phenomena under 
examination (collective defences and thought-styles), and the Tavistock-style, social-
psychoanalytic methods of inquiry used (Long, 2013; Newton et al., 2006) do not suit 
experimental and survey designs. However, future evidence will indicate whether 
interventions which incorporate both SDT and CT will be more effective.  
 
 
Inference, Interpretation and Abduction 
Social defences are theory-laden phenomena (Maxwell, 2012: 130-131; Yin, 2009: 
72; Danermark et al., 2002: 79 and 88-95). They cannot be observed directly. They 
are inferred (recognised) theoretically from actions-in-context. We can quantify 
defences only as ‘powerful’ or ‘moderate’ but not measure them numerically. They 
are more ‘interpretive’ than given (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009: 18).  
 
Social defences, like any beneath-the-surface phenomena call for ‘abduction’ 
whereby a single-case setting is "interpreted from a hypothetic overarching pattern" 
which may explain their specific manifestation (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009: 4). 
Abduction involves the "reasoning from effects back to causes" to identify the 
inference(s) that lead to the most viable explanation (6 and Bellamy, 2012: 209). 
According to Long (2013: xxii and 10-17), "abductive logic" suits psychoanalytic and 
"socio-analytic discovery". It utilises "narrative, qualitative, descriptive methods”, and 
"action research ... interventions," in order to generate hypotheses about the 
“surprising” effects of the unconscious on action. Abduction captures the "surprising 
fact" in the form of a "metaphor" during the "early stages of hypothesis creation" 
which can be then used to develop "working hypotheses" and be examined against 
new cases. Abduction can be used in both interpretive and realist research.35 
                                                          
35
 These differ by degree. Realism frequently articulates a realist ontology – belief that phenomena exist 
independently of our knowledge of them. Interpretivism treats all knowledge as social constructions created 
from a particular vantage point (Maxwell, 2012: vii). Thus realists and interpretivists adopt different ontologies. 
Realists accord “truth status [to] knowledge that can be achieved either by observation or inference” or 
conclusion validity (6 and Bellamy, 2012: 61). Realists and Interpretivists both depart from positivism in that both 
reject the proposition that ‘reality’ is directly observable. They doubt that it is possible to establish general and 
constant laws that will predict constant conjunctions between variables. Positivists object to realists and 
interpretivists on the grounds that their theories are difficult to test. What differentiates realism from both 
positivist and constructivist approaches is that “it re-legitimates ontological questions about the phenomena” 
under study; with both positivism and constructivism in different ways relegating ontology to questions of 
epistemology or what constitutes knowledge (Maxwell, 2012: 8-13). In placing the emphasis on ontology, Tilly 
(2008) argues that realism combines “theoretical with empirical work” in qualitative and empirical research 
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Given their hidden qualities and theory-dependence, social defences, are by 
definition realist.  
 
 
The Iterations of Data Analysis 
Cases do not come fully-formed. We noted that the post-GFC policy responses to the 
GFC preceded the inferred social defences and worsening problems then followed as 
the organisation got ‘stuck’. CT was applied next, as a way of giving SDT a 
sociological dimension. 
 
The case developed in approximately three phases with forwards and backwards 
iterations (Diagram 3.1). This began with sorting the coaching-consulting data, 
identifying the key events of the case, and re-evaluating the case in the light of failure 
of the social defence intervention and the application of CT.  
 
Diagram 3.1 The Research and its Iterations 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
through “pursuing ... two interacting bodies of theory simultaneously: a theory embodying explanations of the 
phenomenon under investigation, and another theory embodying explanations of the evidence” (Tilly, 2008: 138 
and 47). Tilly’s advice was followed when examining social defences that appeared during the consultation. They 
became autonomous ‘structural’ entities. This was done by inferring their contextual causes, and cultural origins 
in thought-styles, operation and consequences. 
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3.2 Data Collection 
 
Sources of Data 
All the data came from the coaching and consulting activities with the top three levels 
of the organisation. The rationale was to maintain consistency with the practice-
based nature of the project. This informed the on-going consulting, and reflected, as 
closely as possible, what coaches and consultants utilising Tavistock methods and 
interventions actually do. Only later was this data re-analysed for the purpose of the 
research.  
 
Qualitative data was collected from four sources: 
 The one-on-one coaching of over 50 managers from the top three levels of 
the organisation, of which 80% come from the two largest departments of 
Manufacturing and Sales, but all functions were represented.36 The coaching 
made up most of the data.  
 This was supplemented through other consulting activities such as:  
o Feedback and action planning sessions that reported the higher level 
themes to emerge from the coaching, and designed as action 
research interventions to facilitate further discussion, analysis, and 
action-planning. Most were with the senior executive team. 
o Additional large-group interventions between the top three levels and 
functions to deepen the communication, improve collaboration and to 
solve problems.  
 Informal observations when coaching was conducted in head office. This 
included invitations to observe in several meetings and interactions37 between 
functional managers.   
 Both formal and informal conversations with organisational sponsors - two 
members of the senior team; and others in corridors, between coaching 
                                                          
36
 The initial contract for the coaching was for six sessions per participant, including an upfront 360° feedback 
report, which was debriefed in the first session. The first phase involved the coaching of the 15 most senior 
managers from Manufacturing. Nevertheless, and despite the onset of the GFC which dramatically cut sales and 
revenue, the coaching increased to include the top three levels of Sales, and later, participants from other 
functions. Post-GFC participants who requested more sessions received them.  
37
 I undertook all of the coaching and the longer I was in the organisation, I was treated as “part of the furniture”, 
as one participant put it, and was allowed to sit in on meetings, observe interactions and was asked for my input 
and feedback on whatever topics participants were discussing.  
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sessions; and when invited to contribute and discuss plans and 
arrangements.38 
 
 
Interpreting Data through Tavistock Method 
The purpose of Tavistock methodology is to reveal the nature and quality of the 
collective emotional experience within an organisation (Armstrong, 2005). This 
requires consultants to attend to the thoughts, feelings, preoccupations and their 
underlying meanings in relation to organisational members. These emerge through 
coaching conversations, discussions and observation. A central feature is that 
theoretically-drenched psychoanalytic concepts, techniques and group dynamics are 
used to direct the consultant's attention and to insert theoretically-shaped meaning 
into what they hear, see, and experience. The pooling of participants’ communication 
and its interpretation reveals something about:  
 The organisation's functioning  
 The quality and nature of individuals' engagement or frustration with the 
organisation or work  
 Whether any significant defences against anxiety are operating, or are 
potentially threatening to undermine performance.  
 
This then acts as a kind of diagnostic barometer, as do shifts in its nature over time. 
But its meaning is not self-evident. It requires interpretation.    
 
The main tool used is that all participant communication is interpreted in relation to 
the consultant's own emotional experience in response. This is a central method of 
psychoanalytically-informed consultants - the use of their own self-experience, as a 
tool or instrument for meaning-making through generating hunches, developing these 
into hypotheses, and testing them against what has happened before and next. How 
a consultant is treated, and what they feel and experience in relation to what 
organisational members do and say, is part and parcel of how the meaning 
underlying organisational behaviour and collective experience is revealed.  
 
                                                          
38
 Two-thirds of the coaching and most of the consulting was conducted in head-office which is situated across 
one floor of an office block. In between sessions, I could observe movements, with people frequently stopping to 
interact with me. Being present, I was naturally invited to many informal and, over time, several formal 
gatherings. 
  
66 
As such, what counts as data comes in the form of examples of statements or 
metaphors used by participants, and the consultant-researcher's interpretations 
which are grouped into themes. All data was collected and mediated in this fashion.  
 
 
Sorting the Data 
In addition to the Tavistock method, all coaching and consulting data was sorted 
according to three practice-based consulting models: 
 The Burke and Litwin Model of Organisational Performance and Change 
(1992). The value of this model is that it differentiates between whole-scale, 
organisational change referred to as "transformational change" which is 
affected by change in either the strategy, leadership, culture or external 
environment. Diagram 3.2 shows these top blue shaded categories and 
above which affect all other categories below. Changes made below lead to 
piecemeal change or organisational improvement. This includes the 
categories of structure, management practices and systems, which in turn 
affects the working unit climate and individuals' motivation and skills.   
   
 
Diagram 3.2 The Burke and Litwin Diagnostic Model of Organisational 
Performance and Change 
External Environment
Mission &
Strategy
Leadership
Organisational
Culture
Structure
Management
Practices
Systems
Policies & Procedures
Work Unit
Climate
Tasks &
Skills Motivation
Individual
Needs & Values
Organisational & Individual Performance
Burke & Litwin (1992)
A Diagnostic Model of Organisational Performance & Change
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 The coaching drew on Tavistock theory and methods. This centred on the 
organisational role analysis (ORA) approach to coaching (Newton et al., 
2006). Whereas Burke and Litwin sorted what people spoke about 
according to organisational categories, ORA sorted according to whether it 
referred more to the person (their history, psychology and needs), the role 
(they occupied), or the organisation. ORA helped the coaching to get 
underneath the surface-level of what participants spoke about. Table 3.1 
provides a schematic overview of the reciprocal influence between the 
person, the role and organisation and what these indicate. Table 3.1 
highlights some of the theoretical concepts and methods that ORA draws 
on.  
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Table 3.1 Schematic Overview of ORA and Reciprocal Influences 
 
Analysing using 
B.A.R.T. 
Green and 
Molenkamp, 2005 
Miller and Rice, 
1967 
Differentiating 
The Normative, 
Existential 
and Phenomenal 
Tasks 
Lawrence, 2000 
Differentiating 
Leadership, 
Authority and 
Power 
Trist, 1950b 
Obholzer, 1994 
Systemic Levels or 
Lenses through 
which to view 
behaviour 
Wells,1995 
Boundaries 
Constraints, Rules 
and Resources of 
task, time and 
territory 
How are these 
managed, noted, 
negotiated? 
Normative Task 
Official Role Title, 
Definition and 
Description. This 
establishes an 
independent 
measure of what a 
role-holder ‘ought’ to 
be doing 
Leadership 
Denotes formal role  
Or can be taken up 
informally  
If so, does it further 
the task of the team 
or organisation? 
If not, it is a political 
or power play 
Intrapersonal 
Psychological 
Processes, 
Personality 
Characteristics, Skills 
and Knowledge 
 
Authority 
How is it derived -  
Formally or 
Informally? 
Does it match 
accountability? 
Existential Task 
What the person 
thinks, believes or 
reports what they are 
doing. 
Assumptions and 
‘Take’ on Role 
Authority  
Property of the 
system 
Different 
organisational forms 
authorise roles in 
different ways 
Interpersonal 
Quality and type of 
relationships, 
communication 
patterns, levels of 
conflict and trust. 
Relating styles 
Role 
Nature, 
Requirements, 
Stakeholders 
History of Role in 
Org. 
Person Role 
Biography 
Phenomenal Task 
Actual behaviour in 
role 
Power 
Property of the 
Person 
Does it contribute to 
the task and system, 
or benefit the 
individual? 
Power without 
authority = dictator 
Group-as-a-whole 
Group as a non-
reducible unit of 
analysis, individuals 
as ‘mouthpiece’ for 
and behaviour on 
behalf of group or 
parts of 
Task 
Primary and Related 
tasks of 
Role, Team and 
Org.? 
Anxiety associated 
with doing task? 
Method: 
Differentiating 
between what a role-
holder: ‘ought’; ‘says’ 
and actually ‘does’ in 
role, reveals how: an 
individual’s psycho-
dynamics affect their 
performance; or how 
their behaviour is 
infused by the role or 
system 
Method: 
These distinctions 
differentiate between 
how a role 
‘authorises’ an 
individual to act vs. 
how they take on 
their own authority in 
role; when they act 
with or without 
authorisation in 
service of the task; or 
on their own behalf 
or purposes 
Inter-group 
Relations between 
groups and sub-
groups. 
Actors carry different 
membership 
behaviours from 
other  groups and 
identities and 
ideological 
differences 
Method: 
The B.A.R.T. concepts are used to establish 
the parameters of a system and to analyse 
performance within it. Deviations and 
analysis reveal dynamics that enhance or 
undermine performance and are used to help 
individuals and groups reflect upon, and 
improve, how they go about doing their work 
 Inter-
Organisational 
Relations existing 
between 
organisations and 
their environment 
that makes demands 
on focal organisation 
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 The third consulting model is Wells’ system-psychodynamic levels of 
organisational analysis (1995) that differentiates between five distinct 
organisational levels of analysis described in Diagram 3.2. Whereas Burke 
and Litwin helped sort according to organisational category that told us 
something about the cause-and-effect-linkages in what participants spoke 
about; and ORA between whether it was more about person, role or 
organisation; Wells' model sorted according to the organisational level of 
what participants spoke about and what their psychodynamic 
communication was referring to, or where it may have originated or is better 
understood as referring to.  
 
 
Table 3.2 Wells' System-Psychodynamics Levels of Organisational Analysis 
Organisational 
Level 
Description   
Inter-
organisational 
Processes 
Refer to the “relationships that exist between organisations and their 
environment”. These concern a set of organisations, referred to as referent 
organisations (Trist, 1983) that constitute a discrete domain that “make 
demands on or have impact upon the focal organisation”. It can also reflect 
the nature of the environment and the adaptation demands it makes on the 
organisation (Emery and Trist, 1965). 
Inter-Group 
Processes 
Refer to “relations among groups or sub-groups” that derive from the 
group-memberships that individuals carry with them. These can develop 
from: an individual’s structural or task position; different ideological 
identifications; as well as from “sex, race, age or ethnic identities”. Inter-
group processes determine “how we treat and are treated by others”; 
colour perceptions; and help determine individuals’ “sense of reality”. 
Group-Level 
Processes 
(group-as-a-
whole) 
Refer to the “group as a social system” along with individual members’ 
“relatedness to that system”. It draws on Bion’s group theory where the unit 
of analysis is the “group-as-a-whole” or “as a system” which is greater than 
the sum of its parts. It assumes that when individuals act, they act not only 
on their own behalf, “but on behalf of the group or parts of the group”. 
Behaviour is viewed “as a synthesis of and interaction with the group’s life 
and mentality” where the individual is seen “as a vehicle through which the 
group expresses its life.”
39
 
Inter-Personal 
Processes 
Focus on “the quality and type of relationships” between individuals 
including: communication patterns; information flow; relating styles; and the 
levels of trust and conflict in relationships. It examines “how well or poorly 
individuals relate to their peers, subordinates and supervisors”. 
Intra-Personal 
Processes 
Focus on personality characteristics and the internal drivers of behaviour 
such as defensive styles, ego ideal, desires and needs fulfilled by others. It 
“assumes that the behaviour emerges from the internal life from within” the 
individual. 
 
                                                          
39
 This is the hallmark of a system-psychodynamic approach. Viewing individuals’ behaviour as also an expression 
of aspects or themes occurring within their relatedness to one another and with the various sub-systems and 
whole in which they are part was how the more psychoanalytic aspects of behaviour were coded for both 
consulting and research purposes.  
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Diagram 3.3 transposes Wells' organisational levels onto the Burke and Litwin model. 
This adds a missing cause-and-effect linkage between organisational categories and 
levels.  
 
 
Diagram 3.3 The Burke and Litwin model (1992) with  
Wells’ Systemic Levels of Analysis (1995) 
External Environment
Mission &
Strategy
Leadership
Organisational
Culture
Structure
Management
Practices
Systems
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Burke & Litwin model (1992); with systemic levels of analysis (Wells, 1995)
A Diagnostic Model of Organisational Performance & Change
Business Environment
Organisational Level
Inter-Group Level
Team Work-Unit Team
Interpersonal Level
Individual Level
 
 
 
This tells us whether what participants spoke about refers to the organisation-as-a-
whole, or the level of inter-group functions, teams or individuals. It also suggests that 
if intervention was addressed at a particular level or category, this would point to the 
type of change it may lead to.  
 
Burke and Litwin's differentiation between types of change suggested that the failed 
social defence intervention - like those found in the social defence literature 
(Menzies, 1960; Obholzer and Roberts, 1994) - was directed at team and individual-
level change. This is not the same as whole-scale, or "paradigm" shifting change that 
Trist et al. (1963 [1990]) and Emery (1997; Weisbord, 1992; Emery and Weisbord, 
1992; Emery and Trist, 1965) argued was required for organisations to change, and 
may not be adequately addressed with, or facilitated from, the Tavistock paradigm 
and its methods and interventions.  
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ORA and Wells' models do not distinguish between types or levels of change, and 
like SDT and the more psychological focus often found within the Tavistock 
paradigm, this may only account for why change is resisted by individuals and teams 
(Long, 2006; Krantz, 2010), rather than how organisational change occurs and where 
in the organisation it needs to be directed. The implicit assumption in SDT is that 
organisations change, if individuals and teams (psychologically) change first. While 
relevant, it is somewhat naive and lacking a sociological dimension. This is where 
both Burke and Litwin in helping to sort Tavistock-style data, and CT with its 
sociological explanatory focus, may improve SDT's prospect of change.  
 
This differentiation between types of change and where they may be effected, was 
the value of the Burke and Litwin model to the research, even when compared to 
other organisational models of performance and change found in the literature such 
as: Mintzberg's (1991 and 1981) forces and forms of organisations; Quinn's (1988 
and 2001) competing commitments framework; and Schein's (2004 and 1996) work 
on organisational cultural and leadership. These models are discussed in Chapter 
Seven as rival theories and their explanations, and why they were not as effective as 
Burke and Litwin in sorting data, or the combination of SDT and CT in data-
analysis.40  
 
 
Data-Sorting Method and Implications 
All of the higher level themes from coaching conversation were assigned to one or 
more of the relevant categories of the three models which best reflected its content or 
meaning. These were summarised, and then cross-referenced when overlaps 
occurred between the categories of all three models. For example, if something was 
assigned to the organisation or system category of the ORA model which was also 
further broken down into one of its sub-categories; these were then cross-referenced 
to Wells’ inter-group or organisation-as-a-whole levels, or to one of Burke and 
Litwin’s strategy, leadership practices, culture or structure or systems; and vice versa 
etc. This allowed for causal inferences to be made. Similarly, if something was 
assigned to one of Burke and Litwin’s motivation, individual needs or values, or task 
and skills categories, this was then cross-referenced against one of the sub-
                                                          
40
 In realist research, Maxwell (2012: 127-128), and 6 and Bellamy (2012: 22) argue that conclusion validity and 
generalisability are enhanced by addressing the possible claims of rival theories or explanations against those 
chosen. 
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categories of ORA’s individual or role categories, or to Wells’ intra-psychic, 
interpersonal or group-as-a-whole levels.  
 
This allowed conversation to take place between the predominantly psychodynamic-
systemic and interpretive models and the social or organisational-systemic and 
causal model. For example, if something was placed in Burke and Litwin’s individual 
needs and values category and cross-referenced with Well’s interpersonal rather 
than intra-psychic categories, or ORA’s sub-categories; this raised important 
questions for the analysis.  
 
Together, the three sorting models represented a connecting strategy that went 
across inter-disciplinary and methodological lines. It allowed the data to be viewed 
from both psychoanalytic and organisational change cause-and-effect linkages. This 
proved helpful in the later data analysis to forecast where intervention drawing on 
SDT/CT analyses of institutions could be directed.  
 
 
3.3 Applying Theory to the Evidence 
 
Identifying Social Defences 
Methodologically, SDT is an extension of Bion's (1961) psychoanalytic group 
theory.41 It postulates social defences against anxiety - or what Bion categorises in 
terms of Freud's 'primary process' (or child-like, unconscious, pleasure-seeking and 
pain-avoidance) functioning which he calls the 'basic assumption group' - are present 
when more functional (adult or rational) 'secondary process' thinking is in abeyance. 
Bion's ‘sophisticated work group' focuses on achieving the group's purpose or task. 
                                                          
41
 Bion saw basic assumptions as patterned behaviour (albeit defensive in nature and operation). Individuals, 
anonymously and unconsciously, contribute but once established, BAs operate independently influencing 
subsequent behaviour. Menzies described the nature and operation of social defences in similar fashion, and like 
Bion, elaborated with rich descriptions. The value for this research is if we can infer the basic assumption pattern 
operating in social defences, this allows for a direct comparison to be made between conceptualising social 
defences in psychoanalytic terms and in social terms – if, for example, we infer which of CT’s elementary forms 
(EFs) may be operating in the same social defence system. Like BAs, EFs are patterned behaviour. But they 
operate sociologically according to implicit social values, beliefs and design principles that organise social 
relations. For Douglas (1986 and 1982), EFs can be summoned for defence and attack – in both justifying one’s 
own actions and blaming others. Such comparison allows the research to infer which pattern (psychoanalytic or 
sociological) better matches the evidence that may identify the causes (what externally the social defences are a 
reaction to) and forecast consequences (what they may go on to cause within the organisation) of the social 
defences. 
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Bion postulates, that at any point in time, a group is either predominantly operating 
as a 'basic assumption' group or a 'work' group.  
 
The social referent for both basic assumption behaviour, and social defences, is the 
primary task or purpose of the organisation, role, team, department and so on of the 
individuals exhibiting defences. These are (theoretically) inferred in the reasonable 
presence of what can be deemed task-avoiding or anxiety-circumventing behaviour. 
This can only be quantified as more or less.  
 
A social defence pattern will reflect one or other of Bion's 'basic assumption' (BA) 
behaviours: dependency, fight/flight, and pairing. Two more have been added: BA 
'Oneness' (Turquet, 1974) and BA 'Me' (Gould et al., 1996). These have been 
described in Chapter Two. 
 
Social defences were inferred in the presence of task-avoiding, task-undermining or 
anxiety-circumventing behaviour in relation to the primary task, and then labelled 
according to the dominant basic assumption they displayed.  
 
 
Comparing Social Defences as Basic Assumptions or Elementary Forms 
Identifying the BA pattern exhibited in the social defences could not provide as 
adequate a forecast of the consequences that the social defences contributed (to 
actual case outcomes), compared with identifying one or other of CT's elementary 
forms driving social/institutional operation of the social defences. The elementary 
forms were mostly reliant on observing and inferring the thought-style each social 
defence constellation exhibited. It is from this basis, derived from actual case 
outcomes, that generalisations can be made.  
 
The inadequacy of forecasting what social defences will go on and cause if they were 
defined as basic assumption patterns - derived from the Tavistock methods - led to 
the development of a second and third set of research questions. Using CT, and the 
three analytical models (institutional theory, systems theory, and agency-structure):   
 helped develop the sociological side of SDT, 
 contributed to SDT's prospects of change, and  
 enabled an exploration of the role and relative contribution of social and 
psychological forces in diagnosing and helping change organisations.   
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The implications are taken up in Chapter Five. 
 
 
Steps that Developed the Sociological-Side of SDT 
Developing the sociological dimension also drew upon contributions from Durkheim 
and Freud who used concepts that freely applied to inter- and intra-psychic 
phenomena.  
 From Durkheim, social defences were conceptualised as "social facts" and as 
a form of "anomie" or a reflection of the anomie within the organisation 
(definitions are provided in Chapters Two and Six). 
 From Freud, anxiety as social in origin and nature ("moral anxiety"), and 
"identification" as encompassing symbols, ideas and principles as markers for 
values and beliefs. 
 
This focused attention on the likely social dimensions of social defences emphasising 
how their social nature constrains and informs behaviour. Drawing on realist causal 
methods, this led to: 
 Identifying the social causes and effects of social defences 
 Tracing their history 
 Determining the function they serve both for the social group they exist in, 
and the effects they may generate within the larger organisation. 
 
These tools gelled with the sociological developments and methods in the work of 
Trist, Emery and Jaques who may not have known about CT, but drew on the three 
analytical models in varying ways.  
 
 
Applying the Three Analytic Models  
The three analytical models, like CT, can be used alongside SDT to develop the 
sociological dimensions of social defences that: 
 Operate as institutions (Scott, 2008; Douglas, 1986) 
 Generate systemic feedback loops, and display self-organisation 
(Meadows, 2008; Capra, 1996; 6, 2003 and 2011; Douglas and Mars, 2003)  
 Can be viewed either in psychological terms as forms of agency versus 
sociological terms as structure (Mouzelis, 2008; Archer, 1996). 
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They provided the tools through which the claims of SDT and CT, against the case-
data, can be compared and help answer the second and third set of research 
questions. For example, SDT may posit that social defences are a form of agency, 
albeit unconscious or "de-centred" (Caldwell, 2005); whereas CT could 
reconceptualise social defences as institutions or structural entities generating 
institutional influences and distinctive cultural rationalities on individuals and the 
organisation. This allows different inferences to emerge in diagnosing organisations 
and directing change intervention. Table 3.3 indicates how the three analytic models 
were applied in the research. 
 
Table 3.3 The Three Analytical Models and their Use in the Research 
Analytical 
Model 
Definitions What Used Method 
Agency-
Structure 
- Structure as social 
forces inherent in 
systems and institutions 
that influence and 
constrain individuals’ 
action 
 
- Agency as ability of 
individuals to act and 
pursue goals and 
alternatives in the 
context of social 
influences and 
constraints (King, 2005) 
- Agency can be unconscious 
(Caldwell, 2006) 
 
- Agency and structure as 
two types of causality 
(Mouzelis, 2008) 
 
- Where the theoretical locus 
of explanation should be 
placed on individuals or 
social influences (Gergen, 
2001) 
Viewing agency 
and structure as 
analytically distinct 
phenomena and 
observing and 
comparing their 
influence and 
interplay over time 
(Archer, 1996) 
Institutional 
Analysis 
- Institutions are 
conventions or ways of 
thinking about, and 
doing things, that ensure 
coordination (Douglas, 
1986) made up of 
beliefs and practices 
that influence behaviour 
in regulative, normative 
and culturally-cognitive 
ways (Scott, 2008) 
- Institutions can be formal or 
informal (6, 2011) and 
operating within both the 
formal and informal 
organisation (Goldsmith and 
Katzenbach, 2007) 
 
- Viewing ‘structure’ and 
social defences as 
institutions containing rules, 
practices, norms and beliefs, 
and common ways of 
thinking and doing 
Leaders’ and 
individuals’ actions 
can create 
institutions that in 
turn influence 
behaviour 
Reconceptualising 
social defences as 
informal institution 
practices and 
ways of thinking 
Systems 
Theory 
- Social defences 
generate feed-back 
processes or loops 
(Meadows, 2008) 
 
- Social defences and 
other institutions (e.g. 
the post-GFC policies) 
‘self-organise’ which 
suggests that they are 
simultaneously open to 
the influence of their 
environment and closed 
- Differentiating types of 
feedback loops as reinforcing 
(positive) or undermining 
(negative) 
 
- Positive feedback, if left 
unchecked, will reinforce the 
behaviour and practices 
within the system until it 
begins to undermine the 
system 
 
- Feedback can be directed 
- Through 
observation and 
inference from 
effects to find 
causes can 
identify feedback 
loops within 
institutions and 
toward other 
institutions or the 
organisation 
 
- ‘Self-
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internally or 
operationally in what 
they do with this 
influence (Capra, 1996) 
internally and externally onto 
other systems  
 
- Negative feedback is 
usually directed outward of 
the system to other systems 
to undermine them 
organisation’ 
involves 
examining the 
effects that being 
both open to the 
environment and 
closed 
operationally entail 
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Applying Cultural Theory  
Of the many attempts to operationalise and objectively measure aspects of GGCT, 
those that have focused on the grid and group dimensions (rather than the four 
cultural types) have shown more promise but come with their problems (Maleki and 
Hendriks, 2014). This is because aspects of the theory (grid-group, elementary 
forms, thought-style) are intermediate concepts and not true operational measures 
(6, 2013).  
 
Douglas’ own preference was for qualitative, in-depth case-studies. She remained 
wary of attempts to empirically prove the validity of the theory through quantitative 
measurement. She saw cultural theory as offering “a nice little typology that goes a 
long way in understanding the world around us” and indeed, the "worlds around us” 
(1992: 137), applicable to different levels of analysis from individuals’ preferences, to 
groups, organisations and nations. 
 
For qualitative case-based research, there are five ways of classifying the different 
dimensions of the theory. Douglas (1982) in collaboration with Hampton (1982), and 
Gross and Rayner (1985), focused on defining the grid and group dimensions. 
Whereas, Thompson (1992) and 6 (2011) have produced ways of sorting for thought-
style, and Mars (1982) targeted different ways rules can be violated that identify 
anomalies in thought-style. Recently, 6 (unpublished) has produced measures that 
do not rely on thought-style by identifying the number and types of roles, positions 
and relations between them for each of the cultural forms. Aspects of all five were 
used. 
 
In this research, because CT was applied to:  
 the social defences, including the three groups exhibiting them (the senior 
team, and functions of Manufacturing and Sales),  
 the four most notable post-GFC policies, and  
 the organisation as a whole at different times … 
 
... it made sense to firstly conceptualise each as institutions that generated feedback 
loops; and secondly as containing an organising logic, thought-style and values 
according to one or a mix of CT's elementary forms.  
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To do this, required viewing the cross-tabulated grid-group dimensions as 
'continuous dimensions' rather than 'dichotomous variables' (Thompson, 1982; Boyle 
and Coughlin, 1994; Coyle, 1994 and 1997). As 'dichotomous variables', their cross-
tabulation reveals four parsimonious, 'ideal type' categories. The difficulty here is that 
a slight shift or a crossing of one line into another implies “a sudden, radical 
transformation to another state” (Boyle and Coughlin, 1994: 194). This is empirically 
rare. Nor does it capture how a hybrid mix of elementary forms may be operating (6, 
2011). It also underplays how thought-style is cultivated, and how individuals' 
preferences for particular values or beliefs develop over time, and may change 
depending on the context (Douglas, 1986; Coyle, 1994).   
 
The alternative is to conceptualise the two dimensions as "continuous dimensions”. 
This allows for a weighted hybrid mix of elementary forms. And for the “pure types ... 
[to} occupy only small regions near the corners of the quadrants ... and transitional 
gray areas consume most of the area of the map” (1994: 194-5). As continuous, the 
four corners can then be seen “as ideals or theoretical extremes" rather than the 
location of real individuals or institutions (Coyle, 1994: 220).  
 
Methodologically, this required starting with a blank CT map highlighting the four 
extremes only in the corners, Diagram 3.4, and then plotting where on the map the 
social defences, policies and organisation would be. This allows for slight shifts to be 
detected over time.  
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Diagram 3.4 A Cultural Theory Social Map without the Boxes 
(Adapted from Thompson, 1982; Boyle and Coughlin, 1994; and Coyle, 1994 
and 1997) 
Hierarchy
Coordination
Integration & Alignment
Market 
Individualism
Initiative, Innovation, 
Flexibility: Open to 
Opportunity & Change
Isolate 
Ordering
Survival & lacks Trust
Despotic, Arbitrary
Egalitarian Clans 
Belonging & Involvement
Community
Lively Debate, Robust 
Communication,  
 
 
The methodological steps: 
 Each of the social defences, policies and the organisation-as-a-whole were 
intuitively captured, and described, by one or a combination of elementary 
forms: either the values or principles they displayed, or the style of 
organising they were perpetuating.42  
 Each institution also had a purpose. Individuals working to pursue a purpose 
would over time develop distinctive ways of thinking and behaving - or 
thought-style.  
 Then came identifying the driving value or principle, and style of organising. 
This involved working back to see whether the purpose or intent of each 
institution, and the observed thought-style, matched the intuited inference.     
                                                          
42
 For example, if we take the centralisation of purchasing and distribution, the underlying driving principle or 
value was to seize control of expenditure and to cut costs. The style of organising that this perpetuated was 
centralising control at the top of the organisation, and reducing the options of departments that previously had 
this control. The principle and style of organising indicated both hierarchy and Isolate Ordering. But given the 
fear, and the threat to survival, and the loss of authority this entailed for people below, this leaned it more 
toward the latter. This becomes clearer if we compare this policy to the introduction of the KPIs (Key 
Performance Indicators). The underlying principle or value, and style of organising, was to create order and 
organisation, which though increasing control, it also indicates that it is attempting to create a functional or 
better-organised hierarchy.  
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 The next step was putting these four elements together and placing them 
onto a blank CT map. This helped to determine the approximate location or 
spread of each policy. A consistency would indicate a specific, or the 
strongest, elementary form driving the institution, whereas an inconsistency 
would point to a weighted mix of elementary forms.43   
 This was done for each of the social defences, the policies and the 
organisation as a whole.  
 Next came identifying the most likely consequences or effects that each 
institution generated. 
 The final step was looking at the empirical events that occurred and asking 
whether the hypothesised elementary form or weighted mix would have 
generated such consequences. In all cases, and as described above, there 
was a match.  
 
 
3.4 The Four Iterations of Data-Analysis 
 
First Iteration: Writing a Narrative   
Writing a linear narrative of the case leads to “developing a case description” as a 
strategy “to develop a descriptive framework for organising the case study” (Yin, 
2009: 131). This identified:  
 the plot, ... centering on the failed social defence intervention ... why?; 
 the relevant actors and their contributions,44 ... the senior team, the 
departments of Manufacturing and Sales, and their social defences; 
 the scenes in which the action occurred, ... head office; 
 the significant issues of the case, ... the GFC, the post-GFC policies, the 
social defences and the worsening problems; and  
 the context behind the story, and how it contributed, ... the history of the 
organisation, its tendency toward, and movement, into isolate ordering.  
 
                                                          
43
 For example, with the centralisation of purchasing and distribution, the four elements together were indicating 
a weighted mix of two elementary forms, isolate order being the stronger, and hierarchy. Whereas the KPIs were 
more clearly hierarchical in their intention, and the pushing of initiative was mostly market or individualist.  
44
 Significant examples from the coaching, and how these deepened the learning and understanding behind the 
story, were included in the original narrative but were edited out in order to protect the confidentiality of 
individuals. Attempts were first made to disguise the roles and the individuals involved, but this only confused 
the story as the roles and the departments that these individuals occupied emerged as significant contributors to 
the narrative.   
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This helped to distil the significant elements of the case and how they related to each 
other. It was both “categorising” and “connecting strategies of data analysis” 
(Maxwell, 2012: 118-123) that helped “to identify the appropriate causal links” to be 
analysed (Yin, 2009: 131).   
 
 
Second Iteration: Cause and effect Relationships 
The significant elements of the case were then placed into a time-ordered sequence 
(Yin, 2009: 144-146; Miles and Huberman, 1994). These identified:  
 The metaphors used by participants to refer to the coaching at different 
intervals of time,45 which interpretively framed ... 
 The key events such as the GFC, organisational problems and phenomena, 
social defences and the post-GFC policies.  
 
These were then subjected to a series of analyses which included: 
 Displaying each of the events and phenomena singularly, in terms of what 
happened before and what came after, to see what cause-and-effect 
inferences could be developed; and then 
 Combining each of these significant elements with each of the others to study 
their relationship over time, and to infer cause and effect linkages between 
them. 
These analyses, along with their displays are presented in Chapter Five, as are the 
third and fourth iterations of data-analysis. 
 
 
Third Iteration: Articulating SDT, CT and the Three Analytic Models Against the 
Evidence 
Each of the significant case elements could be analysed by at least one or more of 
SDT, CT and the analytic models. This required articulating the “theoretical 
propositions” arising from the research questions (Yin, 2009: 130). It then involved 
finding ways of sorting SDT, CT and models into ways in which they could then 
analyse the data, find the relations or patterns in the data, and the ways they were 
connected (Maxwell, 2012: 115-117). For example: 
                                                          
45
 These reflected the changes in the nature of the emotional experience, and provided the emotional 
confirmation of the social defences and worsening organisational problems and situation. 
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 SDT identified collective anxiety and the social defences. This involved 
identifying the basic assumption defence pattern of each, and inferring the 
primary task or new expectations to establish a theoretical link between the 
anxiety and the social defences.    
 CT was applied to the key case elements by inferring the elementary form or 
mix operating within each.  
 
While SDT and CT together could identify and describe the significant events of the 
case, (post-GFC policies, social defences and later problems); the three analytic 
models were adept at examining and inferring their nature, their operation generated-
consequences, and could be applied to SDT, independently of CT which already 
draws upon them, adding greater flexibility in the analysis: 
 This involved inferring the agency or structure in what people were doing; 
and assessing these as analytically distinct, rather than empirically distinct 
phenomena, and observing their interplay over time (Archer, 1996; Mouzelis, 
2008).  
o This distilled whether dispositional (psychological) or relational (more 
sociological) accounts (Tilly, 2008) better applied.  
o If people’s actions were inferred as unconscious, as a form of 
“decentred agency” (Caldwell, 2006: 23), this could then be 
compared as either influencing events and structures (institutions) or 
being influenced by them.  
o This in turn, could infer when social defences were best seen as 
institutions (structures) operating independently of people, or as 
forms of agency; and when institutions were better inferred as 
triggered by psychological forces and/or driven by them.  
o This strategy helped to infer the role and relative contribution of 
social and psychological forces, with SDT and CT offering two rival 
explanations which could be compared against the evidence.   
 Formal and informal institutions were identified. The policies being 
initiated by senior team members were seen as formal institutions, whereas 
the social defences were not planned and emerged as informal.  
 Feedback loops from each institution were abductively inferred from their 
effects. ‘Self-organisation’ provided an analytic distinction between the 
influence of external forces versus the force of internal choices (albeit at 
times unconscious). These too were inferred.  
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The third iteration allowed comparison of the theories and models as offering their 
own rival accounts of phenomena, and examining how the conclusion validity of each 
stacked up against the other.  
  
 
Fourth Iteration: Episodes, Causal Triggers, Mechanisms and Processes  
This was the most intentional realist causal analysis. It involved assigning each of the 
significant case elements (the GFC, post-GFC polices, social defences and 
problems) singularly and in relationship as being made up of discrete episodes that 
needed to be explained through inferring the causal mechanisms and processes 
operating within, and between, them (Danermark et al., 2002; Sayer, 1992; Tilly, 
2008).   
 
The third and fourth iterations were analytic “connecting strategies” (Maxwell, 2012) 
in building the explanation. 
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Chapter Four: Empirical Findings - First Iteration Case-Narrative 
  
Iteration is part of the trade-craft of the psychodynamic consultant, which here is 
based on the realist epistemological assumption that there is something to be found 
'beneath the surface' of the evidence. Many organisational consultant-analysts share 
this assumption. Indeed, iteration is a vital part of realist discovery processes. 
 
It was readily apparent that the coaching and consultation which had the explicit, 
indeed enthusiastic, backing of the company had failed to bring about changes we 
were all seeking to effect. While it would be tempting to present condensed findings 
in the form of fiction-after-the-fact, given our methodology whereby iteration is 
essential to explanation and theory building, what follows is the first round of iterative 
case analysis - a chronological case narrative.  
 
The consulting project had amassed data over its four-year duration. As a way of 
organising the overlapping consulting and research data, and to identify the key 
issues and themes, a linear narrative of the case was written first. This included an 
initial re-examination in the light of social defence theory, cultural theory and the 
three analytic models that informed the three sets of research questions. Here we 
present the key events chronologically. These are interspersed with a 
contemporaneous 'primary' analysis that informed the on-going consultation, and a 
'secondary' analysis for doctoral research purposes - this is what is meant by 
iteration. By describing both the author's immediate involvement in the consultation 
and our development of an independent research project, this allows the reader to 
make a more independent 'over-my-shoulder' assessment of the case and my take 
on it. The case has been written to prevent identification of individuals, while 
respecting the rich data that emerged from the coaching.  
 
Data from the coaching and consulting emerged as pieces of a jig-saw puzzle that 
were apparent at different times and in different parts of the organisation. Putting 
these pieces together was initially the work of the consultancy; it then became that of 
the research. This narrative includes our first analysis which they were subjected to.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
85 
4.1 Case Background: Setting-up the Coaching and Consulting -  
Aims, Objectives and Relevant Case Pre-History 
 
4.1.1 Setting-Up the Coaching-Consulting Project 
 
Diagnostic Interviews with the Organisational Sponsors of the Project 
The project began in February 2008 with a series of data-gathering and diagnostic 
interviews with the main sponsors: two members of the senior executive team. We 
identified the aims of the project jointly, including business and organisational 
objectives against which the coaching and consulting would be evaluated. The 
sponsors wanted learning and development opportunities for senior managers. They 
were pressed to identify business and organisational benefits that coaching could 
bring throughout the organisation. We agreed that coaching could be evaluated 
according to its individual and organisational benefits (Sherman and Freas, 2004).46 
What had been an individually-tailored development opportunity for senior managers, 
now addressed organisational performance.  
 
The sponsors soon identified three issues. The need to: 
 Break down the 'command and control' mind-set of managers, micro-
management, and prevention of development opportunities for those they 
managed ('direct reports'). The sponsors proposed more delegation of 
initiative to the lowest possible levels.47 
 Develop problem-solving capabilities at the lowest levels, reducing upward 
referral. 
 Improve cross-functional communication, understanding and collaboration.  
 
                                                          
46
 Dual-Track Coaching: To achieve these aims, the coaching was set up as a dual-track coaching and 
organisational development change initiative suggestive of Sherman and Freas (2004). The ‘dual track’ refers to 
linking the coaching to strategic business objectives while simultaneously providing opportunities for managers 
to work on personal and professional development issues of their own choosing. Linking the coaching to serve 
larger business objectives overcomes some of the problems identified with coaching in organisations. The 
literature suggests that benefits are mainly for the individuals receiving the coaching, but not necessarily the 
organisation. These individuals may use the coaching to seek promotions and better opportunities outside, or 
work on issues that had little or no measurable impact or return on the organisation’s investment. Linking the 
coaching to serve larger business objectives not only accelerates individual learning, it also helps the learning to 
stick, while being targeted to add direct value to the organisation (Sherman and Freas, 2004; Anderson and 
Anderson, 2005; McGovern et al., 2001; Coutu and Kaufman, 2009). This can help build a climate that is 
conducive, not only for individuals receiving coaching, but can translate the learning and benefits to those 
around them, extending its reach across the organisation (Clutterbuck and Megginson, 2005). 
47
 The concern was with the lack of development opportunities at all levels of the organisation and the 
identifying and nurturing of talent from within. They were also keen on managers to be pressed to use their 
initiative and discretion, and for less problems coming up from below.  
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The research emerged to examine the ineffective social defence intervention and 
explore, through this case study, what could be done to improve SDT's prospects of 
attaining organisational-level change.  
 
The following tables allow the reader to retrace the author's steps and to grasp the 
data and its relation to key events quickly. Some detail has had to be sacrificed for 
reasons of confidentiality, including references to role and international regions 
involved. But we do have a composite of coaching and consulting data, and 
indication of the organisational levels and functions at which it was recorded. Table 
4.1 outlines the aims of the coaching and includes the results of the 360° 
questionnaires participants undertook prior to coaching.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Items Raised Early On and How 
Sponsors 
Organisational Aims for 
Coaching 
Roll-Out and 
How Identified 
Participant Aims - 
What was 
Identified and 
Worked On  
Collective Results 
of 360° 
Questionnaire
48
 
- Decentralising  
Authority and 
Responsibility 
- Breaking down 
'Command and Control' 
Mind-set and 
Discouraging 'Micro-
Managing' 
- Delegating and 
Developing the People 
Below 
- Greater Taking 
Initiative 
- More Taking 
Ownership and Finding 
Solutions to Problems 
- Fewer Problems Going 
Up for Solution 
- Improved Cross-
Functional 
Collaboration 
Joint Kick-Off 
Meeting  
- Sponsors 
Introduce Purpose 
of Coaching  
- Facilitated 
Discussion to 
Identify Key Issues 
and Individuals' 
Goals 
- 360° 
Questionnaire 
- Six Sessions 
- Reporting On 
High-Level Themes 
Only 
- Evaluation 
Against 
Organisational 
Aims and 
Participant Aims 
- Communication 
- Being strategic 
- Understanding 
Self and Others 
- Developing 
Others 
- Planning, Being 
Organised, Efficient 
- Delegating 
- Improving 
Problem Behaviour 
(identified by self 
and others) 
- Teamwork 
- Networking 
- Diplomacy and 
Political Tact 
Widespread 
Tendency of 
Managers to be 
'Hands-on' not 
'Strategic' 
High Scores: 
- 'Control' 
- 'Results Focus' 
- 'Taking 
Leadership' 
Low Scores: 
- 'Communication' 
- 'Feedback' 
- 'Team Player' 
- 'Developing 
Others’ 
- 'Cooperation'  
- 'Empathy' 
- 'Being Persuasive' 
 
                                                          
48
 The 360° questionnaire used in Manufacturing was the Leadership Effectiveness Analysis (the LEA). It is one of 
the oldest and most researched questionnaires, with high reliability and validity scores (see: 
http://www.mrg.com/products-services/leadership/ and 
http://www.mrg.com/uploads/PDFs/All_Product_ReportSamples.pdf). For all subsequent coaching the 360° 
instrument was the Leadership Circle (see: www.fcg-global.com/story/the-leadership-circle-profile/ and 
http://www.coaching-courses.com/coach-training/assessments-and-tools/CTI-360-tool.pdf). 
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Feedback, Analysis and Feedback Meetings as Action-Research 
It was agreed with the sponsors that regular feedback and planning meetings would 
take place with the senior team and selected second and third level groups. The 
format was to involve three stages:  
 Presentation of higher level themes and observations from the coaching, and 
recommendations49 
 Free-ranging facilitated discussion and for the senior team to analyse the 
issues and themes as they saw fit  
 Identification of action and follow-up.  
 
This format was itself an intervention based on action-research principles (Coghlan 
and Brannick, 2001; McArdle and Reason, 2008: 123-6; Bartunek et al., 2008: 156-
7). In this way, both the coaching and the feedback meetings offered opportunities to 
work with the organisation and not just the individuals.  
 
 
4.1.2 Relevant Pre-Consulting History with Primary and Secondary Analysis 
 
Table 4.2 Relevant Pre-Consulting History with Primary and Secondary 
Analysis 
Why Manufacturing was 
Chosen for the First Coaching 
Sessions 
A new CEO and a 'Fresh Look' - Innovative 
Senior Team 
- Assessed as most 'inward 
looking', self-serving and 
resistant to change - especially 
level 3 plant-managers - many 
of whom were judged not 
'further promotable' 
 
- The Company had abandoned 
its Regional Structure (in which 
Manufacturing managers were 
prominent) in favour of a 
Functional Management and a 
more equitable distribution of 
control 
 
- The Manufacturing Division 
had been characterised as 
'engineers and experts' - as 
inflexible, uncompromising and 
often uncooperative and 
- New CEO - appointed July, 2007; the first in the 
company's ten-year history not to be an engineer or to 
come from a Manufacturing background, but an MBA with 
expertise in business development 
 
- Old thinking had been that only engineers and plant 
managers ought to be promoted as they were seen as 
most capable to 'trouble-shoot'  
 
- This was believed to have led organisation to 'over-
engineer' its products at high cost, and to determine 'what 
was best for customers' - despite complaints from Sales 
that customer needs were not always met 
 
- This was attributed to the company having been the 
Manufacturing arm of a much larger company from which it 
was spun off in 1999  
 
- It was also attributed to a long period of uninterrupted  
growth, concealing any need to change. Inability to change 
                                                          
49
 Only higher-level themes, reported by at least two and preferably more participants were reported back. 
Individuals’ confidentiality was protected and if participants did not want anything to be fed-back for whatever 
reason, this was upheld.  
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uncommunicative 
 
- Sponsors wanted the coaching 
to 'shift their mind-set' from 
'technical problem-solving' to 
'managers' who develop people,  
collaborate with others and think 
with a 'helicopter-view' of the 
'big picture'  
was now seen as a threat to long-term viability 
 
- The 'new look senior team' was chosen to pursue a 
'managerial' and 'strategic' orientation; new appointments 
including the new Director of Manufacturing came with 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills at developing 
independent business units. Their aim was to 'shake things 
up', disrupting the 'cosy comfort zone' 
 
Primary Analysis as a 
Consultant 
 
 
Secondary Analysis as a Researcher 
 
- The aim was to change 
'management practices’  
 
In the Burke and Litwin model, 
this represents a 'transactional' 
factor concerned with 
improvement, not whole-scale 
change  
 
- Included were: improved team 
performance for greater 
motivation and lessening of 
'command and control' to free 
up individuals’ initiative and 
development; greater 
responsiveness; prompt 
decision-making; greater 
flexibility; reduction in middle-
managers’ power where things 
got 'trapped' 
- From a Cultural Theory perspective, the history and 
functioning of the organisation indicated 'High Grid' (High 
Regulation) based on rank differences. Coaching 
evidence upholds this: 
 
- Several third level plant managers complained that they 
had to 'control everything' and couldn't 'trust' that what they 
requested would be done. Others complained that their 
own managers were 'controlling'
50
 
 
- Second level managers made similar complaints about 
their own direct reports and the managers above them 
 
- The biggest complaint from the senior team was of too 
many problems 'coming back up' to them for solution 
  
- Poor quality of communication, understanding and 
coordination between the levels 
 
These raise questions about the degree of Social 
Integration (or 'Group') in CT terminology 
 
Note: High Regulation with low Integration would indicate some degree of Isolate 
Ordering51 - that was probably a stronger feature of the overall design in the past. 
 
 
4.2 April 2008-May 2009: The Global Financial Crisis and Pre-Social Defences 
Coaching Themes (May 2008-January 2009) 
While participants spoke about a variety of work-related and personal issues, three 
themes were prominent. Using the Burke and Litwin, ORA, and Wells' models to 
code our notes the following emerged. 
                                                          
50
 Throughout this chapter singular italics '...' denote what was heard by the consultant either during the 
coaching, interventions or observations.  
51
 This is somewhat similar to traditional criticisms of hierarchy or bureaucracy that is overly centralised and 
controlling, with systems and procedures that do the thinking for people while crushing their use of initiative and 
opportunities for learning and experimentation. The value of Isolate Ordering is that it allows us to distinguish 
between dysfunctional and functional varieties of hierarchy or bureaucracy (see, for example: du Gay, 2000; 
Jaques, 1998; Jaques and Clement, 1991; MacDonald et al., 2006; Gray et al., 2007). 
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Table 4.3 Coaching Themes from Manufacturing (May 2008-Jan 2009) 
 
Themes  
 
 
Evidence 
Lack of Clarity and 
Differentiation in the Work 
of the Three 
Organisational Levels 
Widespread Overlap in: 
- Work Responsibilities 
- What managers saw themselves as responsible for 
(between first, second and third levels) 
 
Little Consistency in Participants’ attribution of: 
- Decision-Making Accountability  
- 'Added value' they provided to levels below 
- Their own authority over resources and personnel  
 
Low Trust 
- Of others and of others in themselves 
- Describing their boss's behaviour as 'controlling' or 'absent' 
 
Asked to describe their work: 
- The answers were 'problem-solving', 'fire-fighting', 'hands on' 
activity and acting as a 'technical expert' 
 
Complaints of Micro-
Managing by Bosses and 
Lack of Faith in the 
Capability and Motivation 
of Direct Reports 
Issues Raised during Coaching 
- Managers having to enforce control or give explicit directives 
for work to get done 
 
- Not feeling 'trusted' to use their 'brains’. Being 'micro-
managed' 
 
- Criticism that their bosses did not 'add value'  
Low Communication and 
Understanding between 
the Levels and Functions 
- Complaints that managers were not communicating their 
expectations or concerns  
 
- Difficulties in 'honest, straight communication' to clarify 
issues, solve problems. Misunderstanding across levels and 
functions 
 
- Inclination to act on assumption about others, or their work, 
instead of asking for clarification 
 
- Conversational deficit (lack of sharing, understanding, or 
giving and receiving feedback) concerning performance 
and expectations  
 
Note: From a Grid-Group CT point-of-view, these themes are further evidence of 
Isolate Ordering.  
 
When these themes were fed-back to individual participants, all recognised them, 
and either ignored them or felt they were too difficult to do anything about. I also 
learnt that 'under-performers' would be moved into different roles without feedback, 
and how some roles, especially non-line technical support (of which there were 
many), would be designed or duplicated to accommodate 'personality conflicts', or 
seniority. The general preference was to avoid conflict, and difficulties ensued. The 
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sponsors were aware of the 'micro-managing', the high 'control' focus and poor 
communication, but not of the extent of work duplication. These pointed to deeper 
issues of structure, performance and review systems, and practices, as well as, with 
the culture. 
 
 
Primary Analysis 
These issues were indicative of what Burke and Litwin refer to as ‘transactional’ 
factors requiring intervention between individuals, or the adjustment to, or 
development of, performance systems or aspects of the design, rather than whole-
scale organisational change. But they were pointing to deeper problems with the 
'culture'.  
 
The organisation was mostly aware of these problems, and was using the coaching 
as a means of addressing them, as the sponsors said to me. A frequently mentioned 
rationalisation was because of its 'financial success' and 'past continuous growth', the 
company could continue to tolerate these problems rather than actively address 
them. At the time, I noted this expectation of the coaching, and sought to raise these 
issues and help others to address them. It was perhaps why a coach had been hired.  
 
The CT insights were not available to frame at this first feedback session with the 
senior team. At this point in the consultation, the approach and style of intervention 
was to offer an interpretation and facilitate discussion, based on action-research and 
system-psychodynamic Tavistock methodology. It was capable of addressing the 
division of labour and differentiation of the levels; and the poor communication, lack 
of feedback and the micro-managing style of leadership.  
 
 
First Feedback, Analysis and Planning Meeting with Senior Team (September 
2008): Eve of GFC 
Table 4.4 summarises the content and tone of the meeting.  
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Table 4.4 Summary of  Recommendations and Discussion from First Feedback 
Meeting with Senior Team (September 2008) Pre-GFC 
Recommendation General Discussion Impressions 
Clarify the Division of 
Labour between the top 
three Levels 
Create clear differentiation 
that distinguishes:
52
 
 
Strategic Domain: 
- Define strategic intent 
- Manage the primary risk* 
and associated uncertainty 
and anxiety 
- Champion the values that 
govern how work is done 
(the work of the senior 
team) 
 
Organisational Domain: 
- Strategy implementation - 
of systems and processes  
- Develop and lead the 
practices* that give 
meaning to work 
- Forecast what may go 
wrong, make trade-offs and 
identify alternatives 
(the work of the Second 
Level) 
 
Operational Domain:  
- Manage front-line work 
- Applies, oversees and 
stream-lines the operation 
of systems and processes 
that: 
- Focus on the primary 
task* 
(the work of the Third 
Level) 
Senior team liked the 'domains’ 
Discussion focused on three key 
issues: 
 
Defining the 'finger-print' of the 
senior team and Head Office: 
- Rethinking how 'heavy' (control 
capital, revenue and expenditure) or 
how 'soft' to be (signing off decisions 
made below) 
- At this date, mostly 'heavy' but 
varied according to region and who 
was in charge 
- Preference to streamline and to go 
'softer' 
 
Discussion on ways to 
operationalise  these domains: 
- Great variability across functions 
depending on financial decisions and 
the degree to which personnel could 
be 'relied on'  
- Talk of trialling the use of RACI 
chart that has worked in 
manufacturing (R=who is responsible 
for the decision; A=who gives the 
approval; C=who could be consulted; 
I=all parties that need to be informed) 
 
This led to discussion about the 
Manufacturing-Sales ‘fault-line' 
- The cause of most headaches and 
restructures from functional-to-
regional-and-back-to-functional 
- 'Every time we start to cooperate, 
something goes wrong!’  
This is the most 
animated and engaged 
the senior team were 
ever to be 
- Gives a good 
indication of how well 
they function as a team 
when not in crisis 
- Willingness to 
contribute, ask 
questions and focus on 
solutions 
 
However... with the 
final topic, the mood 
changed with: 
 
- Signs of frustration 
- Two Directors 
remained quiet. When 
questioned:  
- One said he 'only 
wanted to listen'; the 
other - 'this takes up 
too much of our time' 
- Discussion ended 
without consensus or 
action 
 
Note: The open discussion and animation was not to be seen again, and the mood 
soured when talk turned to the repeatedly unsolvable Manufacturing-Sales ‘fault-line’. 
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 Based on an adaptation of Jaques' 'levels of work' (1998: Stamp, 1995; Jaques and Clement, 1991) with 
associated systems-psychodynamic concepts in each of the domains, marked with an asterisk*. For example: the 
strategic domain involves managing the "primary risk" (Hirschhorn, 1999) or the anxiety and uncertainty from 
themselves and the organisation that making hard strategic choices entails. An organisation's "practices" 
(Armstrong, 2005) give meaning to the work and the way it is done. The work of the third level, or the 
operational domain, is responsible for ensuring the organisation's "primary task" (Rice, 1958) or what it must do 
in order to survive.  
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Immediate Aftermath to Global Financial Crisis (October/November 2008) 
We were present within the company during the Global Financial Crisis. This was 
fortunate from both a consultant's, and then a researcher's, point of view. The 
aftermath deserves careful examination. From it, we can infer more than just a 
standard commercial response to harsh economic conditions.  
 
Table 4.5 Organisational Responses to GFC and their Initial Impact 
 
Critical Instance 
 
 
Observations 
Key Customers Cancelled or 
Postponed Orders Indefinitely  
- Initial Denial. The GFC 'after-shock' one month 
later brought acceptance that with no sales, there 
would be no revenue beyond orders-in-production. 
The magnitude of the difficulties was realised 
Largest Customer Announced it had 
dropped the company's 'Preferred 
Supplier' status 
- Shock affected the whole organisation. Survival 
Anxiety felt acutely in the third level of management 
and below 
- Coaching participants became voluble about 
company’s past and present practices, their 
concerns and recurrent issues
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Senior Team Announced Changes 
and Cost-Cutting  
- Lacking detail, this induced rumours 
- Second level managers were now fearful 
- Senior team, despite the uncertainties, was 
animated and active  
- Fewer 'sackings' announced than expected  
- Sackings met with approval 
- Hope returned, galvanising second and third level 
managers to be involved and to solve longstanding 
problems 
 
The Remaining National Production 
Facility to Close. Seasonal Workers 
to Replace Most Permanent Staff in 
Production 
 
Production Moved to Eastern 
Europe, Russia with a new 
Acquisition in the Middle East. 
Plans to Establish Additional Plants 
in Asia and Africa  
- Coaching participants report the strain which these 
changes bring, especially among plant managers 
and their teams 
A New Supply Chain Department 
Reporting to Finance 
 
All Purchasing and Distribution 
- Manufacturing  loses much control, initiates the 
cutting of ‘progressive inventory' and introduces 
'lean manufacturing' 
- Manufacturing forced to go through Procurement 
and Finance under central scrutiny  
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 The organisation had been spun off from the largest customer ten years earlier who continued to purchase its 
products at a premium despite cheaper prices from competitors. The bulk of the company's profit came from this 
customer. Due to a common ownership structure, this benefitted both companies. It allowed for mutual 
accounting practices and the transfer of profit and tax burdens between them. Due to guaranteed premium sales 
and continuous growth, the organisation allowed its internal operations to become complacent and extravagant, 
focusing on quality rather than efficiency. It allowed an engineering focus to predominate and, with it, to over-
engineer its products and costs.   
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Centralised under new department 
 
Raw Materials would come from 
Commodity Markets not through 
Local Suppliers 
 
Sharp Increases in Commodity 
Prices  
- New directors appointed to Manufacturing 
(promotion from second level) and Sales (previous 
Manufacturing head). Both appointees welcome the 
'opportunity to improve things' and 'introduce 
change' 
 
Marketing Split From Sales with 
Former head of Sales now head of 
Marketing 
 
New After-Sales Service and 
Warranty Department Split from 
Sales 
- Coaching interviews showed that Marketing did not 
'market' or brand products or do market research but 
did 'product development' only 
- Later interviews suggest an increase of After-Sales 
problems since split from Sales 
 
HR (Human Resources) Initiative to 
Introduce Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) for Top Three 
Levels and to Streamline 
Communication and Collaboration 
between Departments 
- This was partly a response to coaching feedback 
showing lack of clarity and work duplication 
- Formal meetings between Sales and 
Manufacturing initiated  
- Without details, the response to HR initiative was 
positive - with detail, there was dismay  
- HR loses credibility and influence 
'Growth Through Acquisition' in the 
US, Middle East and Africa 
 
Explorations of a Growing South 
American Market 
- This only became clearer after the other changes, 
and when different key people were taken out of 
their roles for extended periods 
 
Second and Third Level Managers 
Encouraged to Use Personal 
Initiative 
- I am confident that this was an outcome of 
coaching that was actively promoted by the new 
heads of Sales and Manufacturing 
- It took hold in Sales, but was overtaken by the 
cost-cutting and reduced authorisation in 
Manufacturing over revenue for resourcing 
 
Note: These changes were reasonable responses to the GFC. Coaching was also 
extended despite non-existent revenue and cost-cutting.  
 
Coaching would encompass all senior and second level Sales (February 2009) and 
all third level country Sales and key account managers (September 2009). 
Individuals requesting further sessions received them, as did new appointees 
entering the second and third levels. In mid-2009, it was also offered to senior 
managers in the new departments (Supply Chain and After-Sales Service) in 
Marketing and to identified 'High Potential' managers.  
 
By the end of 2009, over fifty individuals were in coaching from the top three levels, 
with most coming from Sales and Manufacturing. The consultancy appeared to be 
going well.  
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Activity, then Stalling 
The 'reasonable' responses to the GFC were observed to be uncoordinated. Despite 
feverish activity, this had little effect. Both second and third level managers 
complained of getting 'mixed messages' from senior team members. Though 
accepting these initially as 'teething problems', managers struck me as harried and 
anxious. All managers in the top three levels seemed to be dealing with uncertainty 
by engaging in a flurry of activity and obsessing over detail, in part, because of senior 
team members' more frequent requests for details. Despite express intentions, it was 
clear that work-differentiation and coordination between the levels were worsening 
and personal survival overrode strategy. All three levels were doing their individual 
frantic best to survive.  
 
Only in hindsight was this perceived as the incubation period of social defences.  
 
Table 4.6 Impact of Mood Changes Before, During and Post-GFC 
Period Mood Changes Impact / Insight 
Pre-GFC A Mixture of 
Complacency 
and Interest 
- Breaking the 
'Engineering 
Stranglehold' and 
'Command-
Control Mind-Set' 
- De-
centralisation 
- Coaching and 
Development 
- Business as Usual  
- 'Oh, another change', 'So What's New?!' 
and/or 'About Time!' 
- Initial suspicion of coaching turns into 
opportunity to 'talk and explore'  
- Improvement in communication, 
collaboration and teamwork 
- Little Differentiation or Clarity of the Work 
of top three Levels  
- Senior Team Interested in Coaching 
Feedback to help direct change 
GFC 
Onset and 
Initial 
Flurry 
Shock then 
Realisation of 
Exciting 
Opportunities 
- Organisational 
and Policy 
changes with two 
new departments 
- Centralisation 
and 
Formalisation 
(using KPIs) 
- Initial Fear exacerbated by lack of 
communication from Senior Team 
- Gossip and Rumours in levels below, 
then 'great' the Senior Team's doing 
Something!, but also they 'could do more', 
'let's get in and help' 
- Senior Team focused and coordinated  
- Level two and three managers express 
Opportunities to Fix Past Practices and 
Inefficiencies  
A 
Dawning 
'New 
Reality' 
Feverish 
Activity with 
Little Impact 
 
 
Feelings of 
Being 
Overwhelmed 
 
 
Disillusionment 
- 'Four new Daily 
Number One 
Priorities'  
- 'Hands on' 
involvement from 
senior team 
- Complaints of 
'mixed messages' 
below 
- 'Growth through 
Acquisition' 
pursued 
vigorously 
- Manufacturing managers feeling 
Resignation 
- Sales Initiatives generate movement 
- The nature of their KPIs pushing 
Manufacturing and Sales apart 
- Senior team members pulling in different 
directions - less interested in coaching 
feedback 
- Frantic activity has little impact - the initial 
sense of 'opportunity' turns into 'grind'  
- Pessimism about the market and the 
organisation's ability to change and adapt 
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Note: To a consultant, this situation has the familiar outlines of the 'problem of 
change’. To a social defence Tavistock practitioner, the changes in emotional mood 
indicate deeper problems have been stirred and brewing. To a cultural theorist, it 
suggests a breakdown of Social Integration and intermittent, unmonitored and 
uncoordinated Social Regulation warning of the beginnings of retreat into Isolate 
Ordering.  
 
Table 4.7 looks at the trends of the first year with a primary and secondary analysis 
alongside.  
 
 
Table 4.7 Iteration of First Year  
 
Events and Trends of the 
First Year 
 
 
Primary Analysis 
Using Burke and Litwin, ORA 
and Wells 
 
Secondary Analysis 
Using SDT and CT 
Pre-GFC  
- Financially successful, 
with known inefficiencies 
- Centralised, 'hands-on' 
management 
 
Desire to:  
- 'De-centralise'  
- Break down 
manufacturing-engineering 
dominance over other 
functions  
- Improve cross-functional 
collaboration and 
coordination 
 
GFC onset and Responses  
- Massive drop in sales 
- Initial silence from senior 
team and little detail 
generates 'survival anxiety' 
- Introduction of policies to 
cut costs leads to 
centralisation, and 
- Challenge organisational 
aims of coaching, but ... 
Coaching was increased 
- Actual Changes generate 
opportunity to fix past 
practices and hope about 
the future 
 
- Post-GFC - Pre-Social 
Defences 
- Policies appear 
uncoordinated and produce 
Burke and Litwin 
 
Pre-GFC issues relating to: 
- 'Structure' - lack of clarity;  
differentiation between the 
work of the levels 
- 'Management Practices' - 
centralised, command-
control leadership  
- 'Work Unit Climate' - 
affecting 'motivation' and 
'skills' - little focus on 
developing people or  
initiative, experimentation 
 
These are 'Transactional' 
attempts to improve systems 
and design. Concern is with 
managing, not 'whole-scale 
(transformational) org 
change' 
 
Post-GFC  
- Lack of 'strategy' or 
attention to 'culture' (return to 
old ways) 
 
ORA and Wells 
 
- Problems of 'inter-group' 
relations (understanding, 
coordination) between levels 
and functions 
- 'Differences between what 
people do, say, and ought to 
do' indicate lack of role clarity  
Social Defence Theory 
 
Competing Post-GFC Polices 
emerge behind social defences 
 
- Policies address 'economic' or 
'Theory E' priorities not 'Theory 
O' priorities 
 
Cultural Theory 
 
- Pre-history of High Regulation 
with relatively High Integration 
suggests Hierarchy 
 
Hierarchy can compromise 
initiative with failures in 
coordination indicating 
elements of Isolate Ordering in 
a hybrid with Hierarchy  
 
However: 
- Senior team wish that 
coaching will enable de-
centralised control, greater 
freedom and initiative suggests 
an openness to Market/ 
Individualist reasoning and 
design 
- In combination with a wish for 
'improved communication’ and 
coordination, an openness to 
Egalitarian lowering of 
Regulation and higher 
Integration 
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contradictory outcomes 
- Much activity with little 
result  
- Managers focus on detail 
with 'hands-on' taking-
control 
- Overwhelm, hope-stalling, 
signs of disillusion  
- 'Emotional experience' 
shifts from complacency to 
interest (in coaching), shock 
and fear, (GFC) initial 
silence, then opportunity and 
hope ... disillusion  
 
All point to unclear 
leadership and deficiencies 
in the 'organisation-as-a-
whole' 
Post-GFC and before Social 
Defences:  
- Marked centralising with 
increased Regulation 
compromised by 'mixed 
messages' (greater control and 
initiative) affect Manufacturing 
and Sales differently ... 
- This led to undermining 
Integration reinforcing a 
pathway into Isolate Ordering 
 
Note: The author gathered day-to-day evidence of shifts at all management levels 
and functions (including new functions). The evidence fits Burke and Litwin, ORA, 
Wells and SDT, by degree. Our sense of the evidence, however, is that CT is more 
useful in pinpointing the fateful 'pathway into Isolate Ordering' that was to confound 
the best efforts of this consultant and all who participated in our interventions.  
 
Our initial Burke and Litwin analysis was that coaching was contributing to the 
'transactional' improvement of the performance of individuals and teams but not the 
whole-scale organisation. With the post GFC changes, together with ORA and Wells’ 
analysis, we were alerted to potential issues related to intergroup relations between 
levels and functions (structure), management practices (mixed messages and 
unclear, changing direction), and a shift in the emotional experience toward 
disillusion. This all pointed to organisational level problems related to 
transformational issues of strategy, leadership and, in particular, culture that were not 
being addressed.  
 
Secondary analysis using CT indicates that the clear pre-GFC desire for Lower 
Regulation and Higher Integration was undermined by policies that increased 
regulation. This, along with anxiety and uncertainty, further promoted Increased 
Regulation ('hands-on' control) by the senior team and Lower Integration (worse 
coordination and an even greater rift between Manufacturing and Sales).  
 
CT suggests four prototypical cultural 'positions', each with their distinctive organising 
logic and values, strengths and weaknesses. Thus, by tightening Regulation and 
weakening Integration, the only direction open was a pathway into Isolate Ordering. 
'High Grid/High Group' (Hierarchy) would have offered a more coordinated and 
organised way of weathering crisis, but at the expense of Individualist improvisation 
and Egalitarian mobilisation against a common enemy. While Isolate Ordering can 
work well short-term during the height of crisis, the company was to stay there for far 
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too long. This was to undermine whatever new and established elements of 
coordination, integration and orchestrated initiatives could benefit the whole.   
 
Without knowing or planning, the organisation was entering into the worst cultural 
position regarding long-term coordination, on-going efficacy and integration ... with 
the unfortunate consequences which we were not then properly equipped to forecast. 
I was trained to identify the social defences that developed after the first responses to 
the GFC, and to warn of their potential threat, but not to forecast, or consult to, what 
was to come after.  
 
 
4.3 Social Defences Appear 
By early 2009, policy responses to the GFC were having unintended effects. The 
well-known Manufacturing-Sales ‘Fault Line' widened appreciably. By mid-2009, 
there was strong evidence of social defences operating at all three top levels. Tables 
4.8 and 4.9 summarise the position at early-to-mid 2009 and the four policies with the 
worst effects.  
 
Table 4.8 Post-GFC Policy Effects on Functions (Early-to-Mid-2009) 
 
Post-GFC Policies  
 
 
The Manufacturing-Sales ‘Fault-Line’ 
- Centralisation of Procurement 
and Supply-Chain control restricted 
Manufacturing's options  
 
- New KPIs were introduced for:  
- Cost-cutting in Manufacturing  
- Sales Increases  
- Profit-margins in Sales 
 
- Timetabled Minuted Statutory 
Meetings aimed at improving Sales-
Manufacturing  collaboration 
 
- Senior Team Push Initiative-
Taking and Experimentation 
downward especially in Sales  
 
- Growth through acquisition took 
key managers away for long periods, 
slowing decision-making and 
implementation 
- With no revenue and rising debt, the GFC led to 
frantic survival activity in top three levels 
 
- The 'mixed-messages' from different senior team 
members caused confusion. This was supplanted by 
a singular focus on departmental and role-
specific KPIs which pushed Manufacturing and 
Sales further apart 
 
- Coaching conversations showed this had the effect 
of 'cramping the big-picture thinking' and 
promoting short-term measures. These worsened 
coordination: 
- Sales would say yes to all customers, specifications 
without regard to cost and production-time increases                             
- Manufacturing ran down progressive inventory 
without consulting Sales about orders 
 
- Initially the 'statutory' meetings had enabled Sales 
and Manufacturing to accommodate each other’s 
needs. But attempts at implementation met 
resistance (through absenteeism or lack of follow-
through) and created further complications 
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Note: Each policy, on its own, was reasonable, targeted at specific-and-identified 
problems and championed by a member of the senior team. However, together they 
lacked coordination. Along with the frantic activity, short-term measures and reports 
of 'mixed messages' from below, this suggested that the senior team were now 
operating more as individuals pursuing their specific area of responsibility and not as 
a coordinated team. Coaching confirmed their anxiety and coping-attempts.  
 
 
Table 4.9 Appearance and Analysis of Social Defences 
 
Appearance of Social Defences 
 
 
Analysis  
Social defences appeared in levels 2 and 3 as responses 
to: 
- Increased pressure from departmental Directors and 
'meddling' from Directors outside their respective 
departments. Managers complained of: 'just being pushed 
for results'; 'not knowing who to follow' or 'what to do first’. 
There were 'daily new number one priorities’. The anxiety 
these generated was dealt with by following roles 
slavishly and prioritising KPIs 
 
- The Sales-Manufacturing meetings yielded several 
agreements which stalled at implementation. Individuals 
'went through the motions' without result  
 
- Upwards feedback reduced. Individuals were reluctant 
to speak-truth-to-power and unwilling to 'stick their necks 
out’. It was 'easier to say yes' rather than have 'trouble’. 
There was aversion to conflict 
 
- Other coaching confessions: 'don't say or do anything that 
may attract too much attention' or 'land in trouble’. ‘Stay 
under the radar', 'look busy', 'say "yes" to all demands and 
worry later', 'look out for your own' and 'be on guard' ... 'you 
never know whose toes you might step on’  
 
Social defences in the senior team: 
- Members engaged in more travel and when on home 
territory, increased 'hands-on' involvement and more 
meetings with customers 
 
- Under coaching they expressed increased uncertainty 
and pessimism about whether their actions would work. In 
public, silence. Their individual behaviour resembled 
harried executives, too busy to be stopped, not suffering 
fools (curt and unavailable) 
 
- The second feedback meeting was postponed several 
times as was the third (the social defence intervention). 
Discussions in these meetings lacked bite or were cut 
short. Members took calls and left at different times. 
This indicated that senior team members were acting more 
as individuals pursuing results they were personally 
If we take 'primary task' to 
mean work furthering the aims 
and within the spirit of 
improving organisational 
functioning, there was: 
 
- Clear anxiety carrying out 
primary task work; and 
admitted work-avoidance. In 
coaching, they reported - 'not 
knowing what else to do' 
except protect themselves 
 
- Behaviour was more 
defence-related than task-
related - Managers kept busy, 
attended meetings, made 
agreements, but had little 
effect. They said one thing and 
did another, 'stayed under the 
radar' and avoided honest 
public discussion and 
confrontation 
 
- Defences were built into 
how work was done. This was 
evident:  
- In slavishly pursuing role-
specific KPIs (while 
acknowledging this was not in 
the best interests of primary 
task work)  
- In meetings when agreements 
were made without follow-
through 
- Impasses when it came to 
honest discussion, feedback, or 
cross-function collaboration 
 
Managers either kept to 
themselves or within their 
teams, ran around like 'busy 
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responsible for, not as a team harried professionals’, and 
were generally 'suspicious' of 
other functions 
 
Note: In the privacy of coaching, many despaired at their ineffectiveness, and the 
organisation's future; publically they continued experimenting. Nevertheless, 
behaviour was task-avoidant or anxiety-circumventing. Senior team members could 
express uncertainty, but coped with anxiety privately through relentless action and 
attention to detail. Levels two and three were more aware of playing-it-safe, while 
mindlessly responding to 'mixed messages' and doing their best to meet KPIs, 
respond to demands ('fire-fighting') and new directives. Publically there was muted, 
not robust debate with a mixture of banter and gossip in corridors. All levels were 
doing their best to survive.  
 
 
The Social Defence Intervention: Third Meeting with Senior Team (November 
2009) 
Originally scheduled for mid-September, this meeting was postponed twice to late 
November. The senior team was meeting less frequently, in any case. Coaching 
sessions and meetings with individual members confirmed this. They were 
deliberating less with each other, and more involved in operations, travel, and 
meetings with customers and suppliers than previously. This period brought further 
evidence confirming the social defences across the top three levels. Table 4.10 
summarises the working hypotheses formed at this time and the senior team's 
reactions during that November meeting.  
 
 
Table 4.10 The Social Defence Intervention with the Senior Team 
 
Working 
Hypotheses  
and 
Recommendations 
 
 
The Senior Team's Reactions: 
A Battle of Metaphors 
 
Coach-
Consultant 
Impressions 
and Reflections 
 
- We suggested that 
the post-GFC 
policies were 
generating 
unintended 
consequences 
alongside desired 
ones  
 
- Evidence of 
- Senior team was accepting of 'Unintended 
consequences' and 'Exacerbation of the fault-line' 
but wanted 'more evidence' 
 
- Then came rejection of 'feelings as evidence' 
and comments such as: 'business is no place for 
feelings', 'people are paid well, they shouldn't 
complain' 
 
- I responded that individuals were not 
- By doubting the 
evidence, our 
presentation was 
undermined 
 
- The metaphors 
did not help  
 
- Rejection of the 
'social defences' 
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declining morale, 
culture and 
functionality was 
presented 
 
1. Exacerbation of 
Manufacturing-Sales 
‘fault-line’: combined 
impact of KPIs, 
centralisation of 
procurement, and 
pushing of initiative 
affected 
Manufacturing and 
Sales differently, 
pushing them further 
apart 
 
2. Short-term work 
horizons without 
informing strategy 
meant poorer 
coordination and 
morale 
 
3. The Senior Team 
were acting more as 
Individuals than a 
Team 
 
... all might be 
understood as 
'defences against 
the anxiety of the 
Primary Task’ 
 
For the senior team, 
there was an 
additional pressure 
associated with 
'primary risk' ... of 
what choices 
(strategy) to take 
complaining about, but rather experiencing, 
uncertainty, confusion and anxiety, which if 
translated into how work was done would indicate 
more serious problems brewing  
 
I suggested two metaphors: 
- Feelings are like a chemical reaction to litmus 
paper indicating potential problems  
- Feelings are like canaries used in coal mines to 
indicate if there was enough air to breathe 
 
- With the exception of the sponsors with whom 
the hypotheses were discussed prior to the 
meeting, members would not accept feelings or 
'psychology for evidence’  
 
- My giving examples from the organisation 
literature on 'feelings as indicators'
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 made little 
difference 
 
- One of the sponsors offered a life-line: 'Nick is 
offering a different view and one that we would not 
come up with’. This is 'why we chose his services 
over other options' 
 
- Another member offered his own metaphor, 
likening social defences to 'troop morale' but 
added how 'troop morale is not something you 
look to in the heat of battle' 
 
- Another member, returning to the policies and 
the two new departments suggested that 'what 
Nick is saying are their associated 'teething 
problems’. He added his own examples: delayed 
access to resources; delayed deliveries; an 
increase in customer complaints caused by 
Service being split from Sales 
 
- These metaphors failed to spur further 
discussion, which showed lower quality compared 
to the two previous meetings: far less animated  
 
- The senior team choose not to examine 
'strategy' nor 'working as a team' - it was as if 
these were not heard  
and 'not 
operating as a 
team' damaged 
our credibility 
 
- But nor did they 
engage with 
each other. They 
were muted and 
distracted  
 
- This was a 
turning point for 
the consultation 
and led me to 
initiate research 
 
- I questioned my 
method of 
inferring from 
data. I offered 
'feelings' only, 
not causes and 
effects, or what 
they may refer to 
as 'evidence' 
 
- What had 
caused the 
social defences 
and what effects 
will they have? I 
did not have the 
answer 
 
 
Note: This intervention and its lack of response marked a turning point for the 
consultation. It affected the credibility of the consultant, at least in the eyes of the 
senior team. Could this be salvaged? 
 
We saw here SDT's 'problem of change' (Menzies Lyth, 1990; Long, 2006; Krantz, 
2010; Cooper, 2010; Papadopoulos, 2015). The rejection of our intervention was less 
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 The literature from Burke and Litwin (1992) about people’s feelings being indicators of how well they were 
managed was quoted, and examples from the OD literature (Cummins and Worley, 2000) and Beer's (2008) 
concepts of Theories 'E' and 'O' as both important to organisational performance and strategy-considerations. 
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to do with the conclusions (and working hypotheses) but the psychological nature of 
the evidence. This juncture prompted examination of the 'social (sociological) side of 
SDT' though without abandoning the Tavistock systems-psychodynamic approach. 
As the answers were not obvious, a realist methodology suiting 'underlying' causes of 
the social defences and their consequences if left unattended, was adopted.55 
 
 
Reflections on the Ineffectiveness of the Social Defence Intervention 
 
Primary Analysis 
Table 4.11 examines the failed intervention from a consulting perspective.  
 
Table 4.11 Reflections Arising from the Social Defence Intervention 
 
Issues from the 
Meeting 
 
 
Examination  
Little engagement with 
working hypotheses, 
nor each other, but not 
outright rejection either 
 
- 'Unintended 
consequences' and 
Exacerbation of the 
‘fault-line' aroused 
interest, but hypothesis 
on the senior team's 
'defensive' functioning 
and lack of strategy was 
ignored 
The only substantive objection was to the use of feelings as a 
source of data. Given the audience this was not surprising  
 
- Could our advice be presented in a way that focused less on the 
nature of the evidence but more on causes and consequences? ... 
A presentation that appealed to what they were responsible for 
and how they approached work? 
 
- Alternatively attacking the 'messenger' might be a means of 
avoiding the 'message'. Evidence for this was taking phone calls 
during the meeting, disappearing for long stretches and not 
seeking to catch-up on return. Nor would members challenge 
absences or the failure to arrive at decisions. This behaviour was 
not noted during the previous feedback meetings 
Our intervention 
assumed that if team 
dynamics were 
addressed, issues 
would be dealt with 
This assumption is in keeping with the literature (Menzies, 1960; 
1989 and 1990; Obholzer and Roberts, 1994; Long, 2013)  
 
- In Burke and Litwin's terms, we had addressed 'transactional' 
factors 
 
- Presenting psychological evidence strikes recipients as directed 
more at them as individuals, or as a team, rather than at the issues 
involved 
How else can we 
understand the 
behaviour of the senior 
team during this 
meeting? 
The counter-transference we experienced was consistent with 'free 
associations' of level two managers. They reported how their ideas 
and attempts to support senior team members were ignored or 
rejected. Their feelings ranged from 'not appreciated', 
'despondent', to 'why bother' 
 
- Is this what senior team members also felt? In coaching, they 
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 If a realist approach is more suitable than a hermeneutic or positivist apology in analysing unconscious 
processes as 'generative mechanisms' (Rustin, 1991) then realism should also be suitable analysing the social 
causes triggering unconscious processes (anxiety and defences) and what effects they may in turn generate.  
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admitted 'helplessness' and 'despondency' in the face of unfolding 
events. This is consistent with 'primary risk'  
What might this indicate 
about their team 
dynamics and 
functioning? 
Their behaviour in the meeting was consistent with Bion's (1961) 
defensive pattern of basic assumption 'Flight' and in particular BA 
'Me' (Gould et al., 1996) 
 
- BA 'Flight' relates to their ineffectiveness of holding each other to 
account and of their solutions as a team? 
- BA 'Me' relates to asserting their individual autonomy, and efforts 
to address how they might be judged as individuals in their 
respective roles? 
Was the senior team's 
avoidance of the issues 
'resistance' which (in 
SDT) indicates 
psychological causation 
or something else? 
 
Can 'resistance' be 
conceptualised 
differently so as to bring 
personal, team-, and 
organisation-level 
change? 
 
 
 
According to its literature SDT 'explains' why change may be 
resisted (for psychological reasons), as social defences protect 
against anxiety associated with primary task work (Long, 2006; 
Krantz, 2010; Bain, 1998) 
 
The SDT approach to change involves first helping individuals 
understand and change themselves in relation to their predicament 
 
Could the evidence gathered be presented without inviting 
scepticism? 
 
The organisational change literature on 'resistance to change' 
suggests that resistance is not only psychological in nature but can 
be: 
- Ideological (related to deeply-held beliefs) 
- Normative(offence to values) 
- Political - asserting power to undermine others (Hambrick and 
Canella, 1989) and manifests as 'protecting one's turf' or 'closing 
ranks' (Burke, 2011) 
 
What appears as BA 'Me' or 'Flight' may be caused by these more 
sociological-political reasons  
 
We contemplated drawing out the ideological, normative and 
political dimensions to provide an explanation of the social causes 
and possible consequences of social defences 
 
This led into the research and to our secondary analysis 
 
Note: It was becoming evident that the 'problem of change' could not be contained 
within SDT alone.  
 
 
Secondary Analysis 
While the failure of the social defence intervention was disconcerting, it was not 
unprecedented in the literature. We had an unfolding live example which could be 
examined in depth.  
 
A straightforward systems-psychodynamic consultant's analysis was sufficient to 
recognise that an exception had occurred that challenged my way of working. A more 
sociological analysis, alongside a psychoanalytic one (Trist, 1950) ought to improve 
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the prospects of change. We chose cultural theory, and three analytic models: 
agency-structure dynamics; institutional theory; and systems theory to provide 
additional sociological resources.  
 
Table 4.12 summarises our assessment at this point.  
 
 
Table 4.12 A Social Side to SDT 
Questions 
and 
Observation 
 
Use of Cultural Theory, Structures and Agency and Institutions, and 
Systems Theory 
What were 
the social 
defences 
indicating 
and not 
indicating? 
Work was not done in the spirit of the primary task nor best interests of the 
organisation 
 
- Working as 'individuals’, the senior team's interventions became more short-
term, tactical and less effective 
 
- In levels 2 and 3 there was confusion about whose lead and which policy to 
follow. Decision-making stalled. Individuals became cautious, conflict-
adverse, and risk-adverse 
 
... Here were warnings of worsening problems to come ... 
 
Were these social defences themselves dysfunctional or benign features that 
all organisations have to some degree (Bain, 1998; Hinshelwood and 
Skogstad, 2000; Long, 2006)? 
 
The SDT literature is imprecise as to the consequences of social defences  
 
How can we tell: 
- When social defences are more dysfunctional (task-undermining) thereby 
threatening organisational performance? 
- When are they more benign or circumventing anxiety in the service of task?  
 
Simply identifying them, as we did here, did not tell us. The value of 
differentiating is diagnostic; it can help us identify the possible consequences 
of social defences.
56
 On its own, SDT did not leave us any wiser 
 
How to 
develop the 
social-side 
of SDT? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Menzies (1960) suggested that social defences are more than unconscious 
psychological mechanisms and once established endure in organisational 
systems and processes affecting the way work is approached. They operate 
independently of the individuals involved 
 
- But how do social defences operate as social entities? How is this different 
from the psychology involved? What is their sociology? 
 
- The emphasis in her work (1989; 1990) and in much of the literature is on 
exposing the psychological dynamics of interventions, and helping individuals 
to understand and address their predicament 
 
- The failure of the SDT to assist the senior team had replicated the theory's 
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 If they are dysfunctional, this would suggest an analogy of social defences to organisational performance as 
'smoke is to fire'. If they are benign, this suggests that individuals find ways of dealing with both anxiety and 
achieving task. 
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... through 
the Agency- 
Structure 
Interplay 
 
... With 
Institutional 
Theory  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'problem of change' 
 
- Trist, Emery and Jaques dealt with this problem with 'structural' insights and 
interventions, by retaining psychological understandings in the background 
 
If social defences are social entities, how do they not operate as 'structures' 
implied by the agency-structure dynamic?  
In sociology, structure refers to the relatively fixed or objective features of 
social life such as institutions, systems or social forces and currents. Agency 
refers to human action (which by definition includes unconscious 
psychological processes). For our analytic purposes: 
- We draw on Archer (1995) and Mouzelis’ (2008) method of differentiating 
agency and structure as two analytically (rather than empirically) distinct 
phenomena in order to study their interplay and effects over time
57
 
- This allows us to differentiate the psychological (agency) and social 
(structure) causes and effects of social defences 
 
If we examine social defences as forms of agency and structure, it is 
individuals and their unconscious processes (anxiety and defence) that 
provide the agency that develops the social defences. But to leave it here 
suggests they are essentially psychological entities and psychologically 
caused. This is the implicit implication of SDT
58
 
- Focusing on their psychology (agency) may not help us see what is 
occurring in the environments (structures) they develop in and react to.
59
 The 
social defences we observed were a reaction to something 'structurally given' 
in the 'environment'. Presumably social defences need a 'structural' stimulus 
or 'trigger' to occur - a reaction to change or a 'new structure' 
 
If we examine the interplay of agency and structure over time (Archer, 1995), 
we can compare explanations of social defences as agency or structure 
- Collective anxiety could be treated as 'agency' establishing social defences, 
but this does not identify what the anxiety is a reaction to. Once operating 
'agency' is also insufficient to explain how social defences generate effects. 
The implication of Archer is that anxiety-as-agency is sandwiched between a  
somehow changing structure that triggers anxiety and the new structure that 
defences create 
- Structure better explains the causes or triggers of social defences, and the 
'structures' they become to create their effects. This is the sociology of social 
defence  
 
 
Anxiety and its defence generate new and common ways of thinking and 
behaving that then operate as 'structures'. But (assuming they can be labelled 
accurately) how do social defences become structures and work-practices? 
Something is missing from 'agency and structure' 
 
- One way of understanding how structures operate is as 'institutions': 
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 This is different to Giddens 'structuration theory' or Bourdieu's reflexive 'habitus, field, capital' (King, 2005) 
that do not give primacy to either agency or structure making their interaction and their effects in real time 
difficult to analyse. There is a similar tendency in the psycho-social accounts of social defences found in the 
literature (Hoggett, 2015). By differentiating agency and structure, we can see both their psychology and 
sociology and not collapse their difference nor reduce their explanation to either psychology or sociology.  
58
 See, for example, Menzies (1960). The largest part of her seminal paper focuses on the psychological reasons 
for why nurses experienced anxiety. The focus of her interventions remained on individuals and teams (1960; 
1989; 1990). She referred to the hospital structures that gave rise to nurses' anxiety, and implies that the social 
defences are operating independently of individual nurses involved to create the effects they do (1960). But she 
does not offer these as 'structures' nor as explanations or the focus of intervention. 
59
 What is suggested is akin to Lewin's advice of periodically reversing what is held as 'figure' and 'ground' 
(Burnes, 2004a; 2012; Schein, 1996). 
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... Systemic 
self-
organising 
and 
feedback 
loops 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
... and 
Cultural 
Theory 
conventions which organise common ways of thinking and behaving to 
achieve a purpose (Douglas, 1986). Institutions also exhibit rules and norms 
alongside cultural cognitive ways of thinking (Scott, 2008) - cognitive in the 
sense that 'institutions think' (Douglas, 1986)
60
 
 
- There seems no reason not to recognise that institutions can be formal or 
informal 
 
- Social defences, groups and policies can be recognised as having 
institutional properties which can supplement psychological properties 
 
- We chose to examine social defences and policies as institutions  
 
 
Institutions operate with a systemic 'self-organising' principle - being 
simultaneously 'open' to ('structural) influences from the wider environment 
while being 'closed' in how they operate and respond (Capra, 1996) 
 
- This allows examination of the company's ('structural') self-organising logic
61
 
(distinct from, yet contributed by, 'agency' actions) and how the consequences 
of its responses affect the company ... this can be explained by feedback ... 
 
Institutions change, remain stable and generate consequences through 
systemic 'feedback' processes 
 
- In the first phase institutions establish and reinforce a common way of 
thinking, feeling and acting (thought-style) which at the second phase of 
feedback generate consequences or outcomes (6, 2011; 2003). These 
reinforce or undermine the operation of other institutions and practices 
(Jackson, 2003; Meadows, 2008) which effects the issuing institution ...  
 
- However there is more: from a cultural theory perspective confounding 
events (discrepant 'surprises' which the prevailing thought-style cannot solve) 
constitute 'negative feedback loops' eliciting counter-veiling responses from 
any or all of the three other thought-styles (also known as 'voices' or 
'elementary forms'). Each of CT's four prototypical elementary forms reflect a 
distinct 'self-organising' logic and values that drive 'institutional' behaviour  
 
- Through CT, we can identify the thought-styles animating institutions 
 
Above all, we can postulate which thought-style (elementary form) is 
animating each social defence system. This can be used to forecast the likely 
consequences of social defences by taking into account the thought-styles of 
surrounding institutions to which social defences react and respond to ... 
 
-  Postulating the thought-style driving each of the social defences and 
policies proved a better indicator of their consequences than postulating the 
basic assumption (BA) defence pattern 
 
Note: CT draws on institutional and systems concepts to furnish explanations 
of how groups, organisations, institutions and societies operate. In this 
research we treat agency-structure, institutional and systems models 
separately in order to highlight how SDT can also incorporate these 
(independently of CT if need be) to develop its social-side, and to bring SDT 
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 In 'How Institutions Think', Douglas establishes the theoretical and institutional foundations of cultural theory. 
How CT handles agency-structure is through the institutional constraints that drive common thinking and 
practices, and the environmental opportunities that individuals can use to change their institutions when they no 
longer provide the solutions for which they were developed (Douglas, 1986; 1982).  
61
 Including its parts, such as departments, levels, teams, policies. 
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and CT into conversation in ways they can cross-fertilise to learn and develop 
from each other. The latter was our preferred strategy  
Differences 
in the two 
types of 
social 
defences 
manifesting 
across the 
top three 
levels 
By mid-2009, two types of social defences were manifest across the top three 
management levels: 
 
- The senior team demonstrated BA 'Me' - becoming harried executives, 
rushing around, issuing multiple directives while actually being more 
operational than strategic 
- Manufacturing and Sales level three managers exhibited BA 'Flight' - self-
protection, avoiding conflict, 'not rocking the boat' and concentrating on 
delivering on KPIs 
- Intriguingly, some second level managers adopted the defensive pattern of 
the senior team while others aligned more with the third level 
 
It was now that second level managers confessed to me of feeling 
'ineffective', 'irrelevant except in title' and 'squeezed from above and below'. 
They presented as the most compromised and as bearing the brunt of the 
post-GFC changes 
 
Third level managers reported either:  
- 'No difference' between what their second-level boss and senior team 
members said or did 
- Or that their boss was 'as one of them'. Many found this 'comforting' but 
recognised that their boss 'was not adding value'. One level three manager 
confided that he did not know which was better: level two managers 'at one' 
with level one, or level two managers 'at one' with level three. 'Both were bad', 
he said  
 
My meetings and coaching sessions with senior team members became 
infrequent. They demanded feedback about what was happening, not insights 
about their functioning for which I was contracted.  
My counter-transference experience indicated that: 
- They were thinking of me as one of their direct reports, but with more 
respect. Their disposition toward me was consistent with complaints I heard 
from below about senior team members’ 'demands' on them 
- At times I felt pressed to validate what they were doing. They said they 
wanted me to 'challenge' them, however their actions avoided this, responding 
more to 'stroking' and assuaging their distress. It was as if I was asked to 
'contain' their anxiety and uncertainty: psychodynamically, to be a comforting 
not challenging therapist-mother 
 
 
Analysing the social defences as basic assumptions reflected the manifest 
defence pattern, but this insight did not indicate the consequences which 
when consolidated they were to cause. On the other hand, in hindsight and 
using CT, identifying the elementary form or mix underlying 'thought-style' 
could forecast their consequences more accurately. Moreover, observing their 
combined effects, the organisation was transitioning into Fatalism. All or most 
of the consequences of the social defences here are explicable as 'isolate 
self-preservation' 
 
Note: CT assists in understanding the sociological nature of social defences. It was 
necessary to forecasting their consequences. The metaphors 'structure' and 'agency' 
provided a stepping stone from a psychodynamic-only to a sociological 
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conceptualisation.62 But they were difficult to apply cleanly without understanding how 
institutions - formal and informal - do their thinking. The availability of four contending 
thought-styles suggests that any institution is likely to shift. In trying circumstances 
social defences formed. It was apparent to us at the time that there was something 
wrong. But without awareness of CT I was unable as a consultant to forecast what 
would happen next, or to help the organisation change.   
 
 
4.4 Problems Emerge 
From early 2010, substantive problems appeared, six to nine months after the social 
defences emerged. They worsened throughout 2010.  
 
Cultural theory and the three analytic models were used to draft a better explanation 
of the causes and consequences of the social defences: better in the sense of 
appealing to the senior team's rationality in order to improve the prospects of change. 
The same explanation should also apply to the social defences as they consolidated, 
to the policies, to the different levels and functions, and to the organisation as a 
whole. CT is especially helpful in identifying why problems defied most attempts to 
solve them. Table 4.13 tabulates the problems and Table 4.14 the critical events; 
while Table 4.15 the primary analysis and some of its short-comings; and Tables 
4.16, 4.17 and 4.18 the secondary analyses which are more discriminating.  
 
 
Table 4.13 Problems, Problems, Problems 
 
Increased Production Times 
 
 
Worsening Quality 
Customer  
Forces Temporary Plant 
Closure  
By March 2010, production lead-
times rise from one-three months 
pre-GFC to three-nine months 
 
By mid-2010, lead times rise to six-
By mid-2010, 
serious quality 
problems 
appeared:  
 
In September 2010, the largest 
customer finds faulty wiring as 
the cause of extensive fire 
damage to property 
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 With the constraints and possibilities indicated by CT's Grid-Group Typology, agency-structure becomes 
somewhat redundant, as these exist at any level from the individual, to the group, organisation, national and 
international political economies. CT begins from the Durkheimian assumption that we are social creatures, able 
to think and act (differently) because we inhabit and live out degrees of Regulation (Grid) and degrees of 
Integration (Group). Agency - as used in economics and psychology - suggests that where 'structures' constrain 
change, 'agents' enable change. This is simplistic and methodological individualism, reducing all analysis to the 
level of individuals or their psychology which is an implicit assumption in SDT and systems psychodynamics. It is 
detrimental to understanding social influences and change. Here, social theory is built from the individual up to 
explain social influences and group or societal dynamics. The approach we adopt is to use a sociological 
conceptualisation alongside a psychological one akin to Lewin's recommendation of periodically shifting between 
what is held as 'figure' and 'ground'. This allows different possibilities and hypotheses to emerge and to be 
examined.   
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twelve months 
 
By late 2010, they are nine-fifteen 
months 
 
This placed most stress on Sales  
 
Sales Managers: 
- Found that it was more difficult to 
make sales; customers demanded 
more specifications and quicker 
delivery times; they complained 
more and turned to competitors 
- Were also told to use their initiative; 
warned against changing 
specifications due to their effect on 
slowing production and told not to 
cut profit-margins to make sales 
- Products were 
faulty 
- Not made to 
specification  
- Damaged en-
route 
 
Beginning in a large 
new Middle Eastern 
Plant, the same 
problems appeared 
in Eastern 
European, African 
and Asian Plants 
- The wiring fault was traced to 
the oldest, largest and most 
profitable plant in Asia, which 
was shut down temporarily for 
investigations 
- It took six months and 
considerable expense to 
reopen 
 
- Due to the public liability risk, 
the same customer under-took 
similar investigations at all 
other plants finding other 
potential problems at more 
expense 
 
- The global effects on trust 
and sales were enormous 
 
Note: The company's difficulties were not attributable in any ordinary way to the 
GFC. Typically economic crises force productivity and quality increases. Here 
productivity and quality collapsed. Optimism that the GFC would mean that long-
standing problems would be addressed was confounded by events. Social defences 
in interaction with the policies were suspected as causes; but by what mechanism? 
 
 
Table 4.14 Problems Compounded 
 
Another Environmental 
Change 
 
 
Another Restructure 
In mid-2010, the 
organisation's largest 
customer, an independent 
subsidiary of a much larger 
MNC (Multinational 
company) and market 
leader, announced that its 
purchasing would be 
centralised to its US head 
office. All purchases would 
follow a criteria-based 
competitive tendering 
process from 2011 
 
This threatened to overturn 
the company's local and 
regional sales methods and 
compromise the role of 'key 
account managers'  
 
In November 2010, the senior team responds by announcing 
more restructuring 
 
- A Chief Operations Officer (COO) was appointed to oversee 
Manufacturing, Sales and Marketing. This created new 
reporting lines for each respective Director and their direct 
reports  
 
- Procurement was still to report to the Finance Director, and 
Service to the CEO  
 
This event underlined informal divisions among the senior 
team. The shift in power was towards operations, while the 
power of some of the four senior team members who 
individually championed a post-GFC policy was reduced  
 
The restructure reinforced an earlier hypothesis as to why 
there was no strategic direction behind the policies: anxiety 
and uncertainty had led to tactical operational measures 
where each Director operated individually to respond to what 
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Coaching in Sales revealed 
extreme concerns 
compounded by fear of the 
effects of the temporary 
plant closure 
 
There was a five-month 
delay in the senior team's 
formal response ... 
 
Confusion and gossip 
prevailed  
they were responsible for. The restructure provided 'more of 
the same'
63
 
 
It also prompted another hypothesis: 'competing institutions' 
(policies and social defences) were causing impasses  
 
I was invited to design consulting workshops to include the 
COO and the level two and three managers of Manufacturing, 
Marketing and Sales. These highlighted how Procurement 
and Service (and hence Finance and the CEO) had to be 
included or better coordinated with Operations. This was not 
accomplished 
 
Note: The restructure was a further reinforcement of the company's 'self-organising' 
logic prompted by the senior team’s one-out and operational measures. This was 
best captured by CT - as a deepening transition into Isolate Ordering and Fatalistic 
thought-style, prompting more of the same short-term and expedient leadership that 
oscillated between being absent, arbitrary and directive, and which only further 
reinforced the self-protective defences and diminishing trust below.64 While the new 
Operations function represented an attempt to increase Integration, the senior team 
members' self-protective instincts to keep their individual departmental authority 
undermined coordination, driving the organisation deeper into Isolate Ordering.  
 
 
Table 4.15 Contemporaneous Primary Analysis of Consulting Shortcomings 
 
Primary Analysis using Burke and Litwin, ORA and Wells 
 
 
Evident Shortcomings 
In Our Approach and 
Literature 
 
Would problematise: 
 
- The lack of a coordinating 'strategy' to address the competing 
effects of the post-GFC policies and align Manufacturing and 
Sales (Burke and Litwin) at the level of the 'whole-organisation' 
(Wells) 
 
- Social defences in the 'leadership' (Burke and Litwin) and the 
need to improve the senior team's functioning (ORA) including 
how it handled 'primary risk' (strategy) 
 
- 'Structural' issues (the lack of role differentiation between the 
levels) (Burke and Litwin) 
 
Burke and Litwin, ORA 
and Wells cannot 
account for how the 
organisation's problems 
originated 
 
The problems were 
'compounding' rather 
than being solved. In 
retrospect the problems 
demonstrated 'feedback'  
 
Both the post-GFC 
policies and our failed 
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 One second level manager summed up the feeling of colleagues: the restructure was as effective 'as 
rearranging the deck-chairs on the Titanic as it sunk'. The senior team was bleeding credibility.  
64
 Perri 6's (2011; 2014; 2015) and Coyle's (1994; 1997) analysis that Isolate Ordering condenses social relations 
into two positions of 'Despots' (including aspiring 'Despots') and 'Serfs' was perspicacious. While the senior team 
was not overtly 'despotic' - the metaphor captures the mood and powerlessness of those below and how the 
leadership was emotionally experienced. See Chapter Six.  
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- 'Management practices' affecting 'work unit climate' (‘command 
and control’), micro-management, mixed messages pushing 
initiative but asserting centralised control) (Burke and Litwin) 
 
- The prevailing 'anxiety-culture-defence'
65
 (ORA and Wells) 
across the whole suggested 'culture' for intervention. But being a 
'transformational lever' for organisation-wide change (Burke and 
Litwin), our approach was more oriented towards teams and 
individuals ... 
 
So ... what type of cultural intervention given that the social 
defence intervention failed? 
On the other hand, the GFC and other external changes indicated 
'strategy' as the natural candidate for intervention (Burke and 
Litwin). But given 'structural' issues (lack of role differentiation 
between the levels) and 'culture' (social defences and 'mixed 
messages') - strategy alone was not enough  
 
- The November 2010 re-structure was more of the same - 
piecemeal 'transactional' intervention  
 
On these assumptions, we advised the senior team to generate 
fresh and frequent discussion across the three management 
levels to find solutions to improve coordination and integration (to 
raise productivity and reduce costs)  
 
A strategic shift was also suggested from a 'stand alone producer-
seller to the whole market' to 'supplier' to their five largest 
customers (all large MNCs and compromising 80-90% of sales)
66
 
 
This amounted to a transformation: not simply providing for 
customer needs but assisting them to meet their own strategic 
goals. A fully-developed Marketing function would identify and 
help customers define their needs. This would involve more than 
product development conducted in isolation of customers (the 
work of the current Marketing function)  
 
Using Emery and Trist (1965) - the GFC is recognised as having 
changed 'the environment' from 'placid-clustered' to 'disturbed-
reactive' demanding not (piecemeal) 'tactics' but (coordinating) 
'strategy'. The latest changes indicated it was now a 'turbulent 
field' where capacity to influence market forces (rather than 
respond) is at a premium  
 
social defence 
intervention(s)
67
 were 
beginning to confound 
my framework 
 
The emotional data 
clearly established that 
something was wrong. 
But it was not possible to 
use it to see what would 
come next 
 
Neither our 'interpretive, 
non-interventionist' 
action-research 
approach nor our more 
directive interventions 
were making any 
difference. We were not 
appealing to the senior 
team's rationality 
 
The literature pointed to 
the need for 
'transformational', whole-
organisation change but 
I was not equipped to 
effect a 'paradigm shift' 
(Trist et al., 1963; 
Palmer, 2002). Missing 
was the gravitas and 
urgency that a causal 
explanation appealing to 
the senior team's 
business rationality may 
kick-start them to action  
 
Instead, no matter how 
many times it was 
raised, 'strategy' fell on 
deaf ears.
68
 Either it was 
seen as not immediately 
relevant; or my timing 
was wrong. 'Strategy' 
was going the same way 
as my 'subjective' 
psychological data  
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 The social defence literature suggests that how anxiety and defence are dealt with is a central feature of 
organisations which is referred to as "anxiety-culture-defence" constellation (Hinshelwood and Skogstad, 2000).   
66
 This strategy emerged during the second-half of 2010 through many coaching conversations where 
participants identified their concerns, frustrations and ideas about the organisation and what it was doing and 
not doing to address the problems. Here I was playing more the role of sounding-board and thinking-partner, and 
mid-wife in its development. Before its presentation to the senior team it was offered to many in the second and 
third levels for feedback, adjustments, and for them to take the lead in presenting. Despite its consensus, not one 
of them wanted to present it to the senior team. This reinforced the solidity of the social defences in place.  
67
 Including our raising it during coaching sessions and informal meetings I was invited to with level two and 
three managers.   
68
 Including: post-GFC the lack of communication on strategy; with the social defences, the lack of a strategy to 
coordinate the operation of the policies; and now a new 'marketing-supplier' focused strategy being offered. 
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Note: There is no question that the literatures used have empirical application and 
practical implications. But in this instance they lacked indication as to how practice-
based change might be effected. They were confounded by the familiar 'problem of 
change'. Our failure was now two-fold: the systems-psychodynamic social defence 
intervention had failed and so had a sociological plea for strategic re-redirection.   
 
 
Table 4.16 Secondary Analysis: Deficiencies Take Effect 
 
Issue-Location 
 
 
Build-Up 
Pressure on 
Sales 
The pressure to make sales led to unrealistic promises made to customers 
to: 
- Drop prices and agree to smaller volumes which would reduce profit-
margin in a way that had been forbidden (see above) 
- Change specifications despite repeated warnings from Manufacturing, 
and increased cost 
- Ensure fast delivery (while slower delivery was an inevitable 
consequence)  
 
Sales could not present Manufacturing with accurate sales forecasts. This 
made it difficult to order raw materials and organise workers and 
production-lines 
Frustrations in 
Manufacturing 
Meanwhile, Manufacturing problems included: 
- Lost control of purchasing to the new Procurement and Supply Chain 
department 
- Drastic cuts to their capital budget; reducing their flexibility 
- Began to lay off all but their expert workers and foremen to be replaced 
by seasonal workers 
 
Manufacturing also cut progressive inventory, and experimented with how 
little inventory was needed to meet the (inaccurate) sales forecasts they 
had been presented 
 
New lean manufacturing practices would be efficient in the long-term but in 
these chaotic circumstances they increased costs and 'headaches' 
 
The new seasonal workforce resulted in plant managers returning to 
'command and control' as untrained workers did not otherwise know what 
to do 
Effect of 
Procurement 
and Supply 
Chain 
on 
Manufacturing 
 
Manufacturing-
Sales 
'fault-line' 
The new department took over purchasing and distribution to make bulk-
savings 
 
- As commodity prices rose (post-GFC) they went to the commodity 
markets abandoning long-standing local and regional intermediaries whose 
interest was to service local plants 
- Purchases came from far and wide compromising order-to-delivery time. 
Part orders covering several plants went to the wrong plants and quality 
was variable 
 
The effect was to slow production and put pressure on plant managers 
who now had to fill lengthy centralised request-forms and be 'absolutely 
exact' (which they could not be)  ... then they had to 'wait and wait and 
wait' 
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Disgruntled plant managers were told to be patient until new systems are 
'sorted out'. No progress meant worse frustration 
 
Plant managers and Sales clashed. Sales complained about 'longer 
production times'. Plant managers complained of unreliable and inaccurate 
sales forecasts. A cycle was created and was the subject of much 
complaint during coaching. Both functions experienced new and worse 
pressures than before 
How Marketing 
Contributed 
Through coaching it became apparent that Marketing pursued a product 
development function.
69
 Marketing managers decided on which product 
modification requests to accept from Sales and then developed these with 
Manufacturing 
 
In the coaching, managers complained of either: 
- Lacking authority and the functional leadership to make decisions 
- Intense pressure not to do anything to prevent cutting Manufacturing cost 
- Pressure not to frustrate 'use of initiative' in Sales 
 
Marketing was caught between conflicting demands - between directives 
from different senior team members and between Manufacturing and Sales 
 
They could see how some modifications were possible but that most were 
costly. When pressured by Sales, their standard response was 'be patient' 
- knowing full well that more time and unforthcoming resources were 
needed  
 
In cross-functional meetings Marketing received flack from both sides, 
partly because of their reputation as perfectionists (after all, most were 
engineers not marketers), and partly because Sales and Manufacturing 
were increasingly intolerant of anything that got in the way of meeting KPIs 
 
In line with the social defences in Manufacturing and Sales, several 
expressed 'not wanting to rock the boat'. Conflicting directives from the 
senior team were understood as 'rocking the boat' 
 
In response, Marketing managers: 
- Said 'yes' to all demands - knowing full well they could not be fulfilled 
- Extended the back-log of items on their list of obligations they could 
'never meet' 
 
When challenged during coaching Marketing managers were fully aware of 
what they were doing:  
- One manager spoke of the imaginary 'In-Box' of requests that were 
characterised as: 'probable but difficult', 'possible but unlikely' and 'forget-
about' 
- Another characterised Marketing as being thrown 'the hot potato' to 
decide on what neither Manufacturing or Sales would solve, and could only 
                                                          
69
 There was no marketing as such that provided research, branding and promotion, or coordination with Sales. It 
was more related to Manufacturing than to Sales from which it was split off in the first restructure post-GFC. 
Before that, under the older regional structure, like Sales, both were an adjunct to Manufacturing. It was never 
more than product development and it was always staffed by engineers. When this was questioned, I was told 
that marketing was the responsibility of key account managers in Sales who were assigned to each of the five 
large customers. They were level three support staff versus line-managers, who were treated more as account 
managers, a back-up to Sales colleagues when meeting customers, and to occasionally provide information when 
requested. Some took up a more proactive marketing and research role, but this was not a formalised part of 
their role. Knowledge of this helped to develop the identity-as-supplier strategy. It required a marketing focus 
that the organisation lacked and that linked marketing to strategy (see, for example, Kumar, 2004). 
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be solved by them 
Sales 
Impacts  
Procurement 
and 
Manufacturing 
At the request of Finance and Procurement, several level two Sales 
managers: 
- Developed a process of submitting sales-orders to that production facility 
which would be cheapest and fastest to deliver given the request  
- They also found that by placing orders through a particular country rather 
than head-office, considerable tax-savings could be made  
- Sales created a team to do this. (Previously Country Sales managers had 
worked through one or two factories, processed their own orders, 
negotiated with the factories, 'progress checked' each other, while keeping 
in touch with customers) 
 
Difficulties with the new sales-ordering system appeared quickly: 
- Orders were queued and took longer to process. It also took longer to 
identify the appropriate factory  
- Sales managers would only discover the status of any order when 
customers complained. It then took time to detect where and what the 
problem was and how far the order had progressed  
- Without direct relationships, Sales could negotiate and resolve difficulties 
with Plant managers and were 'referred back' to their own system 
- Customers complained bitterly, cancelled overdue orders, inserted 
penalty-clauses into future contracts and sued for late delivery 
 
When Sales managers argued for restoration of the 'old way', they were 
told by Procurement that this was not possible due to considering tax 
savings and to continue negotiating with Manufacturing to fix the problems 
- Cross-functional meetings reached agreements, but little changed 
- Dealing with angry customers led to greater frustration and more 
experimentation to find alternative ways around their problems 
 
After-Sales 
and Service 
The new function took over control of After-Sales Services and Warranty 
(Service) from Sales: 
- It was expected to run as a profitable independent 'business centre', to 
grow business outside the existing organisational structure and to free up 
Sales managers to focus on sales  
- A proportion of Sales income was redirected from Sales to the new 
department 
 
Service experienced an unexpected increase in production and delivery 
problems and customer complaints. Far from making a profit it was soon 
operating well-over budget 
- Sales had lost its previous closer contact with customers and Plant 
managers. There were delays before Sales learned of Manufacturing 
problems and Sales managers were in no position to recognise any 
patterns to these problems  
- Despite the best efforts of the new Director (who reported to the CEO) 
and an ex-Finance level two manager (second-in-charge), attempts at 
coordination failed badly  
- Faced with their own worsening problems, neither Sales nor 
Manufacturing managers had any enthusiasm  for 'trouble-shooting' 
 
For Sales and Manufacturing it became apparent that Service should have 
been aware of mounting problems:  
- However most of the new Service managers had no sales or 
manufacturing experience  
- They could not distinguish problems attributable to seasonal variations 
from those generated by the restructuring 
- Nor could they identify problems caused by their creation as a 
department; understand the severity of each problem, nor draw on inter-
departmental connections to solve them  
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In coaching, Service managers confided they were 'trying to cope as best 
we can': 
- They supposed that apparent lack of interest from Sales and 
Manufacturing was nothing new  
- They viewed each other as newly promoted managers grateful for 
promotion and 'eager to please'  
 
As the volume of problems worsened it became apparent through 
coaching there was a more serious underlying condition: 
- Manufacturing managers reported awareness of 'growing quality-
problems'. But feeling under pressure and 'lack of authority', they were 
inclined to treat them as 'out of my hands'  
- Nor did Manufacturing make any connections between the different 
sources contributing to their problems or to the problems in Sales or 
Service 
- Instead they blamed Sales  
 
It was apparent to us that:  
- Manufacturing managers had become noticeably more insular and 
focused on their own immediate problems which were piling up  
- Working with decreased authority, reduced budget and a new seasonal 
workforce, product quality was no longer assured 
- With Sales' centralised order-system and loss of the Service 
responsibility, they had abandoned 'progress-chasing' and previously 
closer customer relationships  
 
Note: The coaching was in a strong position to pool together information from the 
different functions to make sense of this worsening situation. Conversations with 
senior team members revealed that most knew aspects, especially concerning their 
individual area of responsibility, but not the full extent. Our feedback was sought and 
welcomed, but it made little difference. No collective discussion ensued, though 
many amendments to previous directives and new ones emerged. Nor did there 
appear to be much communication, let alone difference-of-opinion or conflict between 
senior team members. This underlined to us that the senior team was well-and-truly 
operating as Isolates, confounded by organising-logic they unwittingly contributed to 
which led to 'more of the same'.  
 
 
Table 4.17 Secondary Analysis: Social Defences and Post-GFC Policies 
as 'Agency' or 'Competing Institutions' 
Agency 
or  
Competing 
Institutions? 
 
With the benefit of CT much more is apparent in hindsight than was the 
case during the consultancy 
 
CT offers re-presenting both social defences and policies as institutions: 
institutions generating 'positive and negative' feedback loops  
- Positive loops are made when events confirm the rightness of people's 
analysis in their own eyes which reinforces their thinking and action 
- Negative feedback presents them with exceptions (surprises) that they 
cannot accommodate and which therefore compromise the thought-style 
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(rationality) they are operating within  
 
The coaching evidence demonstrated the unconscious and contradictory 
practices individuals engaged in. But their activities could not be easily 
attributed to 'agency'
70
 
 
Analysing these practices and behaviour as under the sway of the policies 
and the social defences as 'institutions' (each with their own thought-style 
and feedback) could show:  
 
- Behaviours influenced by one or a combination of the policies and the 
social defences were adhered to without thoughtfulness  
- Individuals could acknowledge and articulate that what they were doing 
was contradictory and likely to worsen the situation - but felt powerless to 
do otherwise 
- In combination the post-GFC policies produced unintended 
consequences which elicited counter-measures. These first triggered, and 
then exacerbated, social defences. Together the policies and social 
defences generated new problems that confounded attempts to resolve 
them. These worsened appreciably  
 
Post-GFC 
Policies 
as Institutions  
 
The centralisation of procurement and supply-chain focused on cost-
savings, whereas KPIs intended to drive 'initiative' in Sales and 'cost-
saving' in Manufacturing did. They also exacerbated the Manufacturing-
Sales 'fault-line' and induced self-protective behaviour  
 
... Here we have institutions generating feedback which had direct bearing 
on the issues that emerged in the functions (Table 4.15). Feedback 
consolidated social defences and compounded organisational problems 
(Table 4.12) 
... The centralising and KPIs in turn influenced: 
- Marketing to favourably respond: say 'yes' to (but actually side-step) the 
conflicting demands of Manufacturing and Sales 
- The reluctance of Manufacturing and Sales to engage with the problems 
in Service 
... Poor quality resulted from the new seasonal workforce, which included 
piece-rate payments, work-quotas and a return to 'command and control' 
by permanent staff. Corners were cut, mostly likely causing the six-month 
plant closure (Table 4.13) 
... Cheaper distribution channels (centralisation of Procurement and 
Supply Chain) increased damage in transit, for example, due to multiple 
transfers between transport modes and lengthened delivery times (of both 
raw materials and products to customers) 
Social 
Defences in 
Manufacturing 
and Sales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social defences consolidated in response to the centralisation and cost-
cutting affecting Manufacturing and the pressure on Sales to 'use initiative'  
- Each function became attached to their respective KPIs as a means of 
appearing to do what was expected of them; despite knowing that this was 
failing  
- The Manufacturing-Sales 'fault-line' was now a 'collision path' 
 
Individuals spoke candidly within the coaching 'confessional'. During 
mandated meetings between Sales and Manufacturing we observed the 
contradictory behaviours arising from the social defences and particularly 
the KPIs  
 
Meetings were filled with laundry lists of issues needing sorting:  
                                                          
70
 'Agency' may have induced social defences in the first place but, once consolidated, they operated as 
institutions or 'structural entities' coming with their own rules (dos, don'ts, and shoulds), norms (including beliefs 
and practices) and thought-style (cultural-cognitive rationality). See Table 4.12. 
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Social 
Defences and 
KPI-mandated 
Meetings 
between Sales 
and 
Manufacturing 
- Sales pushing the need-for-faster-production-due-to-increasing-
customer-complaints and greater-flexibility-and-volume-and customisation 
- Manufacturing pleaded for accurate sales forecasts due to the delays in 
obtaining raw materials. They also pleaded for patience while they sorted 
the new seasonal workers and implemented lean manufacturing  
 
Yet despite acknowledging each other's frustrations, the difficulties 
imposed by 'mixed messages' from above and devising 'action plans' – 
caused problems to worsen 
- There was no 'boat rocking' nor action of any significant kind 
 
How each function went about achieving their KPIs resembled 
exaggerated variants of centralisation, cost-cutting or 'use of initiative' 
- Manufacturing managers were burdened and depressed, lacked any will 
to tackle their predicament (complaining of increased pressure and 
powerlessness). They grew insular, passive and their solidarity weakened  
- Sales managers went in a different direction, growing excited, 
experimental and camaraderie intensified  
 
We detected that: 
- Sales realising Manufacturing's determination to reduce progressive 
inventory and the slowness of accessing it, started to inflate their forecasts 
hoping that more inventory may speed up production 
- Manufacturing wondered why they had more inventory, and linked this to 
inaccurate forecasts. Initially they accepted Sales’ difficulty but as this 
continued now challenged all forecasts. They resorted to amending 
forecasts based on actual recent orders and then adjusted their inventory 
purchases  
- As Sales recovered in the second half of 2010, 'adjusted' forecasts and 
inventory meant even slower manufacturing delivery  
 
It was evident to me as a third party that although the departments knew 
what they were each doing, this was never raised in meetings 
- I often observed undercurrents of frustration and blame. This suggested 
the strength of social defences 
- When I challenged those present on issues, linking them to the social 
defences, my observations were neither denied, nor were they discussed. 
Instead there was more 'conflict-avoidance'  
- In the same meeting I also presented the 'five dysfunctions of a team' 
model (see Diagram 4.1) 
 
Later I distributed this diagram throughout Manufacturing and Sales and 
again it was acknowledged but without discussion (October 2010) 
- Only when I facilitated two workshops with the top three levels of 
Operations (March and May 2011) some discussion followed. But without 
Procurement and Service its effect would be limited  
 
Note: Social defences do indeed confound organisations. The Fatalistic resignation 
that was observable and the near determination with which each function became 
'stuck' strikes me now as more than the operation of unconscious defences, but a 
cultural compounding of difficulty. Simply attributing this to unconscious processes 
misses how these (once they) became institutionally-constituted, contributed to (and 
took on) a distinctive cultural manifestation replete with a thought-style and feedback 
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loops which generated consequences that became impossible to address. In this 
instance the cultural style was Isolate Ordering and resignation.71 
 
 
Diagram 4.1 The Five Dysfunctions of a Team Model (Lencioni, 2005, adapted) 
 
Absence of Trust
Fear of Conflict
Lack of 
Commitment
Avoidance of 
Accountability
Inattention
to Results
Five Dysfunctions of Team Model Lencioni (2005)
a way of thinking about 
corporate culture
Absence of Trust
Reluctance to vulnerable with each other
Unwilling to admit mistakes OR
Acknowledge weakness, needs, ask for help
Without trust = Fear of conflict
Stifles conflict & lively, passionate debate
Destructive, back-channel sniping increases
People not offering true ideas & perspectives
Leads to: sub-optimal decision-making
Without Conflict & Lively Debate
Commitment to decisions decreases
Leads to environment of:
Ambiguity, Confusion, Frustration
You are here...??
Accountability is avoided or diffuse
People don’t hold each other to account
Looking out for oneself becomes more important
than attention to the collective
 
 
Note: This diagram was presented as an informal intervention at one of the 
mandated Sales-Manufacturing meetings that managers present invited me to 
                                                          
71
 Papadopoulos (2015) noted a similar cultural dimension of Isolate Ordering present when re-analysing Menzies 
(1960) seminal case-study of nurses. This could explain why Menzies' nurses had become so helpless and 
resigned with many leaving before completing their training, and perhaps why Menzies found her best efforts to 
change the situation met with such stiff resistance. Could this be a feature of SDT's 'problem of change'? 
Arguably, in purposeful organisations rather than societies or groups in other settings, social defences that 
consolidate with a strong feature of Isolate Ordering may be more primary-task undermining, anxiety-avoidant 
and therefore resistant to change than if exhibiting one of the three other CT rationalities. A Fatalistic thought-
style renders those caught in its grip, especially if they are not in the most senior leadership roles, oscillating 
between: 'looking-out for themselves'; feeling helpless, resigned and following orders thoughtlessly; or acting in 
short-term, expedient ways without concern for longer-term consequences. In our case study the fact that the 
whole organisation had inadvertently created a pathway into Isolate Ordering rendered the leaders to also act in 
more despotic, desperate, short-term, arbitrary and expedient ways, not just followers. This would have ensured 
that the other social defences such as in the leadership team (Individualist) and Sales (Egalitarian/Individualist) 
would also get caught in a cross-current of Fatalistic thinking and acting. Arguably if the organisation had not 
entered Isolate Ordering, and the social defences manifested with one of the three other CT rationalities in their 
organising, they may become more anxiety-circumventing in service of task. They may have also mounted a 
stronger resistance and a viable alternative leadership that could contribute to organisational performance and 
the primary task. Another possibility is do organisations that develop social defences also push the whole-
organisation into Isolate Ordering? Those organisations that can resist this pull may exhibit social defences that 
are not so task-undermining but find other ways of achieving work? These are only very tentative hypotheses,  
requiring further research.  
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attend. After listening to the usual laundry-list of complaints and their polite 'not 
wanting to rock the boat' - and only when I was asked to contribute - did I draw this 
model on a white board. It represented an alternative way to get them to engage with 
the issues they were avoiding.  
 
It was my attempt to highlight how their social defences were leading to their side-
stepping of engaging with each other in more robust ways, that further reinforced 
their social defences and inability to solve problems. I linked their social defences to 
having undermined the 'trust' between them. From here the model is self-explanatory 
in its linking of the stages through which performance is progressively undermined. I 
hoped that this would get through to them.  
 
To those present it made a lot of sense, but they also complained of their 
powerlessness to do anything about it. Having experienced a similar reluctance 
during other interventions either with the senior team or in the coaching with their 
peers and direct reports; I decided that as the company was continually inviting me 
back and asking for my input, I felt I had nothing to lose so I circulated this diagram in 
the form of a one-page "working note" (Miller, 1995). The hope was this may do 
something where all my other interventions had failed to bring about change, 
mirroring the ineffectiveness I too felt. Many responded privately saying they liked the 
diagram and that it captured what was happening. But like all my other interventions, 
it was not taken up.  
 
 
Table 4.18 Secondary Analysis: Social Defences now with Cultural Theory 
Social Defences 
and CT's 
Thought-Styles 
post-GFC: 
the Creation of 
Havoc  
 
 
When the social defences consolidated, the basic assumption defence 
patterns did not account for the effects we observed. Nor did they assist 
us to identify what the defences were a reaction against. Nevertheless, 
the appearance of social defences did provide the first sign that things 
were going wrong. We could infer why and how (Table 4.10) ... but not 
what would happen next 
 
Firstly, SDT is not clear on if, or when, social defences are better 
approached as 'symptoms' or 'causes'.
72
 We observed that: 
- When they first manifest they appear as defensive-reactions 
('symptoms’) against something in the organisation or its wider 
environment  
- When they consolidate they create their own effects ('causes')  
                                                          
72
 Jaques (1995; 1998b) abandoned his social defence hypothesis because he came to defences as 'symptoms' of 
organisational problems. We also observed that once they consolidated they were also generating effects - 
'causes'. In this research, Jaques' insight applies when social defences first appear. They are certainly 'symptoms' 
but not necessarily of 'badly designed organisations' as he had suggested, but of organisational and environment 
causes. When consolidated they also generated effects or 'causes'.  
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The social defences in: 
- Manufacturing and Sales - BA 'Flight' was too imprecise to describe 
what individuals were reacting against and what consequences we 
witnessed  
- The senior team - BA 'Me' certainly captured their operation more as 
individuals than a team, each championing and driving a post-GFC 
policy, and how this undermined their ability to identify and coordinate the 
conflicting effects they were producing. We could assume it was a 
reaction to the GFC, that warned of future problems, but could not 
forecast the consequences we observed  
 
Secondly, if we treat social defences as informal cultural institutions 
attended by distinct attitudes to risk, forms of reasoning and practices 
(with sometimes a settlement involving more than one thought-style) this 
is more effective in identifying what they are reacting against, and what 
consequences they may generate 
 
BA 'Flight' certainly fostered avoidance of primary task; eschewed 
conflict, deterred blame to self but also promoted a mindless self-
protective following of KPIs in both functions: 
 
- In Manufacturing, managers were reacting to the centralisation and 
cost-cutting which had diminished their authority, limited their options, but 
also led them to become insular and suspicious of outsiders. They also 
displayed suppressed anger, resignation, helplessness and depression, 
and at times were despotic and dismissive of those below (especially 
Plant managers). These qualities were consistent with Isolate Ordering 
and a Fatalist thought-style
73
 
 
- In Sales the cultural movement was different. Instead of reacting-
against 'the push to use their initiative' they rallied around it. Presented 
with weak market demand, Sales took to experimentation, more risky 
initiatives, defiance of the directive to maintain the profit-ratio and 
defiantly embraced product customisation. These are typical of a 
Individualist thought-style. But in contrast to Manufacturing, Sales 
managers banded together. We also encountered the Egalitarian quality 
of banding together, camaraderie, righteous declarations about being the 
only ones to rescue the organisation (in defiance to the cost-cutting 
occurring elsewhere). This animated a frustration and suspicion towards 
outsiders. But in line with their defences, they also acted without regard 
for their impact on others - this Individualist experimentation mixed with 
Egalitarian self-righteousness had a manic quality
74
 
 
- Meanwhile, the senior team's social defences in the face of mounting 
uncertainty (first the GFC and then the unintended consequences of the 
post-GFC policies Tables 4.5, 4.8 and 4.9) were identifiable as BA 'Me'. 
This certainly captured their operating more as lone-individuals protecting 
their different positions and domains but which compromised their ability 
to coordinate the policies and fostered short-term, piecemeal measures. 
While BA 'Me' resembles an Individualist thought-style
75
 as a defensive 
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 Such isolate dynamics could be described as a manifestation of 'flight' but lacked the internal organisation of 
isolation in relation to the rest of the organisation that was observed, along with the increased suspicion and 
resigned-helplessness.  
74
 While the egalitarianism could be described as BA 'One' (Turquet, 1975) - the egalitarianism-laced with 
individualism was more purposive and focused rather than merely defensive-avoidant. 
75
 Despite referring to two distinct concepts of defensive-reaction versus style or organising, BA 'Me' and 
'individualist' organising, as descriptions of their nature and operation are similar, as is BA 'One' with 'Egalitarian' 
organising. This highlights the complementarity between the two theories and how logically what starts as 
defence will, if consolidated, lead to a style of organising. The reverse however is more interesting. Does the 
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pattern, it does not do what this Individualist organising led to which 
Increased Regulation and Undermined Integration pushing the company 
into Isolate Ordering   
 
The cumulative effect of the conflicting thought-styles-cum-defences 
which now prevailed across the top three management levels created 
havoc. The intent of the policies and their inability to deal with the 
problems diminished dramatically 
 
Our point? ... 
By inferring the thought-styles in play, the consequences of social 
defences are much easier to forecast  
 
The same can be said of the elementary forms animating each of the 
post-GFC polices. Coupled with the defences: 
- The policy of centralisation brought increased Regulation but weaker 
Integration - not a functional-variety of Hierarchy but a path into Isolate 
Ordering 
- The policy of promoting 'use of initiative' was Individualistic Market Style 
- but how it took hold in Sales only further weakened the Integration 
between the functions 
- The KPIs intended to strengthen both Regulation and Integration 
(Hierarchy) were subverted by the social defences which defeated its 
intention (see Chapter Five) 
Cultural Theory 
and 
Accounting  
for the Changes 
within the 
Organisation-as-
a-Whole 
The cumulative effects of the policies and social defences operating as 
cultural institutions of their self-organisation (according to one or mix of 
CT's elementary forms or thought-styles) generated feedback 
(consequences) for each other and fresh problems and damage to the 
organisation's ability to solve them 
 
- As cultural institutions, the policies of centralisation and KPIs fed the 
social defences and each other in ways that undermined Integration and 
increased Regulation - this toxic combination created a pathway into 
Isolate Ordering 
 
Isolate ordering is the best available description of the organisation's 
dysfunctional inability to share and solve problems displaying: 
- The return of ‘command and control’ ('despotic') directives 
- Tactical short-term rather than strategic action 
- Individuals doing their best to cope and 'to stay out of trouble', or 
- Opportunistically doing things that thoughtlessly sabotaged others 
- Suspicion increased, trust decreased considerably 
 
Note: The effects of social defences could have been forecast by inferring the 
elementary form or mix (a settlement of two or more thought-styles) driving their 
cultural (self-) organisation. Their BA defence pattern was the first sign that 
something was wrong, but this was not enough to convince the senior team to do 
anything about them. Together the policies and social defences - re-presented as 
cultural institutions generating thought-style and feedback - captured the havoc and 
mess (the path into Isolate Ordering) the organisation got itself into. Isolate Ordering 
(High Regulation, Low Integration) is a better description of the well-recognised 
                                                                                                                                                                      
observed style of organising start as a defensive reaction or not? Or is the institution we are observing intended 
or not? Asking these questions highlights the value of CT together with SDT in organisational analysis or diagnosis 
of underlying issues or causes. 
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dysfunctional effects of un-enterprising despotic bureaucracies (hierarchy). This is 
not the same as well-designed hierarchies (High Regulation and Integration) that can 
serve bureaucratic efficiency and predictability and promote individual enterprise and 
egalitarian trust and integration (Jaques, 1998a; du Gay, 2000; 6, 2011).  
 
 
4.5 Metaphors Used by Participants to Describe the Coaching 
The worsening problems and the organisation's inability to address them marked a  
significant change of mood confided through the coaching. This was articulated 
through gallows humour and a new metaphor used by participants to describe the 
coaching. Three distinct metaphors were used by participants at different times each 
marking emotions at key events. Table 4.19 presents these metaphors, changes in 
the mood and the key events they delineate. Metaphors have powerful diagnostic 
uses for tuning into participants' emotional experience. 
 
 
Table 4.19 Participant-Metaphors Reflecting Changes in Mood and Key Events 
 
Metaphor 
 
 
Mood 
 
Description 
 
Key Event 
'Coach' Opportunity to 
Fix Things for 
the Better: 
Excitement, 
Hope 
- Positive Evaluations of being 
coached 
- Concerns expressed within and 
about the 'senior team' 
- Eagerness to discuss and solve 
individual and collective practices 
and their impact on others 
Pre- and 
Post-GFC 
Initiatives 
'Shrink' to a 
Sick 
Organisation 
Confusion, 
Pessimism, 
Stasis 
Self-
Preservation, 
Disappointment,  
Discouragement 
- Opportunities and excitement 
evaporate 
- A return to the status quo ante and 
'worse'  
- The 'bosses haven't really changed' 
- Participants joke about my 
psychology-training and the 'real 
reason' for coaching ... 'have you 
had your therapy yet?' 
- 'Organisation is sick and so are we' 
Appearance  
and 
Consolidation 
of Social 
Defence 
'Priest' 
Taking 
Confessions 
and 
Administering 
Last Rites 
Despair 
Hopelessness 
- Participants became aware they 
were making things worse 
- But feared talking openly. Silence 
felt as the only way to survive in the 
circumstances 
- Participants confide in their 
institutions about the organisation 
and their defences, but do not do 
anything about them 
Appearance 
and 
Exacerbation 
of 
Problems 
 
Departures of 
Senior Team 
Members 
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4.6 Senior Team Departures as Problems Compound 
Despite some doubt (Table 4.14) the formulation of initiatives to address problems 
and sales growth in 2010 boosted morale. Initial willingness to collaborate, work 
differently and 'improve communication' was found among many level two and three 
managers. There was support too for bringing Sales and Manufacturing together 
under Operations. Managers said that they had found coaching useful and our 
consulting efforts were in-step with needs expressed by the senior sponsors.  
 
After a time lag (February 2011 - the eve of the first 'Operations workshop' I was 
invited to design and facilitate), many level two and three managers stated that the 
Five Dysfunctions of a Team model (Diagram 4.1) and my reporting of what 
contributed to it (Table 4.16) helped them understand what social defences are. 
Many acknowledged their effect, how they confounded policies, and that their actions 
were compounding problems.  
 
With the senior team however, despite the positive reception to the diagram and 
commentary, it was no help in bringing them together as a team. Coaching continued 
with some senior team members, but they met sporadically.There was no opportunity 
for (our action-research) formal feedback and planning interventions.  
 
The company's annual management conference (comprising the three senior levels) 
was cancelled after being postponed twice. For this conference I had been asked by 
both the CEO and COO to design an intervention for the three levels to discuss, iron-
out and embed the restructure. In lieu of this I was invited by the COO to facilitate a 
series of interventions with the top three levels of Operations due March and May 
2011.  
 
Early 2011 saw acquisitions. A new plant in the US was being made operational, as 
was a third African plant. Similar attempts were being made in South America. In this 
process, several key managers changed roles or were away for long periods which 
made it difficult for others to access them in the ordinary pursuit of the their work. 
Experienced staff complained of being spread thinly when dealing with quality 
problems that were now attributed to the switch to a seasonal workforce.  
 
For all these initiatives - and despite my March-May intervention in Operations - none 
of the problems ameliorated.  
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The March-May Intervention in Operations 
The first intervention began exploring Operations’ effectiveness. I introduced a 
practical version of 'whole-systems' thinking which, with discussion, established 
some 'ground rules'. I suggested that:  
 Nothing exists in isolation, but in relationship affecting all and one  
 'What's in you is in the group: and what's in the group is in you' - emphasising 
the importance that if you feel or think something, it is probably relevant, and 
to 'speak up' 
 In systems: 'everyone is responsible: but no one is to blame' - everyone 
contributes, everyone is implicated. 
 
It became clear very early that it needed the presence of Procurement and Service, 
but also the presence of all Plant Managers and Country Sales managers not based 
in HQ. We began by helping individuals to identify: 
 How they and their teams were contributing to the problems  
 What they needed to stop doing, continue doing, or do differently  
 How they thought managers from different functions would answer these 
questions  
 What they expected managers outside Operations would say if they were 
here. 
 
Participants were encouraged to differ, disagree and challenge others (reminding 
them of the Five Dysfunctions of a Team model) if they thought they were holding 
back and not honest, but not to apportion blame. Each function - Manufacturing, 
Sales and Marketing - presented, and a gallery style discussion ensued. 
 
The next stage addressed developing systems to improve communication, 
collaboration and problem-solving. We closed by eliciting action plans and how they 
would approach other departments to involve them in improving organisational 
working.  
 
Participants were surprisingly frank, diffusing tension by joking about how they had 
sabotaged each other. They were unafraid of challenging each other. They posed 
difficult questions and insisted on answers. After this meeting, I was told that the 
mood in Operations had improved.  
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Nevertheless by the time of the May intervention neither production times nor quality 
had improved. 
 
 
Evidence from Coaching  
Participants were clear that relations among level two and three peers were 
improving perceptibly. They also reported that the senior team had to be involved in 
any future discussions/workshops if real change was to be made. Many were still 
afraid of speaking up. Many continued to be perplexed by the multiple and conflicting 
directives from the senior team. They also described continued meddling and 
ambiguity over what was expected. Despite improved informal communication 
between the five departments, official systems and procedures continued 
confounding their efforts. The organisation remained at an impasse and it was this 
that underlined the explanation of the competing institutional focus of our research.  
 
This systems impasse was the focus of our May intervention which involved 
representatives from all five departments. The mood was positive and discussion 
candid. The COO concurred that a similar intervention which included the senior 
team and the non-HQ-based level two and three managers be part of the next 
Annual conference. This did not happen. Events again overturned good intentions 
and plans.  
 
 
Unexpected Departures 
Within a week of the May intervention, one of my senior team sponsors announced 
his departure and not long after, so did the CEO, and a third key senior team 
member his early retirement. This took level two and three managers by surprise. 
Any hoped for improvements arising from the May intervention were put on hold. 
Rumours abounded: 'Were they pushed or had they just jumped ship'? My senior 
sponsor and the CEO were off to new positions - one with the largest customer, the 
other with a competitor.  
 
A former CEO had come out of retirement to take control while a new CEO was 
found. It was announced the next CEO would be from outside the organisation - the 
first in the company's history. This further lent support to the 'pushed' theory. 'Things 
would be turned up-side-down', as one participant put it.  
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The coaching continued until the end of 2011. We sought to do more than provide 
support and allow people to voice their frustration. The lift in morale and the initiatives 
of the first half of 2011 stalled and the problems described above continued. The 
newly-appointed HR Director informed me he would 'bring in his own people' and 
wanted me to continue coaching only until then.  
 
 
Evaluating the Coaching Contribution 
Measured against the original aims of benefiting both individuals and the organisation 
(Sherman and Freas, 2004; Anderson and Anderson, 2005), coaching had little 
impact certainly on organisational change. Though highly regarded by individuals, 
organisational stasis left them stuck too.  
 
Despite our sponsors’ support, to achieve the organisational aims the senior team 
had to be more actively engaged during intervention and taking the necessary 
leadership to ensure the aims took priority. Neither happened. As a result, coaching 
benefited the individuals involved but only indirectly the culture and organisation. By 
treating the case as an object of research I hoped to find a way of bridging the gap 
between business leaders' typical concern with 'Theory E' economic rationality and 
the more typical coaching and OD focus on 'Theory O'. Providing realist explanations 
- alongside interpretive methods regarding the causes and outcomes of both social 
defences and the post-GFC problems in relation to the later problems - became a 
key strategy. This is taken up in the next chapters.  
 
What became clear is that coaching will only provide limited benefits to the 
organisation if the leadership is not actively involved driving the aims and reinforcing 
whatever insights and changes emerge from coaching.  
 
 
Final Presentation to the Senior Managers 
In March 2012, the last presentation was made to most members of the senior team 
including the acting-CEO, the new HR Director, and the COO (the only one of the 
four senior team members involved in the post-GFC policies). This marked the end of 
my involvement. On this occasion we used Cultural Theory to offer an analysis. I had 
originally planned to incorporate a CT analysis into an action-research intervention, 
but as this was our last presentation, chose instead a presentation and more free-
wheeling discussion.  
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We made confident claims about the benefits of coaching especially to individual 
second and third level managers. But we were equally frank of the consultation's lack 
of impact on the organisation. Early versions of diagrams presented in the next 
chapter were offered, including: 
 CT analysis of the policies and social defences as competing institutions 
 How these institutions compounded the organisation's inability to resolve 
problems 
 The three metaphors which managers used to describe my involvement as a 
coach: (Coach, Shrink, Priest) each capturing the mood, difficulties and 
distinctive phases the organisation passed through; not to mention the value 
of emotional or psychological data 
 How the competing institutions provided unintentional pathways into Isolate 
Ordering and what this means for purposeful organisations. 
 
The new HR Director remained unimpressed. The acting-CEO (a former engineer) 
showed interest in my explanation by asking several questions and offering 
concurring examples from his experience. He intuitively grasped the value of an 
institutional analysis, and his interested confirmed how a causal explanation of 
causes and consequences can appeal to 'Theory E' business rationality. The COO 
(the former Director of Manufacturing and then Director of Sales) and one of our main 
sponsors exclaimed 'Why was this not presented earlier? ... It would have helped!'.  
 
I explained that the analysis presented was only just emerging from the research I 
undertook alongside the consulting. His comments, and the acting-CEO's interest, 
suggested the research was 'on the right path'. In addition to providing a realist 
causal explanation, the presentation confirmed using CT and SDT together to 
improve the prospects of bringing about organisation-wide change.  
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Chapter Five: Empirical Analysis - Further Iterations   
 
This chapter is organised around the four iterations of data-analysis. Each stage 
provided for deeper analysis from the two theoretical frameworks and three models, 
all realist in character.  
 
 
5.1 Notes to Narrative: First Iteration 
Contemporaneous notes recorded over four years captured our immediate 
experience of consultation in an effort to make sense of events and of the feelings 
they engendered. This was an attempt to capture the case in its ‘wild’ entirety. 
Chapter Four is a condensed version of these notes; presenting the scene, 
characters, critical events and fresh difficulties. Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, 
display the key events and dynamics of the case, and then place these alongside the 
metaphors used by participants and some key-word descriptions of the emotional 
experience and journey of both the organisation and the consultation at different 
times.  
 
Contemporaneous notes enabled elements of the case to be analysed singularly, 
and in relation to one another, to infer causes and effects.  
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Table 5.1 Key Events and Case Dynamics Display (Colour Coded) 
 
10 Years of Continuous Growth 
alongside Expensive and Inefficient  
Management, Production and Work Practices 
 
Extended Production and Delivery Times 
Decline in Product Quality, 
Increased Customer Complaints, 
Customer Forces Temporary Factory 
Closures to Review Quality and Safety of 
Products 
Massive Drop in Sales  Consolidation of Social Defences 
Largest Customer Downgrades 
Relationship to Organisation 
Share Price Plummets 
Across: Senior Team, 
Senior and 2
nd
 levels, 
2
nd
 and 3
rd
 levels, 
In 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 level 
Manufacturing and 
Sales – Tension 
Time Line of Key Events (below) Description (above) – Colour Coded 
 
 
Pre-GFC 
 
GFC 
and 
Aftermath 
Oct-Nov 
2008 
Responses 
to GFC 
 
Appearance 
of Social 
Defences 
(June 2009) 
 
Organisational 
Problems 
Appear 
(Feb-Mar 2010) 
 
Exacerbation 
and 
Entrenchment 
of Problems 
(late 2010) 
Strategic 
Initiatives 
Company 
Mood 
 
Strategic Initiatives (below): The Four New Policies in Response to the GFC 
 
 
 
Centralisation of 
Supply Chain and 
Procurement 
3 Restructures  
over 2 years 
 
Pushing the Use of 
Initiative and 
Discretion of 
Decision-Making to 
Lowest Levels of 
Management 
 
“Hands-Off” 
Management 
 
 
 
 
Growth through 
Acquisition  
Factory Closures and 
move to Seasonal 
Production Workforce 
New Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) 
Mixture of Opportunity, 
Anxiety and 
Commitment  
 
 
Table 5.2 The Emotional Journey of the Organisation and the Consultation 
Metaphors 
Describing the 
Coaching 
 
Key Events 
 
Contemporaneous 
Emotions within 
the organisation 
 
Impact of Interventions 
 
 
“Performance 
Coach” 
 
 
GFC 
 
Post-GFC Polices 
 
Appearance of Social 
Defences 
 
 
Shock and Anxiety 
Mobilisation and 
Excitement 
 
Confusion 
 
 
Early Success and 
Expansion 
 
Failure of Social Defence 
Intervention 
 
 
“Shrink” 
Consolidation of  
Social Defences 
 
Problems Appear 
 
 
 
Paralysis 
 
 
Coach Good-to-talk-to 
but little Impact  
 
 
“Priest 
Confessor” 
 
 
Exacerbation and 
Entrenchment of 
Problems 
 
Frustration 
Anger 
Futility 
 
Watching and Advising 
as Situation Worsens 
 
Hopeful but Ineffective 
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Note: By mapping changes in metaphor, emotions, successes and failures, it is 
possible to encompass a mass of data at-a-glance. This is not enough to establish 
causal relationships. However, apparent correlations invite hypotheses. 
  
 
5.2 Second Iteration: Cause and Effect Relationships 
Establishing the time-line helps in avoiding teleological explanations and pinpointing 
explanatory deficits, by: 
 Dating the social defences then examining what happened before and after 
(Diagram 5.1)  
 Identifying elapsed time between the GFC, the appearance of social 
defences, then the exacerbation of problems. 
 
 
Diagram 5.1 Social Defences in Relation to the GFC and New Problems 
GFC
Social
Defences
Organisational
Problems
? ?
6 to 9
Month
Time-Delay
6 to 9
Month
Time-Delay
Lack of Adequate or
Sufficiently Direct 
Cause-Effect
Sequence
What else occurred 
during the two intervening 
periods of time?
 
Note: The GFC can be seen as a 'trigger' of events but is insufficient explanation for 
the social defences.  
 
Re-tracing the emotional life of the organisation finds shock, anxiety and fear caused 
by GFC-related order cancellations, loss of ‘preferred supplier’ status, and massive 
price falls. But, ten years of continuous prior growth masked grossly inefficient 
practices. Recognition of these elicited different emotions within the three top 
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management levels: a sense of opportunity, excitement and determination to 
transform them.  
 
The latter emotions recognised that: 
 Ten years of growth had allowed quality improvement over cost-efficiency 
reflecting the preeminent position of engineers and Manufacturing. Premium 
prices could be rationalised because the largest customers also sold 'quality' 
brands. 
 Coaching had helped repair some of the top-down ‘command and control’ - 
especially within Manufacturing - by devolving initiative and discretion.  
 
The ten months of coaching and consulting pre-GFC had identified 'lack of role 
clarity' between the top three management levels, 'poor communication' and 
understanding across the levels and functions. This was apparent in complaints 
about: 
 'Micro-managing by bosses' 
 Lack of faith in the capability and motivation of 'direct reports' 
 Poor inter-departmental problem-solving.  
 
Recognition of these issues produced the emotional resolve to fix them. Diagram 5.2 
(colour coded similarly as Table 5.1) summarises what came before and immediately 
after the GFC. Here we start to see how the organisation's history affected the four 
'strategic initiatives' intended to deal with the effects of the GFC.     
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Diagram 5.2 Pre-GFC History and the Four Strategic Initiatives 
 
Note: The new supply chain department was a reasonable response to sharp sales 
reductions and longstanding, costly engineering-led practices; likewise were factory 
closures and the shift to seasonal workforces. Determination to devolve discretion 
and 'improve role-clarity and communication' emerged through coaching and was 
already felt by the senior team. The initiative of 'growth through acquisition' was a 
continuation of past policy, but pursued in greater earnest when organisational 
problems were placing an upturn in sales at risk.  
 
Diagram 5.3 charts the effects of the four initiatives, summarising their combined 
contradictory impact.  
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Diagram 5.3 Impact of the Four Strategic Initiatives76 
 
Note: The initiatives prompted confusion and anxiety confided in coaching 
conversations and vocalised in head office meetings, that elicited social defences. 
We infer that the GFC was a trigger but not a cause of social defences. The 
contradictory impact of the strategic initiatives fostered social defences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76
 Note that text in purple describes the contradictory impact of the four strategic initiatives in green. 
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Diagram 5.4 The Four Strategic Initiatives Positioned between 
the GFC and the Social Defences 
 
Note: A similar time-delay occurred between the GFC and social defences as 
between social defences and new organisational problems. The initiatives and social 
defences, together, added to the later difficulties by contributing confusion and 
paralysis. Level two and three managers confided to me their confusion over whose 
lead to follow. This manifested in apprehensive work-behaviour and, ultimately, 
paralysis in problem-solving. Their ostensible task-behaviours were more self-
protective (defensive) than task-related (Diagram 5.5 below).      
 
Social defences were also observed within the senior team. Members were limiting 
themselves to their immediate responsibilities rather than working in concert to 
implement strategic policies. Interpreted as BA 'Me' and presented back to them, 
their narrowing of focus not only contributed to the social defences below, it 
compromised our social defence intervention. This individualism was a direct 
response to the increased uncertainty, pressure and risk they were experiencing. 
Such defence related more to the "primary risk" of which strategy to pursue, rather 
than anxiety associated with primary task being an indicator of social defences in 
senior teams (Hirschhorn, 1999;  Hirschhorn and Horowitz, 2015). Second and third 
level managers witnessed this and discussed it during coaching. Tolerated at first as 
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'reasonable' given the circumstances, it began to elicit similar self-protective 
behaviours in them. Diagram 5.5 describes how contradictory policies and social 
defences contributed to collective confusion, anxiety and paralysis.  
 
 
Diagram 5.5 Strategic Policies Interacted with the Social Defences 
 
Note: We observed that prominent events, emotional journeys reported individually, 
changing metaphors and public emotions marked a deteriorating organisation. 
'Gallows humour' expressed privately but serially expressed was felt in common, and 
yet too disturbing to be shared overtly (Freud, 1905). Private expression of collective 
emotions is typically a good indicator of what lies beneath the surface (Armstrong, 
2005). Our supposition is that without discussion and "working through" (Freud, 
1920), what is collectively unconscious will fester.  
 
Capturing collective emotional experience "as a source of intelligence" (Armstrong, 
2005: 90) or, how organisational events trigger emotional constellations (such as 
social defences) that in-turn impact upon on organisational functioning, is the 
particular value of social defence theory. However, what to do about this if the 
organisation ignores it?  
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In the next section we re-examine events using two theoretical frameworks (SDT with 
CT) and three analytic models. What can be done to help organisations develop and 
change when social defences are ignored will concern the remainder of the thesis. 
 
 
5.3 Third Iteration: Articulating Social Defence Theory, Cultural Theory and The 
Three Analytic Models  
At this stage we consider key events, looking at how different theories can deepen 
the analysis, either in competition (as rival explanations) or in combination. Following 
the narrative examination of cause-effect relationships, this was our third iteration of 
data-analysis.  
   
 
5.3.1 Social Defence Theory  
Reported emotions (social defences) at the top three levels, and observed in different 
departments, served as the early warning of something amiss. But alone, SDT did 
not equip the author to forecast what occurred later. Nor could SDT sufficiently 
interrogate other elements of the case.  
 
Contradictory post-GFC policies account for the confusion and anxiety that elicited 
social defences. We have also seen how these policies, in tandem with social 
defences, help explain worsening problems. But is there any special reason why the 
social defence intervention should have failed?  
 
Here we explore how SDT’s underdeveloped social side limits its usefulness. More 
particularly, how might we enable managers to take SDT seriously enough to act 
upon it? In short, why did our intervention fail and what would improve our prospects 
for facilitating change? 
 
One problem with SDT lies in distinguishing task-undermining from benign social 
defences. Recent theorising expects that social defences will inhabit all organisations 
(Bain, 1998; Hinshelwood and Skogstad, 2000). Without being able to distinguish 
destructive from benign defences, it becomes difficult to know whether to intervene.  
Defences might be integrated into an organisation’s socio-technical and sentient 
systems without harm (Trist et al., 1993; Miller, 1976; Miller and Rice, 1967). 
Defences may be ‘task-circumventing’ in that ways will be found around problems 
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(and therefore anxiety).77 Destructive social defences are ‘task-undermining’ or 
‘avoidant’. In our case, individuals feigned being ‘on task’, knowing that strategies 
were not working, but were too anxious to speak up. This was true for managers and 
direct reports alike. Why?  
 
Destructive social defences resemble what Durkheim termed 'anomie'. Treated thus, 
social defences can be considered as ‘normlessness’. Durkheim would arguably 
warn that ‘anomic’ social defences will affect individuals profoundly, placing them at 
risk of self-harm. Anomic social defences would be distinctly destructive. A 
Durkheimian take on internal life, then, puts the ‘social’ into social defences and 
might meet Menzies’ under-examined innovation of this ‘social side' of social 
defences.  
 
Once institutionalised, then (anomic) social defences may operate independently of 
the individuals involved with consequences widening harmful effects. What does it 
mean to claim that social defences are social in nature and operation? 
 
SDT methodology certainly distinguishes social defences from other psychological 
processes. It does this through Bion’s observation of ‘task’ as a trigger for individual 
anxiety. ‘Basic assumption’ behaviours are such collective defences against anxiety-
provoking tasks. How effective was this in forecasting the consequences of harmful 
social defences? 
 
In our case three observations can be made: 
 There was a time lag between the first appearance and later ‘consolidation’ 
of social defences 
 They registered in the top three levels in distinct ways … 
 Then accompanied the ‘Manufacturing-Sales divide’.  
 
Diagram 5.6 captures these three distinctions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
77
 In line with this, Hirschhorn and Horowitz (2015) have recently argued that any work "worth its salt", including 
"extreme sports" and work-environments, comes with risk and anxiety as a necessary part of the challenge. The 
satisfaction comes in "working through" the anxiety to achieve the task.    
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Diagram 5.6 The Social Defences across the Levels and Functions: 
Manifesting Patterns and Consolidated Effects 
 
Note: The senior team’s social defences manifested as busy-and-harassed-
individuals-not-team-members, pursuing private schedules. They took calls in 
meetings, came late and left early. They ‘went along with others’ in apparent 
consensus, but without results. Tavistock theory would posit basic assumption ‘Me’ in 
this (Lawrence et al., 1996). But this could not have been all. Individualism may have 
fostered a self-protectionist and self-obsessed environment, but not a deregulated, 
creative and discretionary one. On the contrary, there were attempts to increase 
control while managers reported entrapment and diminution of freedom. 
 
Ostensibly the organisation was becoming anything but ‘individualistic’. This was 
defensive individualism: defensive against anxiety and fear and not a source of 
power but of powerlessness and ineffectuality. Managers sought to look the part 
while the scope for action was lessening. The stifling of initiative was most acute at 
lower levels, and the opposite of what had been hoped for through coaching.  
 
Basic assumption ‘Me’ provides precise classification of what was observed, but not 
especially an explanation for what had caused this specific form of defence. Nor does 
it explain why such individualism was associated with reported reductions in freedom.  
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Nor did ‘personality’, ‘team conflicts’ and ‘power struggles’ account for the 
observation. Any such tentative suggestions met with disbelief. Managers were 
adamant that personalities were not to blame. We did not wish to add to their 
defensiveness.78 We sensed through our counter-transference feelings - discomfort, 
bewilderment and powerlessness79 - that the avoidant behaviour was difficult to 
confront. 
 
Basic assumption ‘Me’ was mixed with basic assumption ‘Dependency’ and ‘Flight’, 
particularly in third level Sales managers but in Manufacturing, only the latter. 
Second level managers showed one or the other of these defences; some identifying 
with the senior team (‘Me’) and others with third-level direct-reports (‘Dependency’ 
and ‘Flight’). For them, the strategic policies were creating the confusion and 
apprehension. Contra the theory, the ‘dependency’ and ‘flight’ were not provoked by 
‘task’ but by not knowing how to approach or what task to pursue, KPIs 
notwithstanding.  
 
These managers complained about ‘meddling’ and ‘not knowing’ which directive to 
follow. Sales and Manufacturing met at their own instigation to solve problems and 
improve coordination. While ‘on task’ agreements were reached, they were not 
followed-though. There was individual and collective understanding of problems, but 
none would ‘stick their neck out’ by contradicting a director nor each other. Fear and 
caution reigned. As defences consolidated, managers reported diminution in the 
numbers of people whom they trusted. There was aversion to ‘conflict’, to ‘stirring up 
bad feelings’ and to ‘blaming anyone’. In coaching, managers expressed the regime 
thus: 
 
- ‘Don’t stick your neck out!’ 
- ‘Don’t be seen as a Trouble-Maker!’ 
- ‘Don’t say or do anything that may attract blame, or land you in trouble!’ 
- ‘Stay under the radar!’ 
                                                          
78
 It is perhaps such consulting experiences, and consulting failures, as with Menzies’ seminal case study that led 
to theorising how social defences explain why change is resisted (Long, 2006a; Krantz, 2010). The challenge is in 
translating such theorising into intervention practice.  
79
 With the help of hindsight, these feelings confirmed Hirschhorn's (1999) hypothesis of 'primary risk' as a 
source of social defences in senior teams, reflecting the uncertainty and anxiety about what to do strategically. 
As we have seen, even when such an intervention was offered, it too was ignored. The consulting challenge is 
how to combine strategic with psychological intervention given the largely normative divide the two represent 
both as interventions, and in the world view of their proponents (see for example, Greiner, 2008; Beer, 2008). 
This is where cultural theory may assist, such as in proposing "clumsy solutions" (Verweij and Thompson, 2006) 
and interventions that may help in bringing them about.  
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- ‘Look busy!’ 
- ‘Say yes to everything!’ 
- ‘Get the results expected of you!’ 
- ‘Do your own job, not others'!’ 
- ‘Look out for yourself and your buddies!’ 
- ‘Have eyes in the back of your head!’ 
- ‘Be careful of whose toes you might step on!’ 
- ‘Be on guard!’ 
 
 
The Diagnostic Limitations of SDT 
Knowing the ‘basic assumption pattern’ of these defences helped at the outset. But 
as they consolidated, SDT was unable to encompass the impact they were having on 
the organisation. Nor was SDT discerning enough to account for the effects of 
different social defence systems in Manufacturing and Sales. Another theoretical 
language was needed. ‘Basic assumptions’ did not describe the social nature and 
operation of social defences and provided only imprecise indication of possible 
consequences.  
 
The coaching conversations and other observations established that social defences 
consolidated differently in the senior team and in Manufacturing and Sales from when 
they first manifested.  
 
A central claim of this thesis is that superimposing the four way Grid-Group CT 
typology onto the case renders the observed outcomes markedly more intelligible. 
Identifying the 'elementary forms' operating in each of the social defence systems 
and the four post-GFC policies, and especially the organisation-as-a-whole80 - seen 
as movement into Isolate Ordering (displaying a Fatalistic thought-style) - provides a 
more discriminating account of what our respondents were thinking, feeling and 
doing. The effect of social defences and post-GFC policies operating in tandem was 
to inadvertently create 'pathways into Isolate Ordering', rendering the organisation 
increasingly ineffective in the face of mounting problems.  
 
The easiest place to begin is where CT's ‘Individualism’ and SDT's BA ‘Me’ 
coincided. Looking at the senior team's defences when they had consolidated, we 
                                                          
80
 Each was conceptualised as a social or institutional entity that displayed an institutional thought-style that was 
derived from the degree of (social) Regulation (Grid) and Integration (Group) each exhibited.  
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noted a basic assumption 'Me' defensive pattern and a culturally distinctive 
Individualism (I-don’t-care-about-you. This-way-works-for-me-and-competition-can-
sort-out-which-of-us-is-right). Here, CT and SDT overlap: the BA ‘Me' defensive 
pattern with Individualistic reasoning and action. We can envisage how ‘positive 
feedback’ between BA ‘Me' defences and a concomitant thought-style created 
antagonising effects on other types of social defences in Manufacturing and Sales 
and on the other thought-styles (as in each of the post-GFC policies) existing across 
the organisation. 
 
With the exception of the senior team's BA ‘Me',81 identifying the basic assumption 
pattern only captured the inward-looking, individualistic, self-protective behaviour 
when the social defences first manifested. When they consolidated, it could not 
account for the impact they were having on the organisation. Inferring the 
'elementary form' and tracing the feedback effects this generated, provided a more 
reliable forecast. Devoid of CT, a SDT ‘basic assumption pattern’ describes the 
anxiety and defence, signals a problem but not its dynamic effects.  
 
BA 'Me' could not account for how the senior team's individualist outlook led to 
centralised control at the top (increased Social Regulation) that fuelled both the 
social defences below and the Manufacturing-Sales divide, leading to decreased 
Social Integration. This combination of higher Regulation and lower Integration 
captures the inadvertent pathway into Isolate Ordering that was created. This, in 
tandem with the competing effects of the institutional operation of the post-GFC 
policies and social defences in Manufacturing and Sales, contributed to the later 
problems and compromised the organisation's ability to deal with them.   
 
Likewise, BA 'Dependence' and 'Flight' in Manufacturing could not account for the 
Fatalistic thought-style fostering a depressive, inward looking mistrust towards 
outsiders and greater top-down internal 'command and control' that reversed many of 
the earlier coaching gains. Nor did BA 'Me' and 'Fight/flight' in Sales capture the 
manic 'can do' Individualistic experimentation of managers mixed with Egalitarian 
camaraderie as the only department 'out to save the organisation' through making 
sales and circumventing dysfunctional organisational systems that actually created 
more problems than it solved.    
 
                                                          
81
 This is arguably because of the overlap of the theoretical definitions of basic assumption 'Me' and the 
individualist elementary form and thought-style. 
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Re-Reading Social Defences 
Two questions were posed earlier: 
 What do social defences indicate? 
 How do they assist organisational consultants?  
 
We, and all the managers, knew ‘something was going wrong’. Retrospective 
analysis indicates that four (contradictory) strategic policies elicited social defences. 
The defensive patterns provided us with insufficient prior indication of their effects. 
Nor did SD theory-and-method encompass the selection and organisational impact of 
the four strategic policies. Traditional SDT interventions had not worked and the 
senior team did not take them seriously. SDT was valuable insofar as it alerted a 
changing emotional experience reported by managers – referring to ‘climate’ as 
distinct from the ‘culture’ (Burke and Litwin, 1992). But as Burke and Litwin concede, 
'climate' is mostly an effect of other ‘transformational’ causes and does not address 
the 'transformational levers' of change. We understood the defensive climate but not 
what it would do nor why the social defence intervention failed.  
 
There is often a divide between what concerns business leaders and what concerns 
OD consultants. What the consultant searches for is the means to pique the interest 
of business leaders in emotional data, and help them understand their 
apprehensions. If we had been in a position to offer the senior team causal 
explanations, clearer forecasts and practical advice this would have helped. Trist, 
Emery and Jaques arrived at much the same conclusion by different routes.  
 
Our typical OD action-research method worked adequately in explaining why social 
defences developed. But the intervention unravelled because the organisation was 
overtaken by difficulties bewildering to all. We offered interpretation (working 
hypotheses) and action-research to enable managers to arrive at their own 
conclusions and choices which they struggled to do. We followed the lead of recent 
theorists, notably Lawrence (2000 and 2006) and many others (Long, 2013; Bain 
1998 and 1999; Armstrong, 2005), who urge greater parallels between organisational 
consulting and mainstream psychoanalysis that offers interpretations (analysis) but 
non-directive intervention. In this case, we provided working hypotheses (analysis) 
but did not give advice or, know enough to, advise. We were limited by our 
(interpretive rather than realist) consulting methodology and the under-developed 
social side of the social defence theory we were relying on. 
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Had we been equipped with Cultural Theory, informed and credible forecasts could 
have been offered, encouraging the clients to look more closely at the data and its 
strategic implications. In hindsight, we see that CT understanding of thought-style 
would have enabled us to read the organisation – especially its defences and their 
effects – much more quickly. In parallel with psychoanalytic action-research 
consulting, CT-informed consulting would facilitate 'clumsy solutions' by ‘chairing’ 
organisations so as to ensure that all four ‘voices’ (thought-styles) are expressed and 
respond to each other’s competing, partial and reasonable analyses of ‘what the 
problem is’ and ‘what to do about it’.82 
  
 
5.3.2 Cultural Theory 
Cultural Theory was introduced to bring sociological assistance to SDT. It proved 
compatible and helped re-read the social defences, the post-GFC policies, and the 
independent institutional life which these acquired. With additional sociological 
resources, SDT becomes more diagnostic and useful in bringing about organisational 
change. We can then understand: 
 The thought-styles the policies generate or from which they derive 
 The anxieties these elicit in contending thought-styles 
 The social nature and operation of social defences 
 The consequences of these defences for the organisation. 
 
 
Pathways to Isolate Ordering 
Based on CT, Diagram 5.7 maps competition between the company’s strategic 
policies and how they had the effect of increasing regulation and undermining 
integration. High Regulation and Low Integration is what defines ‘Isolate Ordering’ 
that we think social defences contributed to. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
82
 Facilitated, for example, in the style of Future Search conferences (Weisbord and Janoff, 2010).  
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Diagram 5.7 The Policies Expressed as Contending Thought-Styles and their 
Dynamic Movement 
 
            
Note: The four elementary forms informing the post-GFC policies are inferred as 
distinct constellations of values and implicit social relations that were audible in the 
individuals pursuing them. This pinpoints where the policies clash, the movement 
which these clashes induce and what the combined effects might be.  
 
For example: 
 The centralising of Purchasing and Distribution and the introduction of KPIs 
increased Regulation but, in different ways, while further dividing 
Manufacturing and Sales. Centralisation provided clear directives, limiting 
managers' options. But this affected Manufacturing more than Sales, and 
worsened their integration by setting them on different paths. The KPIs, 
because they were mindlessly followed and used defensively in both 
Manufacturing and Sales, instead of promoting coordination and integration 
between the levels and functions, increased regulation and reduced 
integration, further inducing Isolate Ordering.  
 The encouragement of initiative, a measure to breakdown the ‘command and 
control’ mind-set, was scuttled in Manufacturing as managers lost much of 
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their discretion due to the centralisation of Purchasing and Distribution. In 
Sales, however, while it unsettled 'cosy sales relationships' with buyers as 
intended, it also promoted individualistic competitive entrepreneurship which 
rebounded back onto Manufacturing, further exacerbating the divide between 
the two functions.   
 The policy of growth through acquisition, in addition to being a market-
directed revival measure, involved partial secondments to initiate negotiations 
and to redesign and integrate acquisitions. These secondments, while 
allowing considerable initiative and freedom, induced competing cultural 
behaviours in the individuals involved and suspicion from colleagues. By also 
reducing key human resources in many departments for long periods, these 
functions became increasingly insular, weary and self-protective with 
demands made upon them.   
 
Each of these policies had logic and purpose. But their combined operation elicited 
confusion, anxiety and social defences, and Fatalistic 'playing it safe' by meeting 
KPIs at the expense of functional integration. Our re-reading is that social defences 
and Isolate Ordering, reinforced through positive feedback, underscored the 'anomie' 
across the whole organisation. This further undermined the organisation's ability to 
adapt to, let alone deal with, problems. This only became clearer by plotting 
movements of the policies and social defences onto a blank CT map. While there are 
circumstances when Isolate Ordering is functional,83 that was not the case here.  
 
 
Social Defences 
Diagram 5.8 uses the GGCT typology to superimpose the social defences and 
policies. Identifying the elementary form (observed values, style-of-organising and 
rationality) driving their operation, better captured their effects. It depicts their clashes 
as competing institutions and the failure of the Individualistically-defended senior 
team to moderate them. This further undermined Social Integration, pushing the 
organisation deeper into Isolate Ordering.   
                                                          
83
 An example is in very high risk and dangerous environments: in particular parts or functions of organisations 
where isolate design and working away from other parts and the whole may increase productivity (see Mars, 
2008); in organisations working within the simpler of Emery and Trist's external environments such as placid, 
random and placid, clustered (1965) where smaller and directive designs can be effective;  or in times of extreme 
crisis and transition where leaders need to take control to turn things around. In this last situation, isolate design 
is effectively promoted only in the short-term otherwise it may then start to undermine the positive influences 
that can be promoted if aspects of the other elementary forms are brought into the mix. This is taken up in the 
next chapter.  
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Here we see the elementary forms driving the policies, both fuelling the social 
defences and indicating what they were a likely reaction to. But, we also see the 
effects of their combined interaction on the organisation.  
 
For example, the reduced scope of Manufacturing managers, following the 
Hierarchical centralisation of Purchasing and Distribution, fed their social defences 
and led to their style of Isolate organising. They 'played it safe' through BA 'Flight' 
and 'Dependency' and blind compliance with KPIs. In Sales, managers seized on 
their (different) KPIs to pursue 'initiative' to the maximum. They found a different 
policy around which to build their 'Fight/flight' and 'Me' defences. The Individualism 
that 'pushing initiative' promoted, reduced their internal Regulation and fostered an 
Egalitarian camaraderie. In contrast to the depressive mood feeding a Fatalistic 
thought-style in Manufacturing, Sales grew manic occupying the low Regulation, high 
Integration quadrants of the CT map.   
 
 
Diagram 5.8 Social Defences, Policies and Cultural Shift 
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Note: Feedback loops animated by different social defences in Manufacturing and 
Sales, and fuelled by the different policies, undermined each other’s ability to 
coordinate and pursue a common primary task, culminating in torrid problems.  
Analytically, both the policies and social defences are here reconceptualised as 
institutions. Respectively, the policies are driven by, whereas the social defences are 
feeding, different elementary forms that promote competing values, thought-styles 
and ways-of-organising. These effectively become conflicting cultures running 
rampant in the organisation.  
 
In Diagram 5.8, we see a pocket of Individualism/Egalitarianism flourishing in Sales. 
But far from orchestrating a potential 'clumsy solution' that may articulate an 
underutilised thought-style and alternative solution, this only further undermines the 
Integration between Manufacturing and Sales. Nor can it be heard by the 
Individualistically-defended senior team. Together this pushes the organisation 
deeper into Isolate Ordering.  
 
Had we been aware of Cultural Theory we could have tracked the vectors taken by 
the different social defences by understanding the elementary forms that were 
animating them. In this iteration, form-driven social defences are discernible in late 
2009, a year before the company’s worst problems. Had we been thus equipped, we 
would have had a useful diagnostic tool and could have anticipated the 
consequences that social defences would have had, if unattended. SDT’s ‘problem of 
change’ is addressed here because we see not only ‘why change is resisted’ but also 
the changes that consolidated defences can have.  
 
 
Comment: A Senior Team Member Responds to Cultural Theory 
When Cultural Theory analysis was presented to the last remaining senior team 
member – and sponsor of our consultancy – he was emphatic that it would have 
helped. His immediate grasp of how CT accounted for the events is promising. Here 
was a framework that could hold its own against ‘Theory E’ and which repairs 
sociological deficits in SDT. 
 
 
Re-Reading Menzies Using CT 
How might CT been used with Menzies’ (1960) seminal paper? As cultural artefacts, 
social defences will betray the reasoning of thought-styles. In Menzies’ case study, 
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we might infer that reasoning at the hospital was predominantly hierarchical (placing 
faith in rank and rules). Hierarchy between doctors and nurses minimised nurses’ 
discretion and suppressed their care for patients with absurdly anomalous measures 
(a triumph of formal over substantive rationality). Nurses’ expertise in care and 
rehabilitation was compromised. What should have been glaring anomalies - the 
long-list of problematic patient-care procedures Menzies described - failed to register.  
This contributed to the positive feedback enjoyed by Hierarchical reasoning. In 
response, nurses in CT terms trod a pathway into Fatalism for survival’s sake. Even 
matrons and experienced senior nurses passed on Hierarchical reasoning to junior 
nurses and nurses-in-training. 
 
The manifest social defences were Isolate-Fatalistic adaptations to Hierarchy: in 
Bion’s terms, this was basic assumption ‘Dependency’. Dependency is a well-
recognised defensive manoeuvre in such circumstances. Nurses who could tolerate 
dependency were more likely to stay by conforming to rules and delegating upwards 
even tasks that were within their competence. For others, this provided inadequate 
respite. They adopted basic assumption ‘Flight’ and departed. The respective results: 
unthinking task performance and reluctance to take even authorised decisions, non-
completion of nurse-training and high turnover among qualified nurses. 
 
Likewise, BA 'Dependency’ and BA 'Flight’ featured in our consultancy (compounded 
by BA ‘Me’ within the senior team). 84 We suggest that BA ‘Dependency’, ‘Flight’ and 
‘Me’ are dynamic and that this dynamism fuels, and is animated by, contending 
thought-styles, which depend in part on what the defences were a reaction to in the 
first place.  
 
In the hospital, the nurses BA 'Dependency' was a reaction to the dominating 
Hierarchical reasoning and organising. For those who fled the hospital and/or their 
training by choosing 'flight', this could be a reaction to the 'dependency' they found 
within the nursing system or animated by contending thought-styles operating within 
these nurses’ own consciences.  
 
In our case, the BA 'Dependency' and 'Flight' in Manufacturing was fuelled by the 
policy of centralisation and a blind obedience to their KPIs which animated a 
                                                          
84
 We had much better access to the elite than did Menzies, and were able to differentiate BA 'Me' within the 
senior team, which for level two and three managers was described as a return to the 'command and control' 
practices of the past. Perhaps something else was also feeding the Hierarchical reasoning in the hospital?  
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depressive Fatalistic reasoning and organising. In Sales, BA 'Flight' and 'Me' was 
fuelled by the policy of 'pushing initiative' which animated a manic Individualistic risk-
taking and Egalitarian camaraderie. These, when combined with Individualistic-
defensiveness (and BA 'Me’) of the senior team, pushed the organisation deeper into 
Isolate Ordering. This requires reconceptualising consolidated social defences as 
institutions carrying rules, norms and cultural-cognitive ways of thinking (see: Scott, 
2008) and animated by one or a weighted mix of elementary forms and contending 
rationalities (Douglas, 1986; 6, 2011).      
  
Bion's theory is sensitive to anxiety and defensive manoeuvres, but not to what 
triggers them, nor why social defences ‘consolidate’ and what they go on to cause if 
unattended. This is due – in our terms – to ‘positive feedback’ of a thought-style that, 
in its consolidated form, animates the social defence system.   
 
Neither BA 'Dependency' nor 'Flight' produced new ways of organising the hospital’s 
nursing service. Why? 
 
The defences which Menzies observed exquisitely were symptoms of Isolate 
Ordering in the face of ‘rules-gone-mad’. Using CT, nurses’ dependency consolidated 
into Fatalism. Isolate obedience to senior medics reinforced nurses’ marginalisation. 
But if their defences had encompassed Egalitarian or Market reasoning, we may 
have seen either coordinated protest and supportive camaraderie, or working with 
initiative and finding creative ways around stifling rules. We stress: Hierarchy elicited 
“dependency”, consolidating as Isolate Ordering. This settlement between Hierarchy 
and Isolate organising locked-out other forms of reasoning. Note that this was 
achieved through nurses themselves, starting with the matrons and senior nurses.  
As with our consultancy, Menzies was at a loss when it came to overcoming the trap.  
 
 
One Defence becomes Another 
In our case, we infer that social defences among second and third level managers 
began as 'flight' from anxiety aroused by competing policies and BA 'Me’ interference 
by different members of the senior team. BA 'Dependency' – in Manufacturing and 
Sales managers’ slavish attachment to KPIs – came later. For Bion, this is typical of 
how groups shift between different basic assumptions before they settle into a 
particular defensive pattern (or return to task).   
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For us, 'dependency' manifested differently in Manufacturing and Sales. 
Manufacturing followed their cost-reduction KPIs and submitted to central regulation. 
Aware of lost freedoms, new-found 'dependency' consolidated as Isolate Ordering: 
teams lost cohesion, managers became despondent and insular. Plant managers 
returned to directive 'command and control'. This is similar to what Menzies' nurses 
experienced under excessive rule. In both the hospital’s case and in ours, it was 
thought-styles which consolidated  'dependency' into the Isolate form. 
 
But in Sales, managers were less directly affected by the centralisation (of 
Purchasing and Distribution). Sales’ KPIs allowed for initiative and resourcefulness. 
As a result, their 'dependency' consolidated into Egalitarian and Individualist forms of 
reasoning and acting. They felt ‘unappreciated’ when making sales with new 
customers in new markets. They felt they were ‘rescuing the company to everyone’s 
benefit’, only to meet with fresh diktats: 
 Central Sales Processing Only! 
 Maintain the Profit-Ratio! 
 No Product Modifications Manufacturing and Product Development 
approvals! 
 
In CT terms, Sales team solidarity and camaraderie were ‘reinforced’ when 
customers complained about late orders which were ‘No fault of the Sales Team’. 
Lack of appreciation, compounded by fresh restrictions, validated their sense of 
inhabiting an unjust system. Grievance settled into resentments and became an ‘I-
told-you-so!’ resource, consolidating their Egalitarian defences. 
 
This warranted inflated sales-estimates with the aim of forcing Manufacturing to 
speed up and increase their raw materials inventory, thus: 
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Diagram 5.9 Social Defences as ‘Flight’, then ‘Dependency’, Consolidated by 
Different Thought-Styles 
 
Note: BA 'Flight', in Sales and Manufacturing, turned into 'Dependency' with 
respective KPIs and policy diktats. This consolidated into two distinct defence 
systems that could not have been foreseen using Bion alone. The elementary forms 
driving the social defences also point to their organisational consequences.  
 
By applying SDT and CT, we think we have a better understanding of how defences 
‘consolidate’, and not just in groups. One fortunate feature of CT is that it is ‘fractal’ 
(Thompson, 2008). Different thought-styles will apply at individual, group, 
organisational level and society levels allowing for responses and consequences to 
be inferred not only to group-tasks, but at any scale.  
    
 
5.3.3 The Three Analytic Models 
The discussion so far is built on SDT and CT. Other middle-range social models were 
employed when re-reading the social defences and other critical features of the case. 
CT draws on them (Thompson, 2008; 6, 2011; 2003 and 2014) and it was their use 
by CT that prompted their use here. Each provides a fresh way of understanding 
social defences and developing its social side using an explanatory, realist approach. 
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Here, we turn to the 'agency-structure' interplay over time; aspects of institutional 
theory (the formal and informal organisation and institutions) and systems theory – 
feedback loops and self-organisation.  
 
 
Agency and Structure 
Psychological and sociological accounts differ in their emphasis of agency and 
structure as causal in organisations. Although Menzies postulated that social 
defences become independent of, and influence, the individuals involved (i.e. 
structures), in practice she dwelled mostly on their psychological causes and effects 
(agency which is albeit unconscious – or created by individuals). This limits how far 
evidence of social defences can be used to diagnose their social causes and 
consequences.  
 
CT does not have this limitation. It insists on both options. "Social context" (structure 
agents encounter) is conceived in "social terms" that allows "permitting and 
constraining effects upon the individual's choices ... [and] the individual's part in 
transforming it" (Douglas, 1982: 192). While structural circumstances (institutions, 
organisations) will cultivate a thought-style that shapes and specifies styles of 
agency, individuals will also develop preferences for specific thought-styles that they 
will draw upon to change structure, especially when the dominant institutional 
thought-style falters. We will return to this.  
 
We have already argued that consolidated social defences become independent 
social entities. As such, they can be approached as 'structures' or as we prefer, 
institutions. This provides another lens than only focusing on the anxiety that fuels 
them which can reduce accounts back to individuals or their psychological effects. 
Approaching them both as agency and structure, can help us distinguish between 
psychological and sociological accounts of social defences.  
 
Here we distinguish between different treatments of social defences as symptoms or 
causes. In doing this, we draw on Archer's (1995) distinction of agency and structure 
as 'analytically distinct' phenomena whose reciprocal effects can be observed over 
time.  
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In fact, Elliot Jaques in abandoning his earlier social defence hypothesis (1955) 
simply reversed his treatment of social defences from being causes to symptoms 
(1995). By not 'throwing out the baby with the bathwater' as he had done, social 
defences can be diagnostically approached as both symptoms calling for 
explanation, and causes having effects.   
 
These distinctions enable separate questions to be asked about: 
 What triggered the anxiety that lead to social defences? 
 What in the organisation are they a reaction to? 
 What effects do anxiety and collective defences have on individuals? 
 What effects or consequences do they generate on organisations?  
 
Collective anxiety can be understood as the agency causing social defences. 
However, the subsequent unconscious formation of defences can also be understood 
as agency and structure - agency as individuals actively prevent discomforting 
anxiety; and structure as consolidated social defences (as independent social 
entities) generating consequences back onto individuals and the wider organisation.  
 
As agency, among second and third level managers, anxiety and defences were 
most likely a lagged response to troubling post-GFC policies. In the senior team, 
anxiety and defences were most likely caused by the uncertainty and risk of an 
altered post-GFC external environment and later, the dawning realisation of the 
ineffectiveness of their policies. These were different causal chains. This was helpful 
in alerting us that these defences, as agency, were task-undermining and likely 
problematic.  
 
It is here where SDT and CT can draw upon each other. Social defences, for 
example, may provide an early signal that a thought-style and its related structure - 
by giving rise to collective anxiety and defence (as agency) - is faltering and potential 
change is in the air. The social defences as lagged responses to competing policies 
and inadequate responses to a changed external environment provide such a signal 
that both the existing organisation and its new policies (as structures) were faltering. 
This is diagnostic information. But it is only the first step.   
 
Focusing on social defences as the work of unconscious processes, like Menzies 
had done, allowed us to see them as causal, only insofar as their effects on the 
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individuals concerned, and as providing a warning – but of what exactly? We 
suspected something more: that they would likely generate effects on the 
organisation, but did not have the means to forecast how. All we could do was warn, 
and to offer help to the individuals involved to better understand and perhaps deal 
with them. However, the senior team, our target client was not interested in this. We 
got stuck in SDT's 'problem of change'. Treating them as agency and causal, as we 
did, helped us with little else. If, instead, we treated them as symptoms needing to be 
explained, we could begin to search for their social causes, and also their social 
consequences. This would provide for more complete diagnostic information.     
 
With hindsight, we suspected that the social defences had a hand to play in causing 
the later problems. But how? If we treated them as both 'structure' and causal (rather 
than pertaining to individuals or their psychology – 'agency' and causal as we had 
done), we could focus on how they operated socially – as Menzies had suggested, 
but did not elaborate on how. This was the work and claim of this thesis: that social 
defences once they consolidate can be reconceptualised as informal institutions that 
operate with institutional qualities (rules, values and thought-style), as well as (and 
not only) group dynamics (basic assumptions). As such, identifying their institutional 
qualities, with the help of CT, allowed us to trace back what the defences were a 
social reaction to, and to forecast what consequences they generate given the 
elementary form and thought-style that animated them, and the different elementary 
forms existing in the organisation.  
 
In summary, CT can help elaborate how social defences operate socially, as well as 
what in the organisation (structures) they are a likely reaction to and what they will go 
on to affect. SDT can help CT by indicating that anxiety and social defences (as 
agency) are the first sign that a dominant thought-style driving an institution is 
faltering or that a realignment of elementary forms is already in train. This provides 
consultants with real-time diagnosis and not just suspicions, hunches or hindsight.    
 
 
Institutional Theory and Analysis 
If consolidated social defences operate as 'structures', it is reasonable to understand 
them as institutions, albeit informal ones. They may lack official systems and 
sanctions. They may be implicit and unconscious. Nonetheless, they display 
identifiable practices and ways of thinking and acting for effected individuals. 
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Thompson (2008) defines institutions as any non-randomness in behaviour; Douglas 
(1986) as conventions in support of a purpose. And Scott (2008) defines them as a 
set of rules, norms and ways of thinking that guide behaviour.   
 
By treating social defences as informal institutions, discovery of their rules, norms 
and ways of thinking help us further understand their operation. 'Ways of thinking' 
(thought-styles) are just what CT means to explain as the four outcomes of Grid and 
Group. Treating social defences as (cultural) institutions encompasses what social 
defences are a reaction to, and once consolidated (through positive feedback), the 
effects they may have. This supplements their psychodynamic defensive pattern.  
 
It is institutional analysis which identifies how consolidated social defences in 
Manufacturing and different consolidated defences in Sales undermined these 
functions’ operations. The three-way interplay between these institutions and the 
senior team's Individualistic BA 'Me' defences caused poor coordination and a 
degree of paralysis bewildering to all (including myself). 
    
In the different social defences, we have informal institutions that resist deliberate 
organisational control. While more benign social defences may find better ways of 
realising organisational-purposes by circumventing anxiety-not-task, destructive ones 
undermine task. It is their informality that makes social defences difficult to see and 
hard to control. In our case, the policies of Centralisation, KPIs, Initiative, and 
Acquisitions operated at the formal-informal boundary. They were sanctioned 
formally by the senior team, but in working more as individuals than a team, the 
policies were driven more through (unofficial) diktat and occasional cajoling that 
served to supplement one, while undermining another. This further fuelled their 
already competing nature and operation, adding to the confusion and anxiety while 
undermining the senior team's gravitas. This reinforced the social defences below, 
which in turn, corroded the spirit and intent of the policies.    
 
Centralisation diminished control by Manufacturing managers. The social defences 
(anxiety of losing control) took an Isolate form. Isolate ordering was destructive to 
good practice: it re-asserted 'command and control' practices in plant managers that 
affected the inexperienced seasonal workforce who lacked the attention to quality 
and sense of belonging for which high social integration (high Group) and well-
regulated systems (high Grid) are necessary. Suspicion and mistrust of others 
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manifested in careless behaviour towards outsiders. Meanwhile, in Sales, the policy 
of ‘Promoting Initiative’ brought experimentation and a destructive settlement 
between Egalitarian enclaving (us versus the system) and opportunistic Individualism 
(my way) that produced mistrust of outsiders and indifference towards 
consequences. They also ‘made sure of meeting KPIs' but competing ones to 
Manufacturing.  
 
The crucial point is that neither type of social defence could have been predicted 
from that initial defensive basic assumption pattern. Understanding the interplay of 
each institution – formal and informal – and their competing thought-styles is needed.  
 
Though in official command, the senior team's BA 'Me’ defences turned them into 
‘loose cannons’ capable of ‘damage to the ship and its crew’. The psychoanalytic 
adage - what is unconscious may also prove to be undermining - applies here. But 
institutional analysis of how muscular formal authorisation can contribute to, and be 
brought down by, informal institutions provides a richer account of the practical 
effects of different defences on each other. Consolidated BA 'Me' defences caused 
senior team members to pursue their own agendas to assuage anxiety while 
neglecting coordination or direction. Strong formal authorisation and an interplay of 
three defensive systems (senior team, Manufacturing and Sales) undermined the 
effectiveness even of those in possession of the most authority. 
 
‘Power-struggle’ and unconscious dynamics does not describe all that was in play. In 
Chapter Seven, we will examine the view that unconscious mechanisms and power 
dynamics, while informative, do not encompass the evidence as well as does 
institutional analysis.    
 
 
Systems Theory: Feedback Loops and Self-Organisation  
Feedback loops and self-organisation capture the mechanisms and processes 
through which institutions operate and produce the effects that they do. This proved 
helpful to the research.  
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The Tavistock paradigm draws mainly on open systems theory, introduced by Emery 
in the I950s.85 But, at best, it only implies the operation of feedback loops. CT draws 
on feedback loops to explain change, and while unacquainted with 'self-organisation' 
does articulate that there is no ultimate equilibrium point in any cultural system. Self-
organisation speaks to the degree of permanence acquired by ‘consolidated’ 
institutions – be they intentional policies, or the unconscious social defences against 
anxiety. This is because any reasoning will provoke the discontentment of the other 
forms of reasoning.  
 
 
Self-Organisation 
The systemic concept of self-organisation (Capra, 1996; Capra and Luisi, 2014; 
Burke, 2011) posits that any system (organisations, institutions) is simultaneously 
open to the influence of its environment while being closed operationally in what it 
does. The GFC, for example, created a massive upheaval for the organisation from 
the external environment, but how the organisation responded was of its own 
making. This accounts for how systems can remain relatively stable over time, largely 
because something of the character of the 'whole' is reflected and discernable in its 
'parts' that work to self re-produce, but also how (human) systems (through agency) 
are always open to choice and change. Self-organisation shows how systems can 
work to re-create themselves, despite external influences, while simultaneously being 
open to change given the available environmental opportunities and restraints.  
 
In the research, self-organisation was used to understand the simultaneous open and 
closed operation of the organisation as a whole, but also of some of its parts – the 
policies and social defences. This allowed us to examine the relative independence, 
as well as character, of the various institutions in how they reflected aspects of the 
                                                          
85 As we have seen, it mainly focuses on the concept of task, input and output equations that together inform 
what an organisation, as a system, needs to achieve in order to survive (Miller and Rice, 1967); and how the 
paradigm has come to think of systems as pseudo-structures that are essential parts in relation to each other and 
to the whole. This is used to reveal different levels of analysis or where an issue or problem emerges such as 
within the individual, the relationship between individuals, the group-level, the inter-group or organisation-as-a-
whole (Wells, 1995). It does not explicitly use the concept of feedback as a process that generates effects from 
one part of a system to another except, insofar as this is implied in the operation of open systems which draws 
more on the biological metaphor of an organism in relation to its environment. Nor does it use the concept of 
self-organisation which emerged later from quantum physics (see for example: Capra, 1996; Burke, 2011). Very 
early on, Emery realised a problem with open systems theory. When inputs and outputs are taken into account, 
the influence of the external environment is taken as given, and the very nature of the external environment is 
deemed as knowable (1997). It was this insight, together with their consulting and research, where they realised 
how organisational environments created consequences for organisations often greater than the organisation’s 
own efforts or influence. This led to the seminal paper that he and Trist wrote on the causal texture of the 
organisational environment (Emery and Trist, 1965). Here they suggest how changes in the nature of the external 
environment necessitate changes within organisations which they must adapt to in order to survive. 
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whole but also operated in relative independence. In response to the GFC, the senior 
team, as its most sanctioned organisational agents, issued policies. Some were 
totally new responses, but others could be discerned in what had been done in the 
past. But like the organisation, these policies self-organised as institutions: and what 
Manufacturing and Sales did in response created social defences that also became 
self-organised. Once each of these 'parts' came into operation, despite aspects of the 
whole being reflected in their pattern or character, they took on a life of their own. 
They affected each other, but as we saw of the social defences in particular, these 
remained resistant and even hostile to influence.  
 
CT and SDT make best sense of the contending rationalities and defences that 
animated these institutions. To a consultant, iterative analysis of their 'patterns and 
webs of relationships' matters.  
 
The similarity with CT in particular is also quite striking. According to CT: 
 Institutions are fashioned by thought-style(s) (numbering four distinct parts 
defined as a whole by Grid and Group). While one may dominate, the others 
are potentially available 
 Individuals will subscribe to different thought-styles (thought-styles inhabit 
individuals as much as they do organisations) 
 Individuals may dissent from how their institution thinks (Douglas, 1982; 
1986) (discrepant thinking is an agential response to a dominant thought-style 
that under environmental pressure falters) 
 Nevertheless, response-traces of this whole will be present in its parts and its 
jostling parts will be apparent in a changing whole.  
 
This is a variation of Thompson's (2008) observation that system parts contain 
properties of the whole; like 'fractals' that need not be identical to the whole. Self-
organisation, then, also describes how part-relationships contribute to the character 
of the whole.  
 
Why add self-organisation to cultural theory? Cultural theory encompasses any 
combination of four contending thought-styles, and the disagreements that can exist 
between them. The principle of self-organisation can be used to ask: 
 Are the parts consistent with each other? 
 Does this contribute or not to the coordination of the whole? 
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 Does their operation affect or change the whole? 
 Is their joint operation consistent with the character, intent and logic of the 
whole? 
This helps separate diagnosis of each part, but also its relationship and contribution 
to the operation of others and of the whole. This was contributed by ‘feedback’. What 
we saw was: 
 The whole was characterised by increasing regulation, florid individualism ‘at 
the top’, and social defences below weakening integration that created a 
pathway into Isolate Ordering for all 
 This pathway became apparent in all the institutions’ parts despite their being  
different in design and operation. 
 
Ordinarily, this idea is in keeping with Emery and Trist's (1965) proposition that 
organisations’ design and strategy should acknowledge ‘the external environment’.  
And, we can say that the GFC environment is acknowledged somewhat 
approximately in our organisation and even in its parts (notwithstanding their different 
designs and operations). But because of the social defences, we think all policies 
were undermined, due to the confounding obstinacy of their institutions and their 
complicating feedback. These conspired to weaken social integration, but tighten 
regulation; hence Isolate Ordering. 
      
 
Feedback Types and Phases 
Feedback can occur within, and between, institutions and the whole. In the first 
phase, a thought-style is generated and reinforced within, while the second phase 
generates effects onto other institutions and the whole. Feedback is also famously 
'positive' (reinforcing) or 'negative' (undermining). Feedback loops were used to 
explain how the institutions – policies and social defences – generated effects for the 
individuals involved, each other and the whole.  
 
In a CT context, positive feedback means reinforcement of a way of thinking through 
the gathering of evidence which reinforces its conviction: thus ‘I told you so! It only 
goes to show how right we are!’. Negative feedback occurs when mounting evidence 
of anomalies induces crises of confidence to that way of thinking: ‘beautiful theory 
destroyed by ugly facts’.  
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We saw positive feedback occur within each of the social defences, and negative 
feedback between them. Feedback from social defences created havoc onto the 
policies, while the competing nature of the policies ultimately meant they were 
undermining each other. The confusion and anxiety they generated served to further 
reinforce the social defences within Manufacturing and Sales. 
 
Positive feedback (belief in the rightness of a particular thought-style) also occurred 
within the senior team's Individualistic BA 'Me' defences making them impervious to 
our interventions but also to what was really transpiring in Manufacturing and Sales – 
these were not simply 'teething problems', as one senior team member put it. Each 
social defence system reinforced the other, especially during the first phase feedback 
loop (within each system), while undermining each other’s efforts to secure results 
during the second phase (between systems).   
 
As for the policies, the reasoning and defences associated with Centralisation and 
(different) KPIs strengthened Regulation. But ‘Promoting Initiative’ was weakening, 
whatever Integration had existed. In combination, these created a now recognisable 
‘pathway into isolate ordering’. Disconcerting experiences reinforced (different) social 
defences in Manufacturing and Sales, compromising the policies. And comforting 
dependence on (different) KPIs made a mockery of them. Despite individuals 
knowing that ‘this isn’t helping’; they persisted.  
 
Once identified, the prevailing elementary form operating in any institution should 
help in forecasting the consequences for other institutions. Indeed, we should be able 
to forecast the probability of positive and negative feedback. In CT terms, we should 
be alert to pushes and pulls: cultural shifts across the cultural map imparted by the 
waxing and waning of different thought-styles and their different disagreements. 
 
With the knowledge we already had about (different) consolidated social defences 
and the knowledge we now have about (different) thought-styles, in hindsight we see 
these in what were before, bewildering outcomes: 
 Individualism in the senior team meant that their conflicting directives were 
immanent and imminent. 
 Isolate Ordering in Manufacturing meant that survivalist suspicion and 
mistrust of other functions were immanent and imminent … and despotic 
control suppressed initiative. Things going wrong reinforced the need to ‘keep 
your head down’. This makes sense of failures to address crises in quality 
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and maintenance while concentrating on ‘getting orders completed 
regardless’. 
 Egalitarian enclaving within Sales teams would promote suspicion towards 
outsiders, and look for positive reinforcement of feelings of correctness.  
Sales were inhabited by a second thought-style, Individualism, which would 
likely either increase experimentation, not least, by finding self-serving 
strategies good for Sales and resistant especially to Manufacturing – 
worsening the ‘Manufacturing-Sales Divide’ through deliberate (and 
ingenious) inflation of sales-estimates. 
 
  
Distillation  
It is easy to be wise-after-the-event. But, it is also wise to assimilate the models on 
which this wisdom rests. Look for the elementary forms inhabiting policies and social 
defences and the positive and negative feedback immanent within, and between, 
them. 
 
If consultants find that adherents of a thought-style are seizing on ‘I-told-you-so’ 
evidence to their own satisfaction, then expect positive reinforcement which will 
provoke other ways of thinking, their associated defences, compromising 
coordination and undermining other institutions. These processes are inferred from 
the effects that have been described throughout the case study. Table 5.3 breaks 
down how to identify a thought-style and basic assumption defences.  
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Table 5.3 How to Identify Thought-Styles and Basic Assumptions 
Thought-Style  Basic Assumptions 
Animate Institutions (conventions developed 
over time to achieve a Purpose) 
Collective Emotional Constellations that 
Reflect Anxiety that is Defended Against in 
Groups 
Institutions are made up of: 
- Rules 
- Norms (Values) 
- Beliefs about the World and How it Works 
- Ways of Thinking and Behaving (doing) 
 
... are Driven by one or a hybrid mix of CT’s 
Elementary Forms derived from the 
combination of Regulation (rules) and 
Integration (group Solidarity), and 
 
... reflect distinctive ways of organising 
relationships 
 
All Groups have a Purpose (primary task to 
achieve) 
 
Group Members Working to achieve a 
purpose can experience / generate anxiety 
which is unconsciously defended against 
 
Group Dynamics are Cyclical, reflecting the 
on-going sway between on-task and off-task 
patterns of behaviour  
Can have positive and negative 
manifestations brought about by positive 
feedback within that generates  
consequences outside the institution 
Are in the service of defence against  
 
... but can also have positive manifestations 
that operate in the service of the task 
Isolate Ordering 
 
- Fatalistic - fear 
mistrust  
- Two positions - 
despots or serfs 
- Everyone out for 
themselves 
- Rules serve the 
despot and arbitrarily 
enforced   
 
Can work well in a 
crisis or when work is 
best done in secrecy 
or segregation 
Hierarchy 
 
- Duty and Obligation 
to the Whole 
- People follow rules, 
procedures that exist 
for all contingencies 
- Individuals are 
ranked and respect 
and serve others' 
ranks - status based 
 
Can be overly 
bureaucratic where 
people follow 
procedure mindlessly 
Dependency  
 
A leader is sought 
(and frequently 
replaced) to relieve 
the group of anxiety. 
Members relieve 
themselves of 
individual authority 
and expect direction 
that comforts them 
Fight / Flight 
 
A group acts as if its 
main task is to 
mobilise fight or flee 
from a common 
enemy 
Individualistic 
 
- Autonomy, 
discretion, freedom 
to pursue own task / 
conscience 
- Entrepreneurial  
- Open to calculated 
risk / expediency 
- Rules can be  
improvised for task   
 
Can be self-serving / 
self-oriented  
Egalitarian 
 
- Equality - 'all for 
one and one for all'  
- Principle-based 
- Collaboration and 
Camaraderie  
- Rules must be Fair   
- Robust debate or 
concerted protest  
- Strong boundaries 
  
Can become 
unwieldy if too big / 
subject of splits 
Pairing 
 
A group avoids its 
task by focusing on a 
pair or members pair-
up to avoid anxiety 
Oneness / Me 
 
Group members 
collude to deny there 
is any difference 
between them or its 
opposite - members 
operate as 
individuals or isolates 
not as team 
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5.4 Fourth Iteration: Episodes, Causal Triggers, Mechanisms and Processes 
 
A realist analysis searches for the (most) viable explanation(s) that accounts for the 
events, case-outcomes and causal mechanisms operating to produce them (6 and 
Bellamy, 2012; Maxwell, 2012). We have argued that: realist analysis in concert with 
interpretive methods (Long, 2013) better accounts for unconscious processes than 
only interpretation (Rustin, 1991); and that explanations of (beneath-the-surface) 
behaviour and (complex) social phenomena over time often require several over-
lapping iterations of data-analysis (Yin, 2009). This is our fourth iteration following the 
narrative, cause-effect relationships and analysis with SDT, CT and the analytic 
models.  
 
The four significant case events, or discrete "episodes" requiring explanation 
together and separately (Tilly, 2008) were the: 
 GFC 
 Policies 
 Social Defences 
 Confounded new problems. 
 
Diagrams 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 map the relationship between GFC, policies and social 
defences. Diagram 5.5 maps the interaction between the policies and social 
defences and their relationship to problems. In addressing SDT’s ‘problem of change’ 
as our main concern, we have sought means for forecasting the likely consequences 
of unattended social defences. Diagram 5.1 shows time-lags between GFC and the 
social defences, and then between the defences and the organisational problems.  
These time lags are very telling: they hint at a succession of what we can call 
‘triggers’ that set in train the mechanisms and processes operating to produce 
outcomes. 
 
 
GFC 
The time-lag between GFC and social defences means that the GFC was not their 
direct cause. Causal mechanisms are contingent and need a 'trigger' to come into 
operation (Dannermark, et al., 2002: 55). The GFC is, of course, a backdrop to the 
three other events. Policies, social defences and new problems may not have 
occurred had ‘the environment’ not changed.  
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The GFC gave rise to a certain glee in head office. Despite the threat of losing their 
largest customer, there was reasonable enthusiasm about using the crisis to fix past-
practices. At this point, there were few, if any, signs of social defences. There was 
also support from below that members should increase discretionary activity within 
their departments. This was felt to be reasonable. It was later that enthusiasm was 
replaced by apprehension and confusion in the light of reasonable evidence that 
‘things weren’t right’. Discrepant directives were the more likely cause of social 
defences.  
 
 
What is a ‘Mechanism’ and how does it work? 
Tilly (2008: 138-140) describes causal mechanisms as "events that alter relations 
among specified sets of elements". But there is more to mechanisms than events 
and why was the organisation unable to do something about the combined effect of 
mechanisms they were fully - or partly - aware of?  
 
Senior and second level managers confided their awareness of their contradictory 
actions, but somehow saw this as unexceptional. Both groups reasoned that ‘policies 
can take time’ and ‘it will be a while before we know if they are having the desired 
effect’. As the social defences developed, individuals at both these levels 
acknowledged privately that they were contributing to confusion, uncertainty and 
anxiety. But this was brushed-off as the expected effects of change. 
 
But, by the time the social defences consolidated, it was as if circumstances had 
overtaken individuals’ understanding of their effects, overwhelming their ability to 
control. Why? If we blame the policies, or senior managers’ lack of coordination, or 
second level managers' poor implementation, we misplace blame on the persons 
involved, questioning their capability. However, in collective endeavour, individuals 
are limited. Individual blame – however gratifying – overlooks the organising logic 
which each policy had on each department. Blaming senior managers misses the 
partly intended but largely inadvertent institutions (with defences, thought-styles, 
loops) that were created. These institutions proved stronger than any individual, and 
social defences within the senior team compromised their ability to direct 
proceedings.  
 
Independent of the individuals, it was the institutions that most likely produced the 
case outcomes. With an understanding of each institution's organising logic, we 
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suggest that their influence was greater than that of individuals (even of individuals in 
aggregate). Once the genies were out-of-the-bottle, they caused mayhem. This led to 
a dramatic turn: several senior team members left and an unprecedented world-wide 
search ensued for a new CEO. The organisation had collective realisation of its 
collective inability. 
 
If we search for the internal organising logic of policies and social defences as 
institutions – with the help of CT, SDT and the three analytic models – we saw how 
the elementary forms and anxiety-defences inhabiting these institutions had tandem 
effects. But neither thought-styles nor social defences alone are sufficient 
explanation for the mayhem they created in conjunction with each other.   
 
 
Mechanisms Concatenate 
According to Tilly (2008: 138-140) "mechanisms concatenate into broader 
processes" which become what 6 and Bellamy (2012: 189-194) refer to as 
"trajectories" or pathways in the shape of feedback loops. Social causation rarely 
occurs in a simple linear manner. The institutions generated feedback and feedback 
animated thought-styles that – in combination – produced outcomes which no-one 
intended.  
 
This consultant was equipped with a well-practiced understanding of individual and 
group psychodynamics, but this was insufficient to the task. If we had understood  
institutions and their organising logics, this may have assisted the consulting by 
helping leaders understand their actions and consequences. We would have alerted 
them to social defences as effects and as causes of fresh rounds of unintended 
consequences. Real-time diagnosis-analysis needs SDT and CT and the ability to 
divine what participants’ emotions are telling them and telling us. 
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Chapter Six: From Theories to Practice 
Structural and Psychological Forces are Needed to Understand Consulting 
Practice  
As long ago as 1950, Trist called for "interdisciplinary combinations" of psychological 
and sociological theories in "action research" consulting projects “in order to 
understand the many-sided real-life situations being dealt with”. He suggested that 
“psychological forces ... at the level of the group and individual, interact with 
structural forces to bring into existence a concrete ‘field’ with a dynamic pattern which 
is specific for a given social situation”. This is “impossible [to understand] with either 
psychological or sociological concepts alone” (Trist, [1950] 1990: 538-539). Trist, with 
Tavistock colleagues, Emery and Jaques, provided clues and resources for 
developing a sociological component to social defence theory. 
This dissertation is an attempt to realise Trist’s recommendation more especially by 
synthesising Social Defences Theory and Cultural Theory, increasing their 
explanatory and predictive power, and practical uses. 
The research showed that the social defences interacted with different cultural 
rationalities within the organisation, combining to create distinct ‘institutions’, which 
created problems and vexed consulting. 
Even in the 1950s, Trist was far from alone. Menzies observed that social defences 
are more than psychological processes (1960; Menzies Lyth, 1989; 1990). However, 
she struggled to identify how social defences get institutionalised. Instead she 
emphasised that people's psychological needs, including their defences against 
anxiety, trump an organisation's task and technology in explaining organisational 
outcomes (1960: 101). As a consequence, defences were not examined as social 
institutions. 
With the benefit of hindsight we now know that: 
 Changes in collective emotions (affects) and the emergence of social 
defences, indicated impending change; however, 
 Social Defence Theory was insufficient to forecast and explain what would 
happen next 
 Cultural Theory's Social concepts can explain, but not forecast  
 In conjunction, SDT and CT would have improved the quality of our diagnosis 
and recommendations. 
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Though they can be read as strong warnings of trouble, defensive patterns can not 
be used to infer the damage they will do. The consultancy, armed principally with 
Menzies, proved inadequate in helping the organisation deal with problems, caused 
in part by social defences which bore silent witness to conflicting thought-styles.  
 
6.1.1 Social Defences as Institutions 
Using Cultural Theory (and the three analytic-tools), social defences were 
reconceptualised as institutions, driven by the organising logic of one or more 
conflicting ‘elementary forms’. With positive and negative ‘feedback’, these emerge 
as the most likely causes of social defences, what they were a reaction to, and the 
practical consequences of.  
Social defences operate as institutions in the thought-style they cultivate in 
individuals who come to think along similar lines, getting stuck. Thus, as well as 
mutual psychological ‘identifications’ inferred through social defence theory, Douglas’ 
understanding of thought-styles (1986) parallels Menzies’ suggestion that 
organisational "members become like the institution in significant ways ... sharing [its] 
common attitudes" (1989: 40-41). In a sociologically sanguine moment, Menzies also 
stated that "institutions, once established, may be extremely difficult to change ... 
[they] modify the personality structure of their members ... [and] to change the 
members one may first need to change the institution" (1989: 26). She did not go on 
to develop this thinking. 
How do organisations get stuck? Cultural theory posits that institutions will self-
organise according to one or more ‘elementary forms’ (Thompson, 2008; 6, 2011). 
This produces rules, norms, and common ways of thinking (Scott, 2008) or thought-
styles (Douglas,1986) prone to different forms of feedback. 
Our research indicates that through ‘positive feedback’, a thought-style becomes 
entrenched because all its worst fears seem to come true. In our case, once arrived 
at from a Fatalist Position, then Hierarchical, Egalitarian and Individualistic 
dispositions all appear monstrous. Hierarchs weave excessive rules. Egalitarians 
day-dream. Individualists indulge in competition. But the worst fears of any thought-
style can be magnified, confirming the rightness of that particular position, and what 
is to be done. 
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Negative feedback may occur through ‘surprises’ (after Thompson) when contrary 
evidence defeats the assumptions of any thought-style; either blatant evidence of the 
inbuilt practical failings of any one position, or actions by others that confound our 
theories about them (a kindly bureaucrat, say; or a trust-worthy innovator; an agile 
enclave). Much of this is uncomfortable thus bad-feelings abound, from which social 
defences provide respite. 
Thought-styles and defences combine to create institutions having consequences in 
and beyond organisations (6, 2011; 2015 and 2003). 
The research showed that the effects of evident social defences could not be 
forecast without understanding the underlying elementary form(s) that awakened 
them. Social defences abounded as the organisation became stuck in Isolate 
Ordering. 
Social defence theory does not explain how change occurs, but why it may be 
resisted so deeply (Long, 2006a; Krantz, 2010). Defences are symptoms of disquiet 
induced by the uncomfortable operation of thought-styles. 
 
6.1.2 Poly-rationality + Defences = Collaboration Collision 
It is partly a question of ‘geography’. If we focus on the ‘mechanisms’ of defences 
(treating them as the 'figure' of attention, after Lewin), it is hard to see the 'ground' or 
‘context-plus-situation’ in which they arise. Installing sociological (cultural) theory 
enables the ground to be understood just as well. And, if we want to predict what the 
social defences will cause to happen, we need to see them as institutions 
independently of individuals, whose thoughts are not just of their own making. These 
feed-back both positively and negatively as described above: creating worse cultural 
monsters and more virulent psychic defences, despite consultants’ best efforts to 
exorcise them. 
By identifying the elementary form(s) operating within a social defence system - 
inhabiting systems, policies, teams and departments - we can assess what the social 
defences are reacting to and what they will do.  
We found that post-GFC policies failed to create the movement which senior leaders 
had sought and agreed expressly. Instead of action; apprehension, confusion and 
anxiety gave rise to florid social defences and confounded the ‘fault-line’ between 
Manufacturing and Sales which (was common knowledge) could not be undone. The 
  
168 
elementary forms operating inside these defences were cultural (thought-style) 
reactions against the elementary forms driving conflicting policies.  Indeed, it is the 
nature of sociality that the particular reasoning behind any given policy will probably 
antagonise and ‘animate’ opposition from within any (or all) of the three other 
contending forms of reasoning. Thus, it is understood that the clues are there as to 
likely affects and effects.  
For example, ‘hierarchically reasonable’ centralisation and cost-saving KPI policies 
that restricted the options available to Manufacturing managers, animated 
‘Fatalistically reasonable’ ‘Isolate’ social defences in them. Meanwhile, 
‘Individualistically reasonable’ decentralisation of discretion in Sales had a very 
different effect: namely, individual resourcefulness (creativity beloved of the 
Individualistic thought-style) and team camaraderie; that is a ‘poly-rational’ or 
‘clumsy’ mix (or ’settlement’) of competitive Individualism and Egalitarian enclaving. 
Verweij and Thompson (2006) argue that ‘clumsy’ thinking can excel at solving 
‘messy problems’ however defence mechanisms do have to be contended with.  
Because conflicting thought-styles elicited defensive manoeuvres, then deliberate 
collaborative problem-solving had the opposite effect of pushing two departments 
into collision pathways. 
Hence: Poly-Rationality + Defences = Collaboration Collision. 
 
6.2  Feelings Should Matter to Managers 
The organisational development, change, and Tavistock systems-psychodynamic 
literatures, have long since established that organisational members' feelings act as 
a ‘barometer’ of their level of engagement and of their frustration and dissatisfaction 
with the organisation, its policies, and of how well they feel they are being led (Burke, 
2011; Cummins, 2008; Cummins and Worley, 2001; French et al., 2000; Schein, 
1969; Armstrong, 2005; Obholzer and Roberts, 1994). Changes in collective 
emotional experience is diagnostic.  
In hindsight, the social defences were an early warning that the organisation's 
responses to the GFC were not working, and that there were problems ahead. This 
was the important contribution of social defence theory and associated consultation 
methods. 
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However, the importance of pointing-out social defences to the senior leaders was 
not as evident to them as to the consultant. This knowledge failed to arouse interest, 
as the senior team did not regard the members’ feelings as a valid source of 
information. To imply that social defences are diagnostic, is not the same as 
explaining how they came about, and what they will do if unattended. 
Nevertheless, the senior team did embrace some working hypotheses; including any 
which spoke to the Manufacturing-Sales 'fault-line' and unintended consequences of 
conflicting post-GFC policies. Our hypothesis that the senior ‘team’, so-called, was 
operating as individuals (in what I later realised was a Fatalistic state of Isolate 
Ordering) was denied and dismissed. 
 
6.2.1 Communicating the Financial Risk of Social Defences 
The failure of the social defence intervention speaks to the normative divisions 
pervading organisations and even organisational theory itself. We noted how Beer 
(2008) sees a division in organisational theory between Theories 'E' and 'O': the 
degree that change ought to focus on finance, or culture.  
An insight to emerge from the research was that if social defences could have been 
explained in terms of what caused them, and what they will go on to cause (Theory 
‘O’), it may have been easier to have won the attention of senior managers focussed 
on financial efficiency (Theory 'E'). If we had found the means to demonstrate that 
social defences acting in conjunction with thought-styles affect financial performance, 
they would have paid attention. ‘Interpretive’ identification of social defences implying 
these are potentially harmful is not the same as explaining their causes and risks in 
managers’ day-language. 
One solution to consultant/client communication problems is to offer working 
hypotheses which are open to negotiation and further co-creation by clients 
(Lawrence, 2000; 2006). As with consulting-room psychoanalysis, clients are left to 
decide on actions. The evidence presented is typically psychological, involving the 
surfacing of unconscious motives and desires (Long and Harney, 2013; Bain, 1999; 
Menzies Lyth, 1990). 
However, our position is that the risky consequences of social defences and conflicts 
among thought-styles should be spelled-out in a way that is ‘expert’ (Hierarchical) 
with evidence befitting Theory 'E', in a manner which is intentionally interventionist, 
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and draws out the sociological, political and economic causes and implications. A 
consultant can join-the-dots between: managers’ emotional experience and the 
‘institutions’ operating on them. Table 6.1 summarises the arguments and where they 
point. 
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Table 6.1: How the Research Suggested Improvement to SDT Intervention 
Theoretical Aspect Implication Typical Interventions Alternative 
Interventions 
 
 
Social Defences are 
built into organisational 
systems, structures and 
work practices 
How Exactly and Why? 
 
What is their Social 
Nature and Operation? 
 
Social Defences as 
'Social Facts'? 
 
 
 
 
Provide Examples 
 
 
 
Reconceptualising 
Social Defences as 
‘informal institutions’ 
cultivating thought-style 
and generating 
feedback processes 
 
Social and 
Psychological Needs of 
People Trump Task 
and Technology in 
Explaining 
Organisational 
Outcomes 
 
 
The Psychological 
Causation of 
Organisational 
Outcomes 
Interpret Defensive 
Behaviours and 
Dynamics 
 
Help Individuals 
Understand and Think 
Differently About the 
Dynamics they are 
Caught In 
 
 
Social Defences as 
‘Symptoms’ of Social 
Causes and Anxiety 
 
and What they go on to 
do as Institutions 
 
 
 
Use of Bion’s Group 
Theory to Capture 
Task-Avoiding 
Defences and 
Basic Assumption 
Defensive Patterns 
 
Primary Task as Social 
Referent 
 
Social Defences as 
‘Basic Assumption’ 
Behaviour 
 
Changing, Re-Aligning 
or Differently Adapting 
to Primary Task 
 
Naming the Basic 
Assumption Defensive 
Pattern gives 
Individuals Options to 
do Something Different 
Differentiating between 
Benign vs. Destructive 
Social Defences 
 
Inferring the 
Elementary Form or 
Mix Providing the 
Organising Logic and 
Values Guiding the 
Social Defences  
 
 
 
 
 
Working Hypotheses 
 
 
An Account of How or 
Why the Social 
Defences Came About 
 
Providing the Reasons 
and 'Because' Behind 
Interpretations 
 
 
Action-Research 
Intervention Offering 
Hypotheses, Facilitating 
Discussion, Allowing 
Client to Decide  
Course of Action 
 
Presentation of 
Working Note 
 
 
Same But With A 
Realist Causal 
Explanation: Indicating 
Causal Triggers, 
Mechanisms and 
Tracing the Social 
Processes 
 
 
 
 
Use of Bion's Theory  
to Make Society an 
Intelligible Field of 
Study 
 
Wells' Systemic Levels 
of Analysis 
 
 
Bion’s Innovation from 
Individual to ‘Group-as-
a-Whole’ Extended 
to Explain Social 
Dynamics 
 
Wells' Model Providing 
Psychological 
Interpretations of 
System Dynamics 
 
Observing and 
Diagnosing Work 
Cultures 
 
Group Relations 
Leadership Training 
 
Organisational Role 
Analysis  
 
Social Dreaming 
 
Listening Posts 
 
Using Bion and 
Reconceptualising 
Group Dynamics with 
Institutional and 
Systemic Dimensions, 
and Cultural Theory's 
Elementary Forms to 
Explain the Social 
Operation and 
Consequence- 
Generating Nature of 
Social Defences 
 
Incorporating  
Sociological and 
External Environment 
Lenses to Wells’ 
Systemic Levels 
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6.3 Diagnosis, Analysis and Policy: Coupling Social Defence Theory with 
Cultural Theory 
How to link? 
 
6.3.1 Dialogue between CT and SDT 
Cultural Theory (CT) and Social Defence Theory (SDT) are expert realist theories 
offering analyses of what lies ‘beneath the surface' of appearances. These respective 
neo-Durkheiminan and neo-Freudian approaches show epistemological compatibility. 
CT’s attention to thought-styles accounts for ‘how institutions think’ (Douglas, 1986)  
and offers profound explanations for why well-intentioned participants are bewildered 
by disagreements over moral preferences, explanations and policies. CT overlaps 
and extends psychoanalytic investigations of: 
 emotional experience (Armstrong, 2005) 
 group dynamics (Bion, 1961; Rice, 1965; Miller, 1990) 
 social defences 
 organisational cultures (Krantz, 2013; Hinshelwood, 2013; Menzies Lyth, 
1990). 
This is fortuitous as CT repairs omissions in SDT. Though SDT lacks institutional 
focus, SDT is not formulated so as to exclude CT (sociological) attention, notably to 
thought-styles (elementary forms). CT gives social and political dimension to 
psychoanalytic investigation. For example: 
 The elementary form or ‘settlement’ operating within collective emotional 
experience, group dynamics, social defences or culture, can reveal the 
underlying logic organising internal relations and the social values that 
animate practices. 
 Because thought-styles are ‘fractal’ (inhabiting individuals, groups, 
organisations and industries alike), CT can reveal rationalities in play on any 
scale. It explains reason to reason-ers. 
 Social defences (SDT) and thought-styles (CT) also allow for positive and 
negative feedback loops which reinforce or undermine institutions (though 
SDT does not incorporate such analysis at present). 
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Why incorporate cultural dimensions within accounts of how social defences 
operate? Because basic assumptions, such as 'fight or flight', may be more than a 
defence against the group's task: they likely represent an appeal to specific values, 
ways of thinking and acting in reaction to - up to - three discomforting contrary 
rationalities. 
Given any one of four available rationalities, we can infer what social defence 
constellation is built according to which rationalities it is reacting against; and what 
they may, in turn, influence or affect through the feedback processes they generate. 
We can explain why and how groups and social defences come to be the way they 
are, and forecast the consequences. 
For its part, we suggested that CT could enhance its analyses and forecasting ability 
by being alive to social defences born in cultural conflicts. Synthesis of CT and SDT 
allows us to treat shifting emotional experience within individuals, teams, 
departments, or organisations as evidence that re-alignments in elementary forms 
are occurring.  
CT posits that all elementary forms, however marginalised or seemingly absent, are 
always present, to a degree. Marginalised forms offer alternative thinking and 
leadership, and emerge when the dominant way of organising and thinking stops 
providing solutions. Institutions are forever ‘organising and disorganising’ (6, 2011; 
Thompson, 2008) and if mood ‘improves’ it may indicate that: 
 A marginal rationality is gaining strength, bringing hope to adherents and 
fresh solutions even to those who reason differently 
 A peace settlement between contending forms is made 
 Powerful defences have been created against disturbing alternatives and 
challenging possibilities hence ‘Whistling in the Wind’ by ‘closed minds’. 
‘Worsening mood’ may indicate that: 
 The prevailing elementary form(s) within an institution is struggling to meet 
acknowledged challenges (‘nasty surprises’) 
 Cultural realignment is occurring, animated by bad feeling on either side of 
disputed rationalities, remaking ‘institutions’. 
Notice that divining which of these is the case, calls for consultants who are alert to 
both SDT and CT, identifying reasonable feelings and defences.  
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The emergence of anxiety and defences in our client company suggested implicit or 
impending problems. Identifying where the social defences lay was realised for the 
‘senior team’, in Manufacturing and in Sales. This should have indicated that 
realignment of elementary forms (reasoning, thought-styles, values, preferred 
solutions) was occurring. But if cultural theorists do not take such shifts seriously, 
their analyses will clarify only after-the-event.  
 
6.3.2 Douglas and Menzies, to Durkheim and Freud and Back 
The theoretical underpinnings of social defence and cultural theory share many 
concepts enabling integration. Douglas (1982) was aware of the presence of 
structure (institutions) and agency (cultural animation) influencing outcomes. Menzies 
(1960), too, hypothesised that collective defences can inhabit organisational structure 
and culture. 
Durkheim and Freud also used concepts that apply freely to inter- and intra-personal 
phenomena. Thus, treating social defences as Durkheim's 'social facts' and as 
'anomie' captures their causes and operation. Similarly, Freud's 'moral anxiety' 
admits that anxiety can be social in origin and nature; ‘identification’ encompasses 
symbols, ideas and principles, which are markers for values and beliefs. 
Thus: 
 Defences are 'social facts' carrying “external expectations, obligations, beliefs 
and practices outside [of] individual consciousness” constraining and obliging 
individuals to act in particular ways. Sociality induces "internal psychological 
states" (Keat and Urry,1975: 82-86) 
 Defences are 'anomic' in that they occur when norms no longer bind and 
contain individuals. 
Thrown into disarray by the GFC, our organisation could not contain anxiety nor 
direct action, and social defences are typical in anomic settings. The social defences 
then produced actions, including actions which managers wished expressly not to 
take.  
 Individuals spoke contemporaneously of 'risks' and 'survival', suggestive of 
collective 'existential' changes in sense-meaning which aroused anxiety (see 
also Hogget, 2013; 2015; Boxer, 2013; 2015)  
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 We concur that identification and attachments are the psychological 
mechanisms through which Durkheim's 'individuals' become socially, and 
culturally, constituted (Hausner, 2014). 
 
Table 6.2 summarises the neo-Freudian/neo-Durkheimian argument.   
 
Table 6.2 Consulting with Neo-Durkheim and Freud 
Issue Finding Implication 
 
Emotional  
Warning-Signs 
 
Psychoanalytic Method and 
Social Defences  
Identify Mood Dynamics but 
not their Causes, Operation 
nor Consequences 
 
Cultural Theory 
Explains after-the-event and 
with too little understanding 
of intra- and inter-personal 
emotional dynamics 
 
‘Theory E’ Leaders do not 
take Social Defences 
seriously 
 
 
Weaknesses in one theory 
are repaired by the other: CT 
repairs the social gaps in 
SDT 
 
CT can be alerted to Social 
Defences and Emotional 
Dynamics when recognised 
as ‘Institutions’ animated by 
contending Thought-styles 
Means 
 
Understanding 
social defences 
as ‘Informal 
Institutions’ with 
positive and 
negative 
feedbacks and 
consequences 
 
Understanding 
defences as 
‘anomic’ 
 
Anxiety triggers 
defences and 
tightens 
identification 
and attachment 
to a thought-
style 
 
Treat CT and 
SDT as 
reversible such 
that the  
Dependent and 
Independent 
Variables of 
each can be 
swapped readily 
 
In doing so, 
Wells’ ‘Five 
Levels’ aid 
sorting of data 
 
Group 
Dynamics 
treated as 
Institutional 
Practices with 
Consequences 
that can be 
forecasted 
 
 
 
6.3.2 Using Wells 
Wells’ framework (1995) was one of three methods for sorting our coaching data. He 
invites consultants to link individual coaching urged by systems psychodynamic 
(ORA), with Burke and Litwin’s concern with organisational performance and change. 
Wells differentiates between five levels of “organisational processes”, ranging from 
the intra-psychic to the inter-organisational, within which behaviour and unconscious 
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dynamics derive (1995: 52-54). He recommends that “greater emphasis” should be 
placed on “interpersonal, group-level and inter-group processes than [on] intra-
personal processes” because “too often intra-personal analyses are made [that] 
prematurely indicts/blames individuals for an organisational problem” (1995: 74). 
Wells warns against psychological reductionism in psychoanalytic investigations of 
organisations. 
Wells followed Bion's group theory by shifting attention from the individual to the 
group-as-a-whole (Miller, 1998). This renders organisations and "society an 
intelligible field of study" (Khaleelee and Miller, 1985). While the attention-shift is 
welcome, Wells still only provides for psychoanalytic investigation albeit applied to 
larger systems. By assuming social dynamics and psychic dynamics are similar, we 
arrive at social defence theory's notorious ‘problem of change’. Psychoanalytic 
investigation – at higher ‘levels’ – will provide worrying signs of impending problems, 
without understanding ‘cultural’ causes and consequences. 
Wells is right to assume that psychological dynamics and emotions pertain within 
individuals, groups, departments and whole systems. With Burke and Litwin (1992), 
Wells indicates that psychological dynamics have ‘layers’ (embedded in structure, 
strategy, culture, work-unit climate, etc.) which are susceptible to different 
interventions (transformational, whole-scale change; transactional, targeted 
improvements). 
However, at each level, Wells still offers only psychological analyses specific to each 
level. We argue that SDT and CT can be applied alternately at all levels. In Lewin’s 
terms, the 'figure' and 'ground' of sociological and psychoanalytic analyses can be 
swapped repeatedly to find the cultural bases of defences and the defensive 
attributes of contending rationalities. Though more than willing to swap, initially we 
did not know how. 
Indeed, there may be rivals to ‘swapping’. In the next chapter, Foucault’s 
understanding of rationality and power (Flyvbjerg, 1998) will be evaluated as an 
alternative to SDT-cum-CT, as will the work of Emery and Trist (1965) who 
supplement Wells by urging organisations to ‘adapt’ to their environments.  
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6.4 Leadership and Institutions 
We have examined policies and social defences; the independent life of their 
institutional practices and the unintended, and undesired consequences. How did the 
institutions develop? Most immediately from the actions of different senior managers. 
And what is the relationship between leaders and institutions? 
Leaders are responsible, typically, for creating and changing ‘strategy, structures and 
systems’ - amending the formal institutions. But their actions, intentions and 
unconscious assumptions also generate informal institutions that reinforce or 
undermine the formal ones. Jaques (1998: 14-16) suggests that a leader's 
unconscious assumptions about why people work and whether they can be trusted, 
get built into organisational structures and systems. Hence organisations can be 
"trust-inducing" or "paranoia-genic”. He also suggests that what leaders value 
become "vectors" attracting others that "express force in a given direction”. We saw 
examples of this in some leaders’ policies.  
Schein (2004) writes about a similar relationship between leaders and organisational 
cultures. Leaders are in a position to change culture. But this is simplistic. In our 
organisation, contending thought-styles and defences meant not one organisational 
culture but up to four; such that leaders hardly led as such. Each can be said to have 
exercised influence, but not in concert. They pushed-and-pulled in different 
directions, creating unwitting pathways into Isolate Ordering (Fatalism). They 
possessed unconscious or "decentred" agency (Caldwell, 2005). 
What can leaders do to understand their impact? How can they direct their agency in 
ways that align with their intentions? Is ‘alignment’ possible given four contending 
rationalities? Table 6.3 discusses implications for leadership.  
  
  
178 
Table 6.3 Implications for Leadership 
What Why How 
 
Navigating Formal 
and Informal 
Institutions 
 
Organisations cannot meet 
all Contingences 
 
Rules and Roles are 
Interpreted 
 
Members and groups have 
Cultural Biases  
 
Organisations contain 
different histories 
 
And different anxieties 
 
Any system can be 
contentious and 
problematic, especially 
when circumstances 
change 
 
 
Notice what is done rather than what is 
said 
 
Ask whether systems aid primary tasks 
 
Find the 'go-to' unofficial leaders and 
engage their assistance 
 
Establish whether the task- and 
sentient- system reinforce or 
undermine each other 
 
Do members work around systems to 
get things done? 
 
Be alert to changes in affects 
 
Institutions’ 
Consequences 
 
Leaders’ unconscious 
beliefs and assumptions 
can generate informal 
institutionalised practices 
 
These can be rooted in 
reasoning that conflicts with 
other formal and informal 
institutions, with 
unexpected, undesirable 
consequences 
 
 
Policy directives are insufficient 
 
Know one’s biases and assumptions 
and how others respond to both 
 
See the combined work of institutions; 
how they 'replicate uniformity' and 
'diversify' 
 
Pay special attention to unexpected 
results 
 
 
Leadership is a 
Process Generating 
other Processes  
 
Treat Organisations as 
‘verbs’  
 
Organising 
Structuring 
Defining 
Accentuating 
Renegotiating 
 
 
Trace ever-widening circles of effects 
 
… including conflicting effects 
 
Uncover reticent differences between 
'espoused-desire' and 'real-desire-in-
use' 
 
 
Organisations ‘Think’ 
but usually not in 
unison 
 
Thinking and Opportunities 
are constrained by 
prevailing thought-styles 
 
But Opportunities are also 
created through novel 
‘settlements’ between them  
 
Leaders (and followers) can be taught 
to recognise thought-styles and 
recognise others as reasonable 
 
What ‘blinkers’ exist? 
 
What is animating reactions and 
resistance? 
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6.4.1 Navigating Formal and Informal Institutions 
Distinguishing formal from informal organisation (Soda and Zaheer, 2012; Gulati and 
Puranam, 2009) and treating the organisations as made up of several from both 
(North, 1991; Cason et al., 2009) was our approach from the outset. How can leaders 
do the same? 
Consultants can teach leaders what to look for and how to understand it. The clues 
are clearer when things are not working. 
Immediately after the GFC, managers at the second and third levels were in tandem 
with the senior team (leaders), and eager to address inefficiencies and failing 
practices. But within six months, enthusiasm turned to confusion and apprehension. 
Over time, what Manufacturing and Sales managers were doing to meet their KPIs 
was found to be contributing to problems. How they felt and what they did - not what 
they knew - indicated that what they would do and were supposed to do, showed the 
informal organisation at work. They defended against anxiety, undermining each 
other’s departments. The formal organisation was not aware of the extent of what 
was happening.  
 
Systems-psychodynamic methods for investigating collective emotion uncovered 
what was beneath the surface. Like consultants, leaders can also observe 
discrepancies between what people say, what they should be officially doing, and 
what they actually do. Leaders can recognise: 
 
 Hierarchical respect for formal rules 
 Egalitarian ‘enclaving’ and preference for informality and collegiality 
 Individualist creative competition and again, preference for informality 
 ‘Survivalist’ begrudging acceptance of formality among Fatalists ... and visible 
and hidden recriminations as things go wrong.   
 
This requires attending to these … in self and others; and getting to the source of the 
difficulties (and possibilities). Attention to the values as "vectors" that "express force" 
in a particular direction are also valuable data. It helps if leaders are aware of 
‘cultural biases’ in their evaluations of others and note their (inevitable) impacts on 
others. Systems-psychodynamic training can help leaders learn to use their feelings 
and hunches as a source of data/intelligence from which to develop diagnostic 
hypotheses ... treating their own feelings as evidence.  
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6.4.2 Institutions’ Consequences 
If CT is right then formal and informal institutions are inclined to collisions, not all of 
which are destructive to problem-solving. Policies and procedures, departments and 
teams, are formal institutions with intended purposes. But informal institutions find 
easier, more efficient ways of getting work done; or circumvent or defend against 
anxieties aroused in the course of working. 
 
Informal institutions are not ‘under-socialised’. On the contrary, they respect implicit 
conventions, but lack formal sanctions and incentives, making them difficult to direct.  
Douglas (1986) and 6 (2011: 58-61) stress the "causal significance of informal 
institutions over formal ones", because they can also be "critical in making it possible 
for formal institutions to achieve the leverage they do" and because formal 
institutions cannot be designed to meet every contingency. Observing their operation 
is a critical diagnostic skill. 
 
Formal and informal institutions are linked. Feedback reinforces or undermines 
neighbouring institutions affecting performance (6, 2011: 58-60) and how 
performance is assessed. Understanding confirming and disconfirming feedback 
should help leaders recognise unintended consequences and suggest which 
rationality to use to best effect, when, and of the need to ‘contain’ how others feel. 
 
The value of CT is in how easy it is to recognise four distinctive rationalities and how 
they offer a repository of alternative approaches to leadership. They can be heard in 
the thinking and differences that individuals express naturally, based on preferences 
developed in them through exposure to each way of thinking (and their inherent 
practical limits).  
 
Savvy leaders would draw on all four and contemplate the different solutions they 
offer. They are especially important during crises when fresh solutions are needed. 
Ironically, alternative ways-of-thinking are often present ‘under the leader's nose’. 
What is needed is that people voice what is truly on their minds, however contentious 
to other reasoning, making 'clumsy solutions' possible (Verweij and Thompson; 
2006). They suggest that 'wicked' (complex, large-scale) problems (Rittel and 
Webber, 1973) do not have one solution, but effective ‘clumsy’ composite solutions 
may emerge if all voices engage.  
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As there is ‘no cultural equilibrium’, any solution will create chains of effects; 
intentional and otherwise. Leaders are not omniscient but familiarity and respect for 
the four voices should help them understand organisational talk and consequences.  
Leaders’ thought-style will affect (and provoke) thinking among their ‘direct reports’, 
fostering: 
 
 Anxious and defensive (Fatalistic) attempts to accommodate leaders’ wishes 
 Exuberant (Enclaved) departmental solidarity against other departments 
 Painstaking (Hierarchical) updates to formal rules and punishment of deviants 
 (Individualistic) competition of one against all … 
 
… fostering new institutions.  
 
In the case study, leaders’ directives created not clumsy solutions, but uncontained 
social defences along a concealed pathway to Isolate Ordering. We stress that 
leaders should attend to: 
 Changes in affect 
 Informal institutions and their effect on tasks 
 The rationality of dissent 
 Feedback leading either to retrenchment in thinking or recognition of 
‘surprises’ 
 Their own biases and blind spots  
 Overcoming reticence in others 
 Defining possibilities ‘counterfactual’ to their way of thinking. 
 
 
6.4.3 Leadership affects Leaders 
Hosking treats leadership as a process (1988; Grint, 1997) to avoid treating leaders 
as individuals. This is how organisations become ‘verbs rather than nouns’.  The 
process, says Hosking, involves:  
 Structuring activities and interactions  
 Negotiating definitions of the social order 
 Promoting the values and interests of the social order (1997: 293). 
 
While this invites appreciation of their agency and consequences, Hosking fails to 
notice the cultural boundaries to reasoning. True, there will be intended and 
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unintended consequences. But what counts as a surprise will differ between each 
thought-style. Fatalist reason expects failure so a move into Fatalism provides refuge 
from confounded Egalitarian, Hierarchical and Individualist thinking. 
 
The post-GFC policies generated both types of consequences. The senior team 
members were satisfied with their initial desired effects so dismissed unintended 
effects as 'teething problems'. However, these surprised others, triggering confusion 
and anxiety, and creating social defences below senior management. The social 
defences working as informal institutions reacted with formally institutionalised 
policies that caused worsening difficulties.  
 
The value of culture theory is that it enables leaders to read the elementary form 
contained within any reasoning (theirs included) and the consequences they may 
provoke. Meanwhile, the value of a psychoanalytic perspective to skilled leaders is to 
alert them to defences which send followers running in different directions.  
 
Conflicting post-GFC policies gave rise to manifest confusion and apprehension in 
the levels below and then, social defences. Identifying the elementary forms driving 
both leaders' decisions and different institutions could have provided a real-time 
diagnostic resource for leaders.  
 
 
6:4:4 Leadership Parameters 
Leadership agency is constrained by available reasoning, and existing institutions.  
At best, four-way reasoning is available, but usually it is less. The irony is that the 
agency which alters existing arrangements sets new constraints on leaders once 
institutionalised. 
 
CT and SDT both suggest that Hosking (1988) and Schein (2004) may exaggerate 
leaders’ agency because different strategies suit different environments (Emery and 
Trist, 1965) and different moments within the organisation. Identifying the prevailing 
elementary form will indicate the following: 
 Imaginable changes 
 Push-back from countervailing reasoning  
 What may expand leaders’ scope. 
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Understanding the paradoxical interplay of agency and constraints is a valuable 
resource for leaders wishing to push the boundaries of possibility. Again, ‘switching’ 
between thought-styles allows leaders to encompass the geography of the 
possibilities they inhabit and understand why some of their interventions fail or 
generate unintended consequences. 
 
 
6:5 Pathways into Isolate Ordering 
Cultural theory also offers a way of organising besides markets, hierarchies and 
clans (Lindblom, 1977; Williamson, 1975; Ouchi, 1981). By adding just one extra 
thought-style, Fatalism multiplies the number of available ‘hybrids’ of the elementary 
forms (6, 2011). 
 
Isolate Ordering offers a plausible and viable way of organising under particular 
conditions. But it can be a trap. Surprises, change in external environments, or too 
many unintended consequences create crises that pressure leaders to do things 
differently. This can unravel the prevailing form(s). The Cultural Theory of 
‘disorganising’ (Thompson, 2008; Coyle, 1997; 6, 2011) suggests that when a 
prevailing thought-style reaches the limit of ability to explain or predict, we reach for 
other thought-styles which address their situational-needs. Each form suits different 
contingencies and types of change that leaders want to pursue (Diagram 6.1 below). 
That is, the forms are vulnerable to events they cannot explain or deal with (Coyle, 
1997: 69-70). 
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Diagram 6.1 Strengths, Weakness and Disorganising Tendencies of CT 
 
 
 
Transitions to new ways of organising rarely occur smoothly (Bridges, 2004 and 
1995). During transitional states, organisations may create unintentional pathways 
into Isolate Ordering as with our organisation. 
 
One pathway is created by leaders seeking to assert control or preserve their 
position during crises. Mars suggests that Isolate Ordering works well in constrained 
parts of organisations (2008). However, long periods of Isolate Ordering are 
dangerous especially if collaboration is called for. While regulation can promote a 
sense of order, containment and predictability; it can also stifle. If combined with low 
integration, it compromises communication, trust and debate. It undermines 
solidarity, and increases individual isolation (anomie). In extremes, Fatalistic 
leadership oscillates between highly controlling, absent or arbitrary, further 
undermining trust and inviting rule-bending - an unhealthy variety of resourcefulness. 
Elements of mild and extreme forms were displayed in the case.  
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It is to leaders’ advantage to recognise and understand pathways into Isolate 
Ordering and the dangers and benefits of Fatalistic reasoning. The case has much to 
teach about transitions to fatalism and about getting stuck there.  
 
 
6:5:1 Isolate Ordering as a Viable Form 
The high-regulation-low-integration position in CT was first labelled ‘Fatalist’, referring 
to beleaguered thinking and those squeezed-out by three more viable ‘ways of life’. 
'Fatalism' could be expected among the marginalised, disenfranchised and 
downtrodden (Thompson et al., 1990). Cultural Theorists were interested in what 
would sustain Fatalist reasoning, weak social ties, a view of the world as cruel, and 
the actions consequent of this position: passivity, indifference and resignation. Ellis 
saw this as a learned response to experiences of limited agency (1994), not 
personality types. 
 
However, as CT developed a theory of institutional dynamics (Douglas, 1986; Coyle, 
1994 and 1997; 6 and Mars, 2008; 6, 2011 and 2015); understanding grew that 
Fatalism was a viable way of organising, sustained by a type of leadership described 
by Coyle as "oppressive" or "despotic" (1994 and 1997).  Fatalism has been re-
labelled as Isolate Ordering, in recognition of the experiences of leaders as well as 
pessimistic subalterns being organised in this quadrant of the Grid-Group Typology.   
 
‘Oppressive Leadership' (Coyle, 1994) describes the experience of the highly 
regulated and lowly integrated. Coyle highlighted how low social integration and 
sense of autonomy which Isolates share with Individualism, are subverted by 
extreme constraints indicative of ‘despotic’ oppression. Coercion frustrates and 
subverts autonomy and trust (1994: 225) producing marked qualitative differences 
from Individualism. Unlike Hierarchical leaders who “internalise their externalities [or 
difficulties] rather than impose costs on others”,86 despots pass on the costs and 
constraints to others, not for collective benefit but for preservation of their dominance. 
Perri 6 (2011) noted there would likely be other aspiring despots vying for the top 
spot, encouraging the incumbent despot to be increasingly suspicious and despotic 
                                                          
86
 What economists refer to as “externalities” are the unintended negative consequences or “public bads” such as pollution 
and other technological and health hazards which free markets generate and are not particularly good at dealing with. These 
are in contrast to “public goods” such as social infrastructure, public health, education and other social services that free 
markets generally do not provide as well as governments and who generally do not impose the costs on users (see, for 
example: Harford, 2011 and Sachs, 2011). Comparing what free markets can and can not provide with government regulations 
and services is what cultural theorists frequently use to compare the operation of markets with hierarchies (Thompson, Ellis 
and Wildavsky, 1990). 
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but also politicking below. Coyle writes that by understanding Fatalistic leadership, 
we can clarify and predict forms found in the three other positions.  
 
Isolate Ordering subverts the autonomy that markets need. Duty and obligations to 
others found under Hierarchy and equality associated with Egalitarian organising, are 
compromised by coping at the expense of others (Coyle, 1994: 224-26). Isolate 
Ordering fosters two positions - "despot" and "serf”. The despot inclines towards 
arbitrary rule (6, 2011; 2015 and unpublished): “organisations buffeted by pathologies 
may tend in this direction or ... be viewed that way by their members” (Coyle, 1997: 
64).  
 
By synthesising SDT with CT, a key finding is that these conditions foster, 
consolidate and entrench social defences, resistant to attempts at non-despotic 
leadership. Each thought-style incurs risk, but our study speaks principally to risks in 
Isolate Ordering. This capability of CT to use implicit values and social patterns as 
suggestive of each other (Thompson et al., 1990) enables any quadrant to produce a 
theory of organisation, and we agree that it is better to see high regulation/low 
integration as a way of organising, not a residual category for the dispossessed (6, 
2011).  
 
 
6:5:2 The Organising Genius of Despotism at Large- and Small-Scales 
Orwell’s (1949) novel 1984 provides a brilliant exploration of Isolate Ordering where 
life is experienced as Hobbesian and leadership is Machiavellian. The 'social 
contract' of Locke or Montesquieu is missing (Smith, 2012). Ezrow and Frantz's 
(2011) analysis of authoritarian regimes finds features typical of Isolate Ordering, 
including: 
 Perpetual danger of coups 
 Corruption and cronyism 
 Policy Gridlock 
 Worsening conditions for those below. 
 
Mafia organisation is a case in point, displaying Isolate Ordering throughout. The 
Mafia boss is effective by Fatalistic standards (see Mars, 2008; Douglas and Mars, 
2003). Nevertheless, even for leaders, life is anxiety-fuelled and dangerous, forcing 
all to be in a state of ‘constant watch’. Risks are delegated, placing the lowest in 
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worst danger. Criminal street gangs are organised similarly and are just as durable. 
In contrast, Terrorist organisations which may appear similar, would likely display 
hierarchical coordination on top, charismatic Individualist recruiters, and Enclave-
designed missions (Douglas and Mars, 2003). 
 
Our warning to leaders and followers is clear: difficulties in eradicating organising 
principles, which institutionalise dismal outcomes for the majority, are a testament to 
the viability of Isolate Ordering. The longevity of Totalitarian regimes is a case in 
point.  
 
In ‘failing (democratic) states’ (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013), the rule of law is 
tenuous; judicial institutions and markets cannot be relied on. Rules are enforced 
intermittently, fostering rent-seeking by office-holders. Public goods and services, 
typical of Egalitarian reasoning, are moribund. Public safety is poor. These are 
graphic illustrations of the powerful organising capabilities of Isolate Ordering.  
 
Though Isolate Ordering has a powerful self-organising logic, other elementary forms 
provide repositories for different organising principles which leaders can reach for.  
Procedural justice typical of Hierarchy, Enclave solidarity, and creative freedoms 
associated with Individualistic reasoning may each prevent staff from leaving, and 
each harness people’s commitment and best efforts in different ways. 
 
But our case illustrates that if leaders create unintentional pathways into Isolate 
Ordering and if its organising principles go unchallenged for too long, leaders and 
followers may have to continue that way, maintaining power while diluting legitimacy 
and impoverishing, even with survival as an outcome.  
 
An individualised ‘bunker mentality’ affected commitment to the whole. Our coaching 
data found individuals with reduced initiative, and unwillingness to exercise the 
discretion for which they were qualified (as did Menzies’ nursing staff). Camaraderie 
diminished and there was unwillingness to hold difficult conversations or engage in 
teamwork. Duty and obligation to the whole were being eroded, and activity was 
more opportunistic, defensive and survivalist. Functional activity was stalling and 
feedback increased frustration, erratic activity and a certain calculating indifference. 
This undermined followers who complied too readily with conflicting directions. 
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6.5.3 Inadvertent Isolate Ordering 
In the case study, Isolate Ordering was inadvertent and unintentional. It took hold 
while dealing with existential risks posed by the GFC by increasing regulation and 
reducing integration. If leaders (and this researcher) had been more aware of the four 
sets of organising principles invoked by moving any organisations in either direction 
along both Grid and Group dimensions, our experimental capability would have been 
enhanced. With training, sensitivity to the effects even of small changes can be 
gained, enabling attention to the specific empirical outcomes to many small 
experiments (and not just to the effects of catastrophic experiments). And while 
running these tests, one needs to notice how changing the organising logics and 
practices begins to affect how institutions think and ‘what there is to feel’.  
 
These sensitivities should enable us, for example, to judge when Isolate Ordering is 
beginning to be entrenched. This will feature in formal and, especially, in an 
organisation’s informal institutions; in political manoeuvring and defensive strategies. 
We can learn from democratic governments and political parties as leaders begin to 
lose their grip and party members start apportioning blame (for unpleasantness), and 
passing constraints onto others (widening anxiety). Leaders, then, can treat their own 
(defensive) feelings as evidence of Isolate Ordering and their unintentional 
contributions towards it (6, 2015) while buffeted by crises (Coyle, 1997). 
 
Social defences will appear. Table 6.4 below summarises arguments where Isolate is 
legitimate and when it is problematic.  
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Table 6.4 The Organising Logic of Isolate Ordering 
What is it? - High Grid/Low Group Ordering 
- Calls for ‘realism’ and ‘urgent action’ under conditions of ‘real and 
present danger’ 
- ‘Tough Leadership’, ‘Difficult Decisions’ 
- ‘Survival’ 
- ‘Game Playing’ 
- ‘Screw Others before they Screw You’ 
 
Recognisable in: 
- Arbitrary Rule Changes 
- Inconsistent Rule-Enforcement 
- Opportunism and Cynical Treatment of Others 
- Coping Mechanisms 
- Mistrust 
- Undisguised Coercion 
- ‘Breath-takingly Bad Behaviour’ 
Form of 
Power 
Isolate Ordering is ‘a law unto itself’: 
- Legitimacy is low 
- Democratic consultation dismissed as ‘time-wasting luxury’ 
- Despotic Control 
- Patriarchal Control 
- Fratricide 
- Matricide 
- Regicide 
- Hostile Take-over   
When 
necessary? 
- When time is of the essence (crises) and risks are extreme then 
centralised ‘command and control’ and seizure of resources can be 
very effective 
- When demands exceed the capacity of existing processes to meet 
them 
- Unprecedented Circumstances for which no Rule Book exists and for 
which Experts have no answers 
- Market chaos 
Why 
Dangerous? 
- Corrosion of those systems that do work 
- Incapable of complex coordination and discipline 
- Rewards ruthlessness rather than merit 
- Breeds indifference towards others 
- Fosters Deviance 
Pathways 
Into Isolate 
Ordering 
- Recipe = Any Simultaneous  Increasing of Regulation and 
Undermining Integration ('command and control' and/or 'divide and 
rule') 
From the Hierarchical Position: 
- Leaders who do not uphold Rules 
- Leaders who flout regulations intentionally to get things done; or 
'turning a blind eye’, ‘blinkering and continued rhetoric’ (Mars,1982; 6, 
2014)   
 
From the Egalitarian Position: 
- Failure of a Popular Grand Project 
- Loss of a Charismatic Leader 
- ‘Comrades’ who 'Defect' or do not uphold group norms or principles 
- Complete Defeat of an Enclave 
 
From the Individualistic Position: 
- Market Crashes 
- Unregulated Competition  
- Losers pay heavily (Germany post-WWI gave rise to Hitler: … Greece 
2015?: but not Germany/Japan post-WWII - debt eventually forgiven) 
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- Broken Deals 
- Unregulated Disruption (Mars, 1982; 6, 2014) 
How to 
Escape? 
- Change in leadership (6, 2015) 
- Recognition and Reward for loyal subalterns 
- Amnesty 
- Peace and Reconciliation 
- ‘Surprises’ which are accountable from Hierarchical, Egalitarian or 
Individualistic positions (see Diagram 6.1) 
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Chapter Seven: Rival Explanations and Anticipated Objections   
 
The validity of realist causal explanations can be enhanced by accounting for 
possible alternative theory-explanations and objections and why these could not 
account for the case as well as the ones chosen. This chapter examines and 
addresses some of these challenges. Three types of alternative or rival explanations 
will be examined. These arise from organisational strategy; rival models of 
organising, culture and change; and analyses-interventions based on power.  
 
This chapter also identifies possible objections that can be directed at why SDT, CT, 
and the distinction between types of change - and not other theories or concepts - 
were adopted in the research. These will be examined first.  
 
 
7.1 Potential Objections to Theories and Models Chosen 
 
Social Defence Theory 
Regarding SDT, there are no easily identified rivals in the psychological or psycho-
social or sociological literatures. Its emphasis on collective defences against anxiety 
in the workplace that form unconsciously, and carry consequences to organisational 
performance, is unique. 
  
Hochschild's (1983) emotional labour refers more to the nature of specific work and 
how employees are expected to manage their emotions in accordance with official 
guidelines and expectations. While there may be a contradiction between official 
rules and the appropriate feelings employees should show, it pre-identifies the type 
of roles and labour in which employees are expected to display the requisite emotion. 
It does not focus so much on how emotional defences may arise. Defences, for 
example, may arise in non-emotional-labour work, or how it can be used to diagnose 
organisations or facilitate change. Similarly, the sociology of emotion and its 
application to organisational behaviour (Fineman, 2000), simply, but importantly, puts 
emotion on the map, as distinct from thinking, judgement or decision-making, albeit 
influencing them. The focus is on how different theoretical traditions apply it to 
culture, subjectivity, social relations and power (Harding and Pribram, 2009; Burkitt, 
2014). But it is not intentionally practice-based like SDT, though it may be utilised 
implicitly. 
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Nor does the sociology of Goffman or Garfinkel, that draws on the pragmatist notion 
that knowledge should not be abstracted from practical contexts (Outhwaite, 2005), 
address the same terrain as SDT. Goffman focused on how social roles are 
performed, and how individuals move between 'frontstage' appearances, and 
'backstage' impression-management. Garfinkel, like his contemporary Goffman, was 
interested in the 'dramatic structure' of social interaction and the reasoning 
individuals use to define situations in particular ways, how order was maintained in 
social interaction, and the implicit rules that guide and may be breached (Outhwaite, 
2005).  
 
Kelley's personal construct theory and repertory grid technique (Fransella, 2005) 
which covers some of the analytic ground that a combination of SDT and CT seeks, 
focuses more on individuals rather than groups or collectives, to interpret their 
experiences and how they construct meaning. It seeks to identify the values, beliefs 
and assumptions individuals use. It could potentially be used with groups but this 
does not include how group dynamics, defences, or underlying social principles of 
design, or the conflict CT postulates through the presence of four competing 
rationalities may influence social outcomes, regardless of whatever meaning 
individuals may place on them. These may be defensive manoeuvres or personal 
justifications, placing individuals in the best possible light.  
 
 
Cultural Theory 
Much of the remaining chapter addresses alternative theories and rivals to CT from 
the organisational literature, such as Mintzberg, Quinn and Schein. This section 
addresses the types of theories and approaches to culture used in organisations and 
how CT stacks up. The work of Smircich (1983) who initially mapped, and Martin 
(2002) who took up, the different theories and approaches to culture will be 
examined.  
 
CT is relatively unique in being an institutional theory of culture that posits how there 
are present four competing rationalities that co-exist in some way or shape within any 
specific culture, and how organisations are likely to have several cultures, each with 
its own internal competing rationalities, co-existing with the whole. One of CT's 
strengths is that it has an in-built theory of change. It does not rely only on external 
forces or "exogenous" shocks to bring about institutional or cultural change, but 
shows how culture can change from within or "endogenous[ly]" (Mahoney and 
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Thelen, 2010) from the weight of its own contractions, perpetual self-reinforcement, 
or inability to adapt to changing circumstances.  
 
In comparing the concepts of organisation and culture, Smircich identified how both 
are concerned with how social order is maintained or changed (1983: 341). This 
overlaps with CT. In reviewing the literature, she also identified two distinct 
approaches to culture which carry implications of whether, or how, culture can be 
changed. Culture can be philosophically approached as a "critical variable" which 
implies it is something an organisation has and can therefore be "instrumentally 
changed" or manipulated; or it can be approached as a "root metaphor", suggesting 
that culture is what an organisation is, implying it is not so flexible or amenable to 
change. Nevertheless, she importantly identifies the normative tension between its 
different proponents who frequently, but not always, overlap with Beer's (2008) 
distinction between how proponents of ‘Theory E’ or ‘O’, respectively, approach 
change.  
 
The value of CT is that at its heart are the normative conflicts that play out within, and 
between, cultures. It encompasses both approaches but is neither constrained nor 
governed by them because of its in-built theories of change and values-conflict. 
Analytically, it allows both approaches to be on the table. This is how culture was 
approached in the research, thanks to CT. Moreover, as Greiner (2008) has noted, 
since 2000, there have been moves in the change literature to bring together 
strategic and OD approaches, with all the normative tension this entails, and how 
both are required to understand organisations and to change them. CT has an 
explicit awareness of these.  
 
Martin (2002) identified three more practice-based, rather than philosophical, 
approaches to understanding culture and change. Compared to Smircich, these 
represent potential rival approaches to CT. She identifies these approaches as:  
 Integration: or "an oasis of harmony and homogeneity" oriented toward 
organisation-wide consensus, consistent relations between cultural elements, 
while excluding ambiguity 
 Differentiation: as "separation" of sub-cultures with "the possibility of conflict" 
oriented to consensus within sub-cultures but not between sub-cultures, 
where ambiguity is channelled to other sub-cultures  
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 Fragmentation: as "multiplicity and flux" where a lack of consensus occurs 
throughout, ambiguity is acknowledged and there is no clear consistency or 
inconsistency between sub-cultures (2006: 94-111).  
 
Martin suggests all three approaches need to be adopted. The value of CT is that all 
three are implicitly subsumed under the one theory, rather than an approach which 
shifts between several models at once. A similar distinction was identified by Wallace 
(1970) within anthropology of culture as either a "replication of uniformity" or the 
"organisation of diversity”. CT addresses this in a similar fashion.  
 
 
Transformational Change versus Planned Change 
Burke and Litwin's (1992) distinction between "transformational" and "transactional" 
change, which makes a similar differentiation between "types" of change models 
found in the literature (Burnes, 2009), was used as it draws attention to where 
change needs to be directed. This distinction helped identify why SDT had a problem 
with change.  
 
Theories or models that focus on 'how' to affect change, such as planned change, 
top-down versus bottom-up change, or emergent change were less relevant to the 
research. This is because the focus was more on where change needs to be 
directed, and how we understand this; rather than how to actually facilitate change. 
These 'how' models do not tell us where to focus, but how we need to go about 
change, and take as given that a diagnosis and a change strategy is already 
identified.   
 
Nevertheless, one such approach like Kotter's (1996; 1995) "leading change" that 
was not used, could be used to critique the consulting on which the research was 
based. His work outlines eight critical factors for why change efforts, like this case 
study, fail. This consultation fell into many of the traps identified by Kotter. In part, 
because the consultation was not set up initially to facilitate change, but found when 
social defences appeared and the intervention failed, it needed to understand why, 
and given SDT's acknowledged problem of change, what could be done to improve 
its prospects.  
 
Kotter's approach assumes that a change strategy is already identified and the 
purpose is to facilitate change. His first critical factor of “establishing a great enough 
  
195 
sense of urgency” was not part of the consulting brief. Nor did the organisation after 
the GFC, or at any time, actually embark on change but rather management of the 
fall-out.  
 
From this point, according to Kotter, things started to go wrong. The lack of “urgency” 
did not help establish a “clear vision” for change. For Kotter, without a vision, “a 
transformation effort can easily dissolve into a list of confusing and incompatible 
projects”. This is what happened, but more by default, rather than intention or design. 
Nor was Kotter's second critical factor of “creating a powerful enough guiding 
coalition” ever present, despite our efforts to point this out to the senior team, given 
the competing nature of their post-GFC policies. From there, every other factor in 
Kotter’s list was compromised. 
 
 
7.2 A Possible Strategic Explanation? 
The lack of an articulated strategy, especially after the onset of the GFC, loomed as 
a key issue throughout the consultation. The first sign was when the company lost its 
preferred supplier status with its largest customer, which guaranteed its high prices, 
'cosy' practices, and exclusive focus on quality. Overnight, it was forced to compete 
on price, quality and everything else with competitors. In Emery and Trist's (1965) 
terms, its external environment changed from the simplest "placid, randomised" type 
to a "placid, clustered” one.  
 
In such circumstances what an organisation knows about its environment becomes 
critical for survival (1965: 24-25). Historically, the company had chosen to focus on 
quality, knowing that sales and profit-ratio were protected. Now it focused on reigning 
in cost, and more efficient redesign. From an organisational strategy perspective, this 
indicates it took a "resource-based" approach (Wernerfeld, 1984; Carter et al., 2008) 
rather than being mindful of "market-forces" or "competitive advantage" (Magretta, 
2012; Grant, 2008).  
 
Had I known this, would it have made a difference? Probably, because it would have 
appealed to the senior team's business rationality, as well as quelling anxiety, theirs 
and the anxiety of those below, which I had mostly focused on instead. It may have 
even prevented the social defences from appearing, as it was the contradictory post-
GFC policies that best account for their development. This is a compelling counter-
factual possibility. 
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However, if we look at how the senior team applied a "resourced based" view, 
another picture also emerges. How it was managing this was not working. This 
suggested that a strong cultural dimension was undermining whatever strategy they 
adopted. Their history confirmed this. The company had been successful due to 
sharing a common ownership structure with its largest customer, rather than through 
its own efforts. Despite a new senior team, and the company's pre-GFC efforts to fix 
the ‘command and control’ practices, and to promote greater initiative and 
responsibility below; once the GFC hit, they appeared to be returning to features of 
isolate ordering. Similarly, all the evidence post-GFC indicated a strong cultural 
dimension in its inability to act or to solve problems. Had they adopted a different 
strategy post-GFC, it is difficult to imagine that they would have managed this one 
any better.  
 
Emery and Trist's paper highlighted two further environmental shifts. One occurred 
between 2008 and 2011, when the "placid, clustered" environment gave way to a 
"disturbed, reactive" one; the other in 2011 to a "turbulent field”. The first appeared 
as the company's own doing. Its on-going inability to solve problems allowed 
competitors to get on an equal footing and make inroads into the company's largest 
market share. The next occurred when the largest customer effectively turned the 
company and its competitors into suppliers of larger customers, rather than 
independent companies per se. In 2011, when this was pointed out, it still made no 
difference. 
 
Here, CT and SDT provided a better account of the culture the organisation had 
inadvertently created ... of social defences and a pathway into isolate ordering: 
similar to the one inferred pre-consulting. At this time, however, they had become too 
gridlocked to even contemplate a paradigm shift, even if it could appeal to their 
business rationality. Questions of strategy and paradigm shift, while correct, were no 
match for the cultural gridlock. But neither was the senior team open to a sole 
Tavistock intervention. When a cultural explanation, utilising CT and SDT was 
provided in the last intervention, it appealed to the one senior team member 
remaining. But this was too late: the company was searching for a new CEO and was 
in a holding-pattern.   
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7.3 Theories of Organising, Culture and Change 
Several models that covered the terrain of SDT and CT were identified as offering 
rival explanations. Three offering the most plausible alternatives will be examined. 
They each offer composite approaches to organising, culture and change. They 
include: Mintzberg's (1979; 1987; 1991) forces and forms in organisations; Quinn's 
(2001 and 1988) competing commitments framework; and Schein's (2004; 1996) 
relationship between leadership and culture.  
 
 
Mintzberg's Organisational Forms and Forces  
Mintzberg identified five component parts of organisations: a strategic apex, 
operating core, middle line, technostructure and support staff (1981). Their 
combination forms the basic structure of an organisation. Not all parts are needed, 
and they can combine in simple or complex ways, and in different sizes and shapes 
for the purpose of coordinating the organisation's work. Minztberg argues if their 
combination is not suited either to the task, situation or external environment, the 
organisation will not function effectively. There are five distinct configurations or 
organisational types that lock into naturally occurring cohesive and integrated 
systems. Each has its strengths and weakness, and each is better suited to particular 
situations. These configurations are designs that organisations can adopt to match 
their needs, size and purpose. They can also be used to diagnose the appropriate 
design. They are: entrepreneurial, machine, diversified, professional, and adhocracy. 
  
Change occurs through organisations being subject to one of five forces and pulls. 
The forces include: the pulling together of a dominant 'ideology' of values and beliefs; 
the pulling apart of 'politics', strategic debates and competing interests; the 'cleavage' 
of two or more forms confronting each other, creating ‘fault-lines’ or paralysis; 
conversion into another form or configuration; and a life cycle or evolution (1991). 
See Diagram 7.1 below. This captures how Mintzberg's forms and forces are 
dynamic and at odds with each other. Kets de Vries and Miller (1984) furnish an 
array of psychological-pathological styles or tendencies associated with each of 
Mintzerberg's forms. The latter is included because of its psychoanalytic concepts 
that allow comparison with SDT. With Kets de Vries and Miller, Minztberg's two 
models seek to do what SDT and CT were asked.  
 
Mintzberg also identified a number of 'pulls’ which include: the pull to “centralise” by 
senior management; the pull to “formalise” by the technostructure; the pull to 
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“professionalise” by operators; the pull to “balkanise” by middle managers; and the 
pull to “collaborate” by the support staff. Mintzberg suggests that organisations are 
faced with two on-going options: either to continually adapt at the expense of their 
internal consistency, which Mintzberg describes as “evolution”; or maintain internal 
consistency at the expense of external fit where they periodically undergo sudden 
restructure to achieve internal consistency with external fit or “revolution” (1981:12-
14). This change distinction is akin to Burke and Litwin's transformational and 
transactional change. 
 
 
Diagram 7.1 Mintzberg's Forces and Forms (1991) with Kets de Vries and 
Miller's (1984) Pathological Tendencies 
Entrepreneurial
Machine
Diversified Adhocracy
Professional
Direction
Proficiency
InnovationConcentration
Efficiency
Ideology/Culture
Political
Dramatic
ParanoidCompulsive
Depressive Schizoid
Cooperation
Competition
Forms & Forces Operating Style-Provided Pathological-Psychological Tendency
Mintzberg (1991), Kets de Vries & Miller (1984)
A System of Forces & Forms in Organisations
 
 
Mintzberg's forces and forms are parsimonious and compelling because, essentially, 
his research came from studying actual organisations and how they evolved and 
changed over time. They also capture several features of the organisation in the case 
study, and aspects of what occurred. But they left gaps. For example: 
 There was not one dominant ideological force, as Mintzberg suggests, but 
several institutionally-based competing ones. Competing ideologies within 
each of the policies and then the social defences, rather than politics per se, 
created the schisms. Within the senior team, there was more evidence for 
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uncertainty and anxiety underlying self-preservation, driven more through 
desperation rather self-advancement.  
 The widening schism or ‘fault-line’ between Manufacturing and Sales could 
have been conceptualised as two competing design-configurations 
confronting each other: one from a machine configuration in Manufacturing, 
and the other toward an entrepreneurial one emerging in Sales, and leading 
the organisation into paralysis. But these were driven more by the conflicting 
post-GFC policies, than their internal configuration. It also fails to take into 
account the role of the policies in generating the social defences, with both 
now operating to create outcomes. This offers a more direct and compelling 
analysis of the causes of problems. 
 Nevertheless, the strong engineering focus pre-consultation indicates the 
'pull' to professionalise and exert greater control by Manufacturing which 
represented the organisation's core strength and the reason it was originally 
‘spun off’ ten years earlier. But this does capture the reason for the post-GFC 
problems. 
 The pull to centralise does capture what the senior team did post-GFC, but 
not entirely. Pre-GFC, however, they were seeking to de-centralise. But this 
too, in Mintzberg's terms, could be partially explained through the senior 
team's attempts to evolve the organisation away from its Manufacturing or 
machine-configuration dominance, toward a more entrepreneurial design. 
But, these two configurations could not satisfactorily explain what the 
organising was 'evolving' into. This was better captured through the 
inadvertent increase in regulation and undermining of integration creating a 
pathway into isolate ordering.  
 There appeared a pull to 'formalise' aspects of the technostructure, especially 
in the introduction of the KPIs, but these were associated more with the 
senior team's pull to centralise. But both miss how this was the result of 
anxiety and self-protection rather than politicking. Similarly, the pull to 
'balkanise' that appeared in the middle levels - to protect their positions - was 
more about creating self-protective social defences rather than systems or 
procedures to ensure the positional authority of the middle levels.  
 Kets de Vries and Miller's (1984) pathological tendencies identify neurotic-
psychological traits associated with each configuration. Kets de Vries’ earlier 
work linked each trait with pathological tendencies in leaders. It lacks the 
collective dimension of SDT, or how such effects are generated such as CT's 
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institutional thought-styles. They impose psychological concepts associated 
with individuals that appear to criticise rather diagnose organisations.  
 
Mintzberg's forces and forms appear more descriptive of configurations and why they 
look like they do. They are design tendencies that may 'cleave' but only with 
configurations beside them in Diagram 7.1. They impose a character onto the whole, 
and not how the parts may be very different, reflecting different cultures or 
tendencies operating or their effects. Elements to the model are added to explain 
change and conflict but lack an underlying theory, such as CT's grid-group typology, 
which operates like an engine under the bonnet. CT allows for more variation than is 
commonly observed, and for how hybrid combinations of elementary forms may give, 
for example, a distinctive individualist or egalitarian character to a machine 
bureaucracy, or hierarchical or fatalist tendencies within an adhocracy. It also has an 
in-built theory of change, such as: how the less dominant elementary forms within a 
hybrid represent alternative leadership along with strategy, design and culture if the 
dominant configuration stumbles; and how change can occur through internal forces 
rather than only external, as is suggestive of Mintzberg.  
 
 
Quinn's Competing Values Framework 
Quinn’s framework (2001 and 1988) is similar to CT in its emphasis on the co-
existence of competing values influencing organisations, and its underlying 
construction. Quinn developed it as part of the wider interest in organisational culture 
of the 1980s that provided an alternative way of explaining what occurs within 
organisations. It seeks to explain why changes in strategy or design either do not 
take hold, or are undermined by underground competing cultural forces.  
 
Quinn (2001) arrived at his framework through four sources: 
 His interest in organisational effectiveness which had produced numerous 
studies and lists of variables, but how these differed from study to study, only 
adding to the confusion (2001: 60). 
 Insights from Peters and Waterman (1982) who highlighted how effective 
managers had a capacity for dealing with paradox. This was elaborated by 
Van de Ven's (1983) observation that most organisational theories could not 
account for paradox because of their need for internal consistency, along 
with how leaders utilise ethics and value judgements to inspire higher levels 
of motivation and morality.  
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Quinn saw such leadership as inherently related to culture which he argued is 
reflected in a set of values that convey “how we do things around here”. For Quinn, 
these “take on moral overtones”. Values, he suggested, are “so powerful, it is difficult 
to see past them [or] to recognise that there are weaknesses in our own perspectives 
and advantages in opposing perspectives” (2001: 60-61). He concluded there was a 
need for a dynamic theory that “could handle both stability and change [and] can 
consider the tensions and conflicts inherent in human systems”.  
 
 Third, whereas Mintzburg asked what effective organisations looked like, 
Quinn explored what the experts thought. He sought to get to the 
assumptions behind the studies on organisational effectiveness that could 
help make sense of the confusion (2001: 60).  
 He drew on four prominent theoretical frameworks in the literature. He placed 
them on a two-by-two matrix. One dimension focused on the degree of 
external or internal focus; the other on decentralisation emphasising the 
degree of flexibility or centralisation emphasising control and integration (see 
Diagrams 7.2 and 7.3 below). 
  
 
Diagram 7.2 Competing Values Framework (Quinn, 1988) 
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Diagram 7.3 Cultures, Leadership Styles, Ways Power and Influence are Used 
and Negative Zones of Each of Quinn’s Models of Organising (1988) 
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Quinn suggests that each model has a polar opposite in the diametric column; 
whereas each shares parallels with the two on either side. Each quadrant is a way of 
organising, with an implicit means-ends theory. Each mode tends toward a: particular 
culture, style of leadership, way that power and influence is utilised, and a negative 
zone which implies how a cultural configuration may start to unravel from internal 
inconsistencies and contradictions.  
 
The four models suggest the choices, values, messages and consequences of 
different designs. The axes are negatively labelled to show how criteria of 
effectiveness, if blindly pursed, become criteria of ineffectiveness, and how within 
each quadrant there is a negative cultural zone. But also, if no values choices are 
made, the organisation can be left without a sense of meaning and direction, or 
worse, conflicting messages. Similarly, organisational strengths can become 
weaknesses and the challenge for leaders is to continually manage paradox. This 
can occur, not only through drifting into a negative zone, but from a lack of clarity of 
choice and purpose, or drift into the middle (Quinn, 2001: 62-66).   
 
Much of what occurred in the case study can be explained by Quinn's model: such as 
the competing values and their associated organising logic underlying the different 
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policies, and how their joint operation created the confusion, apprehension and 
anxiety that gave rise to the social defences, and, even how the conflicting post-GFC 
policies were introduced without an overriding strategy to integrate, coordinate and 
implement them. Quinn's model could equally be used alongside SDT to indicate the 
inherent tendencies within the organisation that generated the social defences, or 
how the policies and social defences drew upon competing models, or internal 
contradictions in how they operated. Because of the clear links with organisational 
theory, Quinn's model would have arguably appealed to the senior team's business 
rationality, better than a model coming from anthropology.    
 
What occurs in Quinn's negative zone, or drift into the middle, is similar to 
explanations provided by CT. Positive feedback, for example, can begin to unravel 
any dominant rationality, whereas two competing rationalities may undermine clarity.  
 
Quinn's model adds organisational theory weight to the role of values, and their 
influence in organising and disorganising used in CT. The reason CT was used 
instead is because it provides a simpler, parsimonious, and easier-to-use model. Its 
high-low values for regulation-integration make intuitive sense, as do the thought-
styles, rationality and organising logic of each elementary form.   
 
CT's elementary forms captured, quickly and easily, the organising logic, values and 
thought-style operating in each of the policies and social defences, and how their 
combined interaction was creating an inadvertent path into isolate ordering. If this 
was used early in the consulting, it could have predicted the case outcomes that 
eventuated.  
 
Quinn's model was more cumbersome. Unless a manager is versed in organisational 
theory, what is meant by a 'human relations' model or 'rational' model needs to be 
explained. Similarly, cultural descriptions such as adhocracy and market, intuitively, 
overlap while belonging under the same decentralised/flexible focus.  
 
CT also suggests that any two or more forms may combine to form a relatively 
weighted hybrid. Quinn does not consider hybrids and settlements, only that forms 
sitting next to each other have more in common. This gives CT more ways of 
organising. While each elementary form can be functional or dysfunctional according 
to the circumstances, CT's 'fractal' quality (Thompson, 2008) suggests the 
elementary forms apply to an individual's preferences. In addition, they range from 
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the most informal institutional practices to departments, organisations, external 
environments and nations, allowing CT to highlight how there can be several 
competing cultures within the whole, while subject to external influences.  
 
CT explicitly holds that all four ways of organising will likely be present in some 
shape or form, in any sized grouping, and the many groupings that make up the 
whole. This indicates that conflict and change, along with paradox, as Quinn 
suggests, is always potentially present. But it is more the result of the less dominant 
forms representing alternative leadership, and rallying points for discontent 
(Thompson, 2008), rather than an unravelling through contradiction as Quinn's model 
suggests.   
 
CT's isolate ordering, while not inherently dysfunctional, or more or less dysfunctional 
than the other three, offered a useful metaphor for the type of dysfunction that 
purposeful organisations can drift into when too much anxiety or uncertainty unsettles 
leaders, triggering them to overly assert control, or more control than is necessary. 
This can work extremely well during a crisis, or to drive change in the short-term, but 
will start to undermine the more functional aspects of organisations such as 
collaboration, coordination, flexibility-initiative represented by the other three 
elementary forms that can be found in varying degrees in whatever organisational 
configuration. Instead, in functional organisations, too much isolate ordering can lead 
to expedient, short-term, survival tactics; arbitrary regulation or enforcement of rules; 
and the flaunting of formal systems and procedures. Unless it is absolutely necessary 
as a means of changing an organisation, or for its long-term coordination, this spells 
warning. The movement into isolate ordering, evidenced in the case study, better 
explained the cultural grid-lock and inability of the organisation to solve its problems 
or to coordinate its policies or for its departments to collaborate. This further fuelled 
the social defences as a means of self-protection.      
 
Quinn's model, like Mintzberg's, lacks an underlying theory or engine under the 
bonnet. As a result, it is more descriptive of the types of benefits or dysfunctions that 
can emerge.  
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Schein on Culture and Leadership 
Schein’s work on culture and its relationship to leadership, (2004) and his three 
cultures of management (1996), offer alternative ways of understanding aspects of 
the case. Diagram 7.4 and Table 7.1 summarise his respective models.    
 
Schein defines culture as a set of tacit assumptions about how the world is - and 
ought to be - that a group shares and which determines their perceptions, and 
behaviour (1996). These are learnt as a group solves its problems of external 
adaption and internal integration, and become valid enough to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to think about and do things (2004). He argues that 
leaders’ beliefs and values drive the creation of culture, or can change culture when 
new situations warrant (2004); and how competing, occupationally-based sub-
cultures can operate and undermine organisational performance and learning.   
 
 
Diagram 7.4 Schein's Three Levels of Organisational Culture (2004) 
Artefacts
Espoused Beliefs 
& Values
Underlying
Assumptions
Visible Organisational
Structures, Processes, Behaviours
(What you see, hear & feel)
Strategies, Goals, Philosophies
(What we say we do &
espoused justifications)
Unconscious, taken for granted
Beliefs, Perceptions, Thoughts & Feelings
(What we really do & the ultimate 
source of values & action)
Schein’s Three Levels of Organisational Culture
 
 
Schein's surface level of organisational culture is straightforward, but comes with the 
anthropological warning that outsiders may mistake or impose their own meanings 
onto what they see, hear or feel. His second level offers a view of how cultures 
develop - through the process of solving problems, adapting and integrating - that 
provide their on-going justification and existence. These transform into taken-for-
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granted, non-discussable assumptions, or his deepest level of culture, because they 
continue to work. At this level, they now operate more like rules that serve a 
normative and moral function of guiding members to deal with surprise, uncertainty 
and difficulty. Like Quinn and CT, values are central to understanding culture, but for 
Schein, it is their relationship to leadership that underlies his theory and change.    
 
 
Table 7.1 Summary and Implications of Schein's Three Management Cultures 
Culture Assumptions and 
Translation Difficulties 
Effect on Organisation Missing Sub-
Cultures and 
Relations  
CEO and 
Executive 
- Maintain financial health: 
focus on board, investors, 
capital markets 
- Tension between 
organisation-as-team vs. 
accountability-of-individuals 
- Maintain control or 
experiment 
- Values rules and systems 
over/or relationships and 
community 
- Assumptions of people: 
necessary evil vs. intrinsic 
value 
- Hierarchical vs. 
Individual vs. 
Community focus 
- Eliminate hierarchy or 
intrinsic to control and 
coordination 
- Direct or indirect 
control  
- Organisation as well-
oiled machine not 
needing people, but 
contractors; or Built on 
people, values, culture  
Senior Team - lone 
heroes or team? 
 
Middle Managers - 
collaborators, 
contributors or 
implementers?  
Engineering 
Technology 
- Designers of Work and 
technology 
- Linear, cause-effect, 
quantitative thinking 
- Optimistic can master 
nature 
- Pragmatic Perfectionists, 
stimulated by puzzles, 
elegant processes and 
machines  
- Prefer people-free 
solutions independent of 
human needs or foibles 
- Designing Humans 
Out of systems vs. into 
them 
- Over-engineer for 
quality, safety, elegance 
vs. people 
- Emphasise task 
system over sentient 
needs 
Sales and 
Marketing - usually 
more creative and 
people-oriented 
- Sales: 
merchandisers vs. 
contributors of 
buyers’ needs, 
wants 
- Marketing:  
subservient 
product-develop-
ment vs. orient and 
design for market 
Operator - Evolves Locally, in 
Operational Units, around 
core technologies 
- Based on Human 
Interaction, Requires: 
Communication, Trust, 
Teamwork = 
Interdependencies of 
processes and people 
- Efficiency depends on 
people's knowledge, skill, 
commitment 
- Requires: translation of 
rules and procedures, and 
capacity to learn and deal 
with surprise 
- Must follow 
assumptions from 
above - but incentive 
system and how they 
are managed may 
conflict 
- Must work to rule vs. 
at times, work around 
systems and managers 
to be efficient  
- Need to align task and 
sentient systems for 
efficiency and 
commitment 
First Line 
Supervisors - know 
from experience 
and assume their 
way is best 
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Schein's three cultures of management highlight how outside influences from 
individuals' occupational experiences and training, can influence behaviour 
independently of the organisation. It also captures how and where potential conflicts 
and ‘fault-lines’ can play-out because of sub-cultures. There were certainly aspects of 
these sub-cultures in the senior team and in Manufacturing, and to some degree, 
these influences did play out in their respective social defences. But, these alone 
were not enough to explain the influence of policies and social defences as 
institutional cultures. The policies, especially, incorporated groupings from across the 
three sub-cultures. Schein's three profession-based cultures may encourage a 
formulaic approach to understanding problems, rather than observation of what else 
may be contributing.     
 
 
Schein's "Test" of Culture and SDT 
The ways Schein conceptualises his deeper levels of organisational culture overlap 
with those of CT and SDT. For example, the “test” that Schein suggests that allows 
some espoused values and beliefs to transform into fully-fledged unconscious 
cultural assumptions, his third level, is not so much “whether they work or not [but] 
how comfortable and anxiety-free members are when they abide by them” (2004: 
29).  
 
This is in keeping with the "anxiety-culture-defence" view of culture in SDT 
(Hinshelwood and Skogstad, 2000: 16) which “mediates between the task, with its 
associated anxieties, and the defence” constellations that arise in response (Long, 
2006: 284). For both Schein and SDT, culture provides the means of dealing with 
anxiety. SDT may better explain Schein's idea of why cultural change is difficult and 
resisted, whereas CT explains why leaders' agency/rationality can change some 
cultures which share it more easily than others that do not.  
 
 
Schein's Purpose of Culture and the Contribution of CT 
How Schein defines culture is also similar to CT. Schein (2004: 32 and 13) quotes 
Douglas when he likens his deepest level of culture as a "thought-world"’ or "mental-
map”, referring to the common "habits of thinking" that are generated within the 
members of the group or organisation: culture as 'thought-style'. The way Schein 
describes culture as a set of assumptions that work to solve a problem is also similar 
to Douglas’ definition of institutions as conventions that coordinate members in 
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problem-solving. For Schein, any set of values, as long as they appear to work for 
the circumstances, can become cultural assumptions. For Douglas, it is around the 
values inherent in each of the elementary forms and how these reflect a particular 
way of organising.  
 
In both CT and SDT, culture is linked to how an organisation or group-as-institution is 
organised and carries out its strategy or primary task by being built into 
organisational systems, structures and work practices. This is only implicit in Schein, 
as the values a group uses to solve its problems.  
 
For CT, the values that sustain or pull a culture apart are the key organising and 
governance values found in political philosophy such as: liberty; equality; fraternity or 
the sense of duty and obligation to the whole, which includes fatalism. These viable 
ways of organising were what Douglas (1982) found in her research of the recurring 
themes of anthropological ethnographies in constructing her grid-group typology.  
 
 
Schein's One-Sided Emphasis of Leaders' Agency in Relation to Culture 
In CT and SDT, culture is not just a variable, as implied by Schein, that leaders can 
use to reinforce or change their organisations, but it is very much how groups, 
institutions or organisation are organised.  
 
Instead, Schein (2004) sees leadership and culture as two sides of the same coin. 
He suggests that culture begins with leaders who impose their own ways of doing 
things - and with this their values and beliefs - on a group. If the group is successful 
on an on-going basis, these become the underlying, taken-for-granted assumptions 
of his deepest level of culture. When this happens, it is culture that defines leadership 
and the types of leadership behaviours that are acceptable. If, however, the group 
runs into difficulties to the point where the assumptions are no longer valid, Schein 
suggests that leadership comes back into play. The work of the leader is then to step 
outside the culture and look for new ways of adapting or integrating the organisation 
that solve problems and, with this, develop new values, beliefs and ways of thinking 
and working. Schein's point is if the organisation and its culture are no longer 
producing the expected results, the ultimate act of leadership is to destroy the culture 
and start afresh.  
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The issue here is the degree of agency or control that Schein suggests leaders can 
exert over culture in creating, destroying or changing it. What is missing is the 
reciprocal cultural influences constraining leaders and how even the policies they 
create in turn constrain them. What we saw in the case study was that senior team 
members were just as much at the mercy of, and as ineffective in tempering, the 
effects of the policies they initiated, as those below. This is not because they did not 
use their agency as Schein suggests: they continually did. Nor were they any more or 
less effective than the ideal leaders that Schein speaks of. It is just that Schein, at 
least as far as this case study is concerned, overemphasises agency and power.  
 
Emphasising leaders' agency and influence reinforces the stereotype of leaders as 
lone heroes rather than also being team members and players, as much subject to 
psychological group dynamics and social institutional influences they find and 
inadvertently create, as those below. However, Schein is appealing to, and 
reinforcing, the self-importance afforded to them by their role which can as equally 
undermine leaders, as give them a springboard to change things. Schein's appeal to 
leaders represents only one way of creating change, and one that this case study did 
not find.  
 
The issue here is that it underplays the role and influence of an institutional 
conception of culture and of the different institutions or cultures co-existing within the 
whole, and how these exert their own influence independently of the individuals 
involved. The agency Schein attributes to leaders does not take into account the 
operation of the informal organisation; and informal institutions such as social 
defences, that leaders may not see, let alone influence. Nor, does he take into 
account that when institutions such as social defences are operating, change may 
become even more difficult to effect.   
 
 
7.4 Power, Rationality and Power Dynamics 
A totally rival explanation focuses on the role of power, and how it is rationalised, 
resisted, and shapes the context-specific rationality in which it is applied. This can 
apply to elements of the case, including:  
 The effect of the senior team and their internal dynamics 
 The different rationalities as thought-style they generated  
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 The social defences, especially below, if they are seen as resistance to 
power.  
 
However, it tends to reduce analysis to power and its exercise. This by-passes other 
factors such as the independent effect of institutions once they were generated; the 
social defences in the senior team; and poses difficulties in how to utilise during a 
change intervention. For example, naming dynamics as 'power' is similar to naming 
psychological dynamics, which the senior team resisted.   
 
Power mostly relates to the third stream of the organisational literature which focuses 
on critical and postmodern approaches to change. These emphasise: ethical 
concerns related to means-ends instrumentality of change (Smircich, 1983); the gaps 
between the rhetoric and the reality of planning and strategising (Whittington, 2001); 
different ‘bounded rationalities’ (Simon, 1997); and the role of power on what voices 
are heard and excluded (Clegg et al., 2006). A case study, undertaken by Flyvbjerg 
(1998), on the political, administrative and planning processes in Aalborg, a Danish 
town, is used to compare a power analysis to the one in this research. What occurs 
in senior-levels of politics can apply to the senior-level of large organisations.  
 
Flyvbjerg draws on an intellectual tradition culminating with Foucault through the 
ideas of Nietzsche, Machiavelli and Thucydides, who he suggests focus on the real 
rather than normative or values-based rationalities at work in politics.87 He seeks to 
demonstrate, through the political processes in Aalborg, how power defines 
rationality, which is context-dependent. He sees power not as an entity which is held, 
but exercised through subtle strategies and tactics: the principle being defining what 
is rational. Following Foucault, Flyvbjerg suggests that power is omnipresent, it is set 
within a dense network of relationships, and where there is power there is resistance. 
Power can be both productive and repressive. Its analysis requires the study of 
conflict and struggle,88 and focusing on what people actually do, not what they say 
they do or their stated reasons.  
 
Flyvbjerg's case study culminates in a series of propositions to answer the recurring 
pattern he observed: during the implementation of a project or policy, or what he calls 
                                                          
87
 By normative rationalities, Flyvbjerg means the Enlightenment's establishment of scientific method and 
analysis as the dominant or only rationality, and/or what actors in different situations espouse to justify their 
claims.  
88
 He suggests these are central requirements for sustaining social freedoms and democracy. In organisations, 
this applies to positional-based freedoms that role-holders can take up within organisational constraints.  
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"when idea met reality”, Machiavellian power-plays, Nietzschean will to power, and 
Foucauldian rationalisation-as-rationality resulted in the fragmentation of the project 
or policy. Table 7.2 provides a summary of Flyvbjerg's propositions (1998: 225-236). 
 
 
Table 7.2 Flyvberg's (1998) Propositions on Power 
Power Defines Reality - Power defines what counts as rationality and knowledge and 
thereby what counts as reality 
- Power does not limit itself to a given view or interpretation; but 
defines and recreates physical, economic, ecological and social 
realities 
Rationality is Context-
Dependent 
- Power blurs the dividing line between rationality and 
rationalisation  
- It is misleading to operate with a concept of rationality in which 
power is absent 
- The rationality of a given activity (practices) is produced in action 
by participants via the activity 
- When challenged, or required, rationalisation is produced 
Rationalisation 
Presented as 
Rationality is a 
Principal Strategy in 
the Exercise of Power 
- The freedom to interpret and use rationality and rationalisation for 
the purpose of power is a crucial element in enabling power to 
define reality 
- Where there is power there is resistance - rationalisations can be 
challenged 
- Rationalisations are often difficult to identify and penetrate - they 
are presented as rationality 
- Powerful actors may not reveal a rationalisation as power lies 
behind it 
The Greater the 
Power, the Less the 
Rationality 
- Kant: 'power unavoidably spoils the free use of reason' 
- As 'power corrupts' it 'spoils reason' - as 'the greater the power 
the greater the corruption', it 'spoils reason even more' 
- Rational argument is one of the few forms of power available for 
the powerless 
- Machiavelli places little trust in rational persuasion - he 
differentiates between those who can 'force the issue' for their 
purposes and those who must use 'persuasion' 
- Power finds ignorance, deception, self-deception, rationalisation, 
and lies more useful for its purposes than truth and rationality 
Stable Power 
Relations are More 
Typical than 
Antagonistic 
Confrontations 
- In contrast to Foucault who observed power relations as dynamic 
and reciprocal - they can at any time evolve into antagonistic 
confrontation 
- Flyvbjerg found stable power relations far more typical - 
antagonistic confrontations are actively avoided - because 
confrontations are far more visible, they are what get researched 
or publically reported - this leads to a biased representation of 
power relations 
Power Relations are 
Constantly Being 
Produced and 
Reproduced 
- Power relations are not immutable - they evolve and change - 
they demand constant maintenance, cultivation and reproduction 
- Flyvbjerg found business substantially more skilled at this - 
creating a 'semi-institutionalised' position from which to influence 
government 
The Rationality of 
Power has Deeper 
Roots than the Power 
of Rationality 
- Pre-modern relations of power based on class, privilege and 
tribalism - are more powerful than modern institutions and ideas 
such as democracy, rationality and neutrality - and often prevail 
In Open 
Confrontation, 
- 'Truth is the first causality of war'  
-  While Foucault places emphasis on knowledge-power and 
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Rationality Yields to 
Power 
rationality-power relations - Flyvbjerg found that where power 
relations become open, antagonistic confrontation - power-to-
power relations dominate - dictated by what works most effectively 
to defeat the adversary in situ  
Rationality-Power 
Relations are More 
Characteristic of 
Stable Power 
Relations than 
Confrontation 
- Rationality and power tend to stabilise and often constitute power 
relations 
- Stable Power Relations are not necessarily equally balanced - 
they entail no more than a working-consensus within unequal 
relations of dominance 
The Power of 
Rationality is 
Embedded in Stable 
Power Relations 
Rather than 
Confrontation 
- Because rationality yields to power in open, antagonistic 
confrontation - the power of rationality or 'force of reason' is 
weaker  
- But it can gain maximum effect in stable power relations 
characterised by negotiation and consensus-seeking  
   
 
Reduction to Power 
There are two types of problems associated with analyses focusing mainly on power. 
The first is the tendency to reduce everything to power dynamics and, by implication, 
to the actors involved who are seen as protecting or furthering their interests. Power 
is made the determinate, or what does the explaining. Other issues such as values 
differences, the role of uncertainty and anxiety, or the influence of institutions or 
external events take a back seat.  
 
What may not be asked nor experimented with, as this research did with social 
defences, is when is power better approached as cause, effect, or trigger? A similar 
problem occurs with strong versions of psychological or sociological analyses. Once 
explanations are reduced to either individuals or institutions, there is little room for 
alternative understanding. The same applies with other single-factor determinates, 
such as when self-interest is used as the behavioural foundation of economic theory 
or the explanation of political life (Sen, 1990; Mansbridge, 1990; Douglas and Ney, 
1998). Other reasons for behaviour - related to altruism, ethics and morality, or why 
people cooperate other than furthering their interests - can be overlooked. This is the 
weakness of any single-factor explanation. A psychological-only focus, frequently 
found in SDT, was criticised for this reason.  
 
Flyvbjerg's case study, while illuminating of political processes, is guilty of this. 
Machiavellian power-play, Nietzschean will to power, and Foucaultian rationalisation-
as-rationality, for Flyvbjerg, represent what is real. They are used to explain the 
recurring pattern that when a policy was about to be agreed upon or implemented, it 
would somehow fragment. He frequently noted how stronger arguments from weaker 
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opponents fail in the face of power - especially in the agreement phase of policies -
but how disagreeing opponents will gain extractions that frequently undermine the 
implementation of policies. This gives Flyvbjerg's propositions a good degree of face 
validity in any situations where policy is being developed, agreed upon and 
implemented.  
 
This makes his case study relevant to this research given the competing nature of 
the post-GFC policies, their effects in triggering the social defences as resistance, 
and how the social defences could arguably be seen as undermining, through 
indirect means, the intended implementation and effects of the policies.  
 
Flyvbjerg's desire to be pragmatic focuses on:  
 What he calls "real rationality" or "realpolitik" (1998: 6) during the workings of 
power, and its resistance versus the more normative rationalisations or 
accounts used by actors to justify their actions or push forward their claims 
 The "minutiae" of what actually occurs, when and how, and whether there is 
overt conflict or not, and how it plays-out or is suppressed (p. 7-8).  
 
Such analysis seeks to be explanatory and is in keeping with realist methodology and 
analysis.   
 
 
Power and the Problem of Intervention 
The second problem concerns intervention. This applies whether power is assessed 
as an issue or not. The two-way risk is if power is not seen as an issue, is this 
succumbing to dominant interests or is it a case of consultant-naivety? If it is made 
an issue, unlike in pure research which can stay more detached, it is difficult not to 
be seen as taking sides.  
 
When power and actor credibility - both of the senior team members and consultant - 
are at stake, it becomes difficult for consultants to play the role of psychological 
referee, so to speak, as one can with competing values or group dynamics. A 
consultation can risk becoming politicised, and be accused of cutting across or 
undermining authority lines, or it can be seen as challenging or succumbing to 
different power interests.  
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This was not something Flyvbjerg had to deal with. If he had, this may have altered 
his perspective or added complications, especially, as in this research, if an 
explanation was developed for use as intervention. This occurs when theory meets 
practice, as Kurt Lewin was acutely aware, leading him to suggest that 'the best way 
to understand an organisation', or for that matter anything, 'is to try to change it'. 
This, in turn, led Lewin to suggest 'there is nothing as practical as a good theory' 
(Burnes and Cooke, 2013).        
 
Nevertheless, issues of power in organisations, as in politics, are always present, or 
present as an alternative perspective. This is because in getting things done or 
getting what they want, individuals not only use formal means such as their roles, the 
authority attached to their roles, and official procedures, but at times rely on their 
personal power or influence (Obholzer, 1994).89 If we accept Flyvbjerg's assertion 
that 'rationalisation is presented as rationality’, then if such rationalisations are 
directly challenged they will most likely be denied. The challenge for intervention is 
not only assessing how important power is to the situation, but also how important to 
make it, given that this would be most likely denied and resisted.90  
 
This, it is argued, requires experimenting with seeing power as either cause, effect or 
trigger. Each choice carries different consequences for analysis and intervention. 
Three examples will be examined.  
 
 
Issues of Power as Effect or Something that is Triggered 
Firstly, given that the senior team resisted the use of both psychological evidence 
and interpretation of their not working as a team; they would most likely also resist 
any reference to power dynamics and underlying conflict. The challenge became 
finding alternatives to a direct approach. Such thinking in the research led to a focus 
on the causes and effects of social defences, rather than their only being causal. 
                                                          
89
 Obholzer (1994) makes a helpful distinction between leadership as a role; authority and authorisation as 
officially-sanctioned; and power as an unofficial personal ability to muster "internal and external resources". He 
notes that while authority is sanctioned from "above”, it importantly has to be taken-up from "within”, and 
needs to be earned from "below”. He invites consultants to look at the "authority/power" ratio both in a role-
title and how individuals take up their roles. He suggests that authority without power is mostly ineffective, but 
power without authority is prone toward dictatorship or despotic leadership.       
90
 The same applies when psychoanalytic interpretations of unconscious processes are offered. It does not deny 
their truthfulness, only that they cannot be independently verified. The challenge is both whether to offer them 
and if so, how. Trist who was Menzies' long-time mentor was originally very suspicious of her directly interpreting 
anxiety as he believed it would be resisted and perhaps undermine the consultation. This is why he chose, 
instead, to work with psychoanalytic insight in the background (Armstrong, 2012).   
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Offering this interplay between what caused the social defences, and what they may 
go on to cause, provides an explanation that may better appeal to the senior team's 
business or 'Theory E' rationality, as a guide to intervention. Approaching the issue of 
power in a similar fashion may also be more helpful especially for intervention. 
 
If power was seen as the cause of what was occurring within the senior team, to not 
focus on power dynamics may be seen as side-stepping the issue. But addressing it 
may be seen as playing a power-influence game, or worse, manipulating the existing 
balance of power. If, instead, it is seen as an effect or triggered by the GFC, the 
senior team's behaviour could be framed as dealing with a crisis. Reframing their 
behaviour as a consequence, and as appropriate, rather than manipulative or self-
interested as the naming of power may appear, was something they would more 
likely engage with than deny. Similarly, raising their lack of an overriding strategy as 
an effect of their still working-through of various strategic debates and choices, treats 
the problem as part of a process they will eventually solve, and not an over-sight 
which may imply ineptness and likely be defended against. Also, by treating it as a 
future cause of undesirable consequences, if not addressed, also puts the choice 
and control of what to do back into their hands. This does not undermine their 
authority or stature as senior team members.  
 
 
Power-Play or Primary Risk and Clumsy Solutions 
Secondly, we could interpret the different policies as power-plays by individual senior 
team members: as ‘strutting’ their credentials as alternative CEOs. Or, we could 
interpret the lack of an overriding strategy as evidence of covert conflict and 
resistance to one view winning at the expense of others. Both are in line with 
Flyvbjerg's propositions.  
 
However, given the resistance that was already encountered during interventions, 
naming this, if not done diplomatically, may open up a Pandora's Box and risk 
aggravating an already anxiety-fuelled situation. Instead, by not taking the strong 
version of power as a causal approach, allowed other evidence to emerge. This was 
pointing to the senior team members' sense of uncertainty; anxiety; their doing their 
best to avoid bad decisions and to survive in their roles while keeping the 
organisation afloat. This is better seen as their dealing with what Hirshhorn (1999) 
refers to as 'primary risk' or the anxiety and uncertainty associated with a choice of 
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which strategy to pursue. Such anxiety keeps leaders awake at night and is a good 
example of psychoanalytic interpretation being used in the background.    
 
At the same time, there did not appear to be signs of overt or covert conflict between 
senior team members, nor did they seek to undermine each other’s domains or 
chosen means of addressing problems. With their direct reports, they pushed their 
own policies and preferences, while not undermining those of their colleagues. When 
faced with evidence of conflicting directives coming back at them from below, these 
were diplomatically side-stepped. This, too, was more suggestive of uncertainty and 
not knowing what to do, rather than playing politics.  
 
Nevertheless, it was also evidence of senior team members’ 'power defining reality' 
and of 'rationality being context-dependent', at least within each leader’s domain. 
And, as Foucault suggests, where there is power there is also resistance. This could 
be seen as evident in how those below reacted. While on the surface they complied, 
it did slowly trigger social defences. There was also evidence of 'stable power 
relations being more typical than antagonistic confrontation’. This certainly applied to 
the senior team. Individually, they were protecting their own power base by not 
openly challenging their colleagues which mutually reinforced their joint power-base 
as the senior team.  
 
But such insights are more descriptive of the obvious, adding a more nuanced 
understanding of what the senior team were doing and their effect on those below 
and the organisation, rather than representing a rival explanation.  
 
Instead of seeing the policies as evidence of power-plays by individual members of 
the senior team, we focused on their effects as competing institutions generating 
unintended consequences. This may have allowed the senior team, individually and 
collectively, to engage with this. Similarly, for the purpose of intervention, even if the 
assessment is one of power struggle, reframing and working with it more in terms of 
strategic and normative differences - as suggestive of a clumsy-solutions approach 
within cultural theory (Verweij and Thompson, 2006) - may allow alternative ways of 
thinking to enter into a solution-focus.  
 
The value of the concept of 'primary risk' is that it focuses leaders’ attention not on 
nebulous anxiety per se, but the actual risks associated with different strategic 
options they must choose from. The value of 'clumsy solutions' is that it focuses 
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attention not on conflict, but on normative differences that represent viable, 
alternative approaches and solutions to the problems they face. Together, these two 
models may allow team members to better tolerate, or cope with, their uncertainty 
and anxiety, and to voice different perspectives toward finding a workable but clumsy 
solution.  
 
 
Social Defences as Power through Resistance-to-Power 
Thirdly, if we develop the idea of social defences as a form of resistance to the 
effects of the rationality-as-power of individual members of the senior team, this can 
provide an interesting twist on conceptualising social defences. Just as we have 
reconceptualised social defences as informal institutions generating their own 
independent feedback and consequences on the individuals involved and the 
organisation; reconceptualising social defences as resistance similarly opens up 
other possibilities.  
 
Social defences, by their nature, are covert and operate unconsciously. They avoid 
direct 'antagonistic conflict' which Flyvbjerg suggests is more indicative of 'stable 
power relations’. They help organisational members maintain the semblance of 
stable relations between the levels and functions while also voicing their resistance-
as-complaint to what they are experiencing.  
 
If social defences are presented as resistance-as-complaint - rather than as 
something psychological and all that comes with such a label (which is commonly 
resisted and denied) - it can be offered as an opportunity to explore the push-and-pull 
as a kind of Lewin style 'force field analysis' within the organisation. This may provide 
an easier method of working with social defences between the groups that are 
exhibiting them, and the groups or institutions they are reacting against and/or 
affecting. This can become an organisational-level or inter-group rather than team-
level intervention and help the effected groups across the organisation identify the 
different pushes and pulls between them. This is the first step to understanding each 
other’s needs and complaints. Through voicing these, they could agree upon 
solutions that could better navigate - or find alternative ways - around the grievances 
by the different groups better understanding and helping each other.  
 
What such an intervention suggests is working with power - as was suggested with 
psychological insight - not in the foreground, but in the background. Here, power and 
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resistance could be named as something natural and a given in all organisations. Not 
as a rallying point to take up arms and defensive positions, as it can be if it is bluntly 
interpreted. The challenge and solution is finding ways of understanding the push-
and-pull in order to address both the causes and the effects of social defences. 
 
In a similar way, with the social defences in the senior team, the push-and-pull could 
be seen more in terms of their relationship to changed environmental conditions, and 
its effects on them as individuals responsible for functions and as a team responsible 
for the organisation. Helping team members identify how they are being 'pulled' by 
the changed circumstances, can help them begin to find better alternatives to 'push' 
back at these. Their own social defences could be reframed as an opportunity to 
assert power-as-resistance. This may have been a better way of helping them 
engage both with their social defences but also to find a strategy they could identify 
and be used to address the changed environmental conditions that the organisation 
now had to navigate. Being proactive in finding ways to influence the external 
environment is very much a solution that Emery and Trist (1965) identified as type 
four external organisational environments or turbulent fields.   
 
These examples highlight the value of working with power, as was done with 
psychological-insight in this research, in the background rather than foreground of 
analysis and intervention. This utilises Flyvbjerg's insights, as a rival hypothesis, as 
one of many to be examined.     
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
The research set out to explore social defence theory's recognised problem with 
change. It was triggered when social defences appeared during a coaching-
consulting project the author was working on where a traditional Tavistock-style 
action-research intervention failed.  
 
A review of the social defence and wider Tavistock literatures, and the post-fact 
analysis of the case, revealed problems with both the theory and method that may 
assist with this problem of change.  
 
This started with Menzies’ (1960) sociological innovation of SDT that social defences 
are more than psychic phenomena but get built into organisational systems, 
structures and culture. The implication is that social defences take on a social quality 
and nature that becomes independent of the people involved: “an aspect of external 
reality that old and new members must come to terms” (Menzies, 1960: 101; Menzies 
Lyth, 1989: 26-44).  
 
However, this does not tell us how they operate socially, why they appear in some 
organisations and not others, and what social defences will go on to do, without 
intervention. Nor does it tell us what consultants should do about them. Menzies 
(1960) focused instead on detailing the psychological reasons for social defences 
and how they affect individuals and undermine task-performance. Her later writing 
similarly develops the psychological dimensions of SDT, and interventions to help 
individuals and teams come to grips with their situation (Menzies Lyth, 1989; 1990). 
In fact, she increasingly grew pessimistic about organisations as adequate containers 
of anxiety and about changing them.      
 
Trist, Emery and Jaques provided clues on how the sociological dimension of SDT 
may be developed. This included that both sociological and psychological theories 
are needed to make sense of consulting projects, and to experiment with seeing 
social defences as causes and symptoms. The organisational literature indicated that 
organisational level change is qualitatively different, in addition to individual and team 
change. Changing individuals and teams will not necessarily change the 
organisation.  
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Menzies was aware that individual and team change was often not enough to 
address social defences. She suggested that "an institution affects the personality 
structure of its members" leading members to "introject and identify with the 
institution" and become "like the institution in significant ways" and "to change 
members one may first need to change the institution" (Menzies Lyth, 1989: 26; 41-
42, italics included). It was this quote that first alerted us to the parallels with Mary 
Douglas' cultural theory and with its institutional focus which was used to develop 
Menzies’ sociological innovation.  
 
The research revealed difficulties with the method, particularly in business 
environments. The social defence intervention failed as it was not taken seriously by 
the senior team. It did not appeal to their business or 'finance' rationality. CT 
contends that competing rationalities can as easily promote conflict and stasis, as 
they can problem-solving. The senior team showed interest when possible causes 
were presented – how their post-GFC policies exacerbated the Manufacturing-Sales 
‘fault-line'. But they baulked at our attempts to initiate their analysis through action-
research intervention – an OD and psychoanalytic-consultant's rationality. What was 
missing was a forecast of what the social defences would cause if unattended.   
 
In order to appeal to the senior team's rationality, explanations of the causes and 
consequences of social defences may have helped. A realist causal approach was 
then integrated with Tavistock interpretive methods (Long, 2013) and interventions 
that allow clients to conduct their analysis and problem-solving (Lawrence, 2000). 
Our research involved several iterations of data analysis to arrive at the most viable 
explanation of case-outcomes.   
 
 
Reconceptualising Social Defences as Informal Institutions 
The key research finding reconceptualised social defences as informal institutions 
driven by the organising logic, values and thought-style of one or a mix of CT's 
elementary forms. Analysis of thought-style better pointed to the causes and 
consequences of the social defences when they consolidated compared to their 
basic assumption defensive pattern when they first manifested.    
 
Nevertheless, the research underscored the value of SDT by identifying social 
defences as the first sign that something was going wrong. But alone, it could not 
adequately tell us why, or what may happen next. Only when SDT was integrated 
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with a CT analysis, drawing on the three analytical models, could the causes and 
consequences of social defences be identified – and then can interventions that 
better appeal to business leaders' rationality and organisational-level 
(transformational) change be developed.  
 
 
Recommendation for CT, SDT and Psychoanalytic Consultants 
If cultural theorists can take emotional data as being relevant - something that 
unfortunately Douglas warned against - this can speed up CT's responsiveness in 
real-time versus post-mortem organisational diagnosis. Emotional data (such as 
social defences) can be seen as appeals to different thought-styles, and to search for 
the social or political dimensions underlying anxiety and anomie. This may be the first 
sign or warning that change in the realignment of elementary forms, within or 
between institutions, is in process.  
 
Similarly, if SDT and psychoanalytic-consultants follow Trist's 1950 recommendation 
that both sociological and psychological theories are needed to account for the real-
life complexity of action-research projects, this may greatly improve the prospect of 
bringing about organisational level change. Psychological phenomena in 
organisations take on sociological dimensions – thought-style, values and ways of 
organising - that may assist consultants better account for the unconscious dynamics 
they are observing.  
 
This thesis represents one way of integrating psychoanalytic theory and consulting 
methods with sociological theories and models to develop the sociological 
dimensions of SDT, and with this, to better explain and forecast the causes and 
consequences of social defences, and to help bring about organisational-level 
change. We found that unconscious dynamics importantly warn that something is 
going wrong, but only revealing them is not enough to either explain the situation, 
forecast what may occur next or help us do something about them.  
 
After all, the purpose of consulting through the psychoanalytic study of organisations 
...  is to bring about change ... organisational change and not only individual and 
team change.     
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